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ABSTRACT 
This combined theory/practice research project investigates and mobilises 
negativity in painting. The written thesis does so by developing an interpretive 
method which identifies two de-subjectifying signifying processes in paintings, 
called poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution. The thesis proposes that these 
signifying processes structure an aesthetic practicing of negativity which 
disaggregates meaning. An investigation of philosophical texts (by Kristeva, 
Merleau-Ponty, Kant, Nietzsche, Adorno, Lyotard, Derrida and Irigaray) and art 
historical interpretations (by Koerner and Marin) of certain poetic and sublime 
paintings, services an understanding of these sublime and poetic practices of 
negativity. 
The thesis explores the tensions and correspondences between negative aesthetics 
and philosophical deconstruction. It explores the irreducible inter-relation between 
experiencing aesthetic negativity in painting and understanding the discursive 
implications of practices of negativity. Such a dialectics enables a critique of 
philosophical deconstruction which degrades the autonomy of aesthetic experience, 
and of the feminist deconstructions of ecriture feminine which conflate textual 
practices of negativity with a politics of the feminine. This research project is a 
contribution to a revival of negative aesthetics after the impact of philosophical 
deconstruction. 
As an applied investigation into aesthetic negativity, this thesis explores how 
selected paintings by C.D. Friedrich, Nicholas Poussin, J. M. W.Turner and Mark 
Rothko invite poetic or sublime practices of negativity. These insights are extended 
into a discussion of how the contemporary painting and visual art practices of Glenn 
Brown, Jeremy Wafer, Rosa Lee and Therese Oulton, invite a double register of 
interpretation. This doubling records the experiential impact of aesthetic practices of 
sublime and poetic negativity, and an understanding of the deconstructive 
significance of these painting practices. I suggest that my own paintings likewise 
engage a dialectical relation between the negativity of sublime experience, and the 
positivity of understanding their discursive and political significance. 
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NEGATIVITY IN PAINTING. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research questions and methods. 
This thesis investigates the tensions and correspondences between aesthetic 
negativity in paintings and the negativities of philosophical deconstruction. It 
does so by developing a dialectical interpretive method which identifies how two 
de-subjectifying signifying processes called poetic ambiguity and sublime 
irresolution, invite aesthetic practices of negativity. This interpretive method 
engages the irreducible inter-relation between practices of negativity which 
register as aesthetic experience, and the positivities of understanding, which 
engage comparison and analysis. In making these distinctions, this thesis 
challenges deconstructive methods which degrade the dialectical relation 
between aesthetic experience and understanding, and which conflate the 
negativities of the feminine with those of deconstructive and textual practices of 
negativity. 
This investigation 1 was initially prompted by a set of questions in which I tried 
to understand what a deconstructive feminine sublime was, and how paintings 
were, in some sense, unspeakable. During the course of this study those 
immense, but unclear, questions have been more usefully addressed via the 
philosophical term called negativity. Such negativity may be aesthetic, 
deconstructive or feminine, all of which respectively exist in a relation to the 
positivities of understanding, a metaphysics of presence or the masculine. 
From a traditional and binarist perspective, these relations between positivity 
and negativity are structured by a fixed hierarchy in which the positive terms 
are privileged. Poststructural theory, feminism, and deconstruction in particular, 
have rearticulated that relation so that negativity, in its various manifestations, 
1 As an academic teacher and an artist working in South Africa from 1986 to 2002, feminist and deconstructive practices 
informed much of my working life. That historical period, in which the cultural boycott, apartheid and then post-apartheid, 
propelled all South Africans into new cultural alignments, demanded the deconstruction of both racial and phallocentric 
hierarchies. The feminist, postmodern, and post colonial courses that I taught were part of an artistic culture needing to 
define that historical moment. Moving full time to Britain, and embarking on this research project. was an opportunity to 
interrogate such knowledges and my relation to them. 
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no longer occupies its traditional and denigrated place. Instead, practices of 
negativity, textual, philosophical, aesthetic or political, are valuable discursive 
possibilities where the 'positivity' of negativity is foregrounded, even as the 
'negativity' of negativity is sustained. 
I had no difficulties with a poststructural project which valorises and invites 
practices of negativity. My difficulties pertained firstly to the question of how 
deconstructive negativity relates to aesthetic negativity. Are these negativities 
in competition? Secondly, if paintings engage the feminine sublime, or a 
postmodern sublime, or a post colonial sublime, how do these (deconstructively 
appropriate) categories of understanding relate to sublime aesthetic 
experience? Thirdly, how did paintings deliver sublime or poetic negativity? 
These questions emerged at a time when my painting practice shifted its 
emphasis from a pre-occupation with post colonial predicaments to an 
exploration of internal, and ever proliferating, landscapes. I had moved to 
Britain from South Africa and several commentators suggested that these new 
paintings registered something of the feminine sublime. In attempting to 
understand what such a feminine sublime might entail, I turned to selected 
philosophical texts, initially Christine Battersby's The Phenomenal Woman and 
subsequently Joanna Zylinska's On Spiders, Cyborgs and Being Scared: the 
Feminine and the Sublime. These texts critique a traditional sublime subject 
position authored by Kant's Analytic of the Sublime. Zylinska's text theorises a 
feminine sublime, understood as a de-subjectifying textual possibility which 
confounds binarist categories and mobilises an indeterminacy not subumed into 
rational understanding. 
I however remained perplexed by these philosophical engagements with the 
feminine and the sublime. I was worried that these deconstructive, feminist and 
philosophical critiques could not record the impact, or richness, of the aesthetic 
experience in painting. Indeed, there seemed to be another power relation at 
work, insofar as such philosophical texts in emphasising the disruptive 
properties of feminine textual practice and the criticality of feminist and 
philosophical analysis, ignored the disruptive and critical properties of traditional 
aesthetic practices of negativity in paintings. From this perspective paintings 
and visual art practices seemed to be theorised through supplements more 
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attuned to the protocols of philosophy than to the disruptive possibilities of 
painting. Furthermore, given the general endorsement of Irigaray's 
philosophical and deconstructive tactics in feminist visual art practice in the 
1990's, I was puzzled by the question of how paintings could simultaneously 
code the negativities of a feminist politics and the aesthetic negativities of the 
sublime. 
These questions necessitated the development of a method which identified 
what negativity in painting might entail, and how we might contextualise and 
understand its de-subjectifying effects. This resulted in identifying two signifying 
processes called poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution, conceived as de-
subjectifying signifying processes which disable conceptual mastery and invite 
the viewer into an aesthetic practicing of negativity. These operations preserve 
the boundary between the negativities of aesthetic experience and the 
positivities of understanding, thereby sustaining the autonomy2 of the aesthetic 
negativity. That being so, these signifying processes also engage categories of 
understanding, inasmuch as they also draw on conventional understanding, and 
on our embodied and phenomenal responses, our innermost drives, our 
discursive prejudices and our aesthetic competences. 
This thesis has drawn on the art historical insights of J.L. Koerner and Louis 
Marin, who respond to, but do not identify, the two signifying processes called 
poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution in their analyses of selected paintings 
by C. D. Friedrich and Nicholas Poussin. The thesis identifies the operations of 
poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution in painting, by synthesising my 
insights sketched above, with these art historical interpretative insights, and 
with a philosophical understanding of negativity. 
Diana Coole's book negativity and politics: Dionysus and dialectics from Kant to 
poststructuralism, although an account of dialectical negativity in politics, was a 
very useful entry point for understanding negative aesthetics in philosophy. This 
2 Aesthetic autonomy has been critiqued in postmodern culture from a variety of perspectives, the most significant being a 
critique of the idea that the autonomy of art is a register of a-historical, non-discursive 'truth'. My use of this term is not 
informed by such an understanding. Instead, following Adorno, the autonomy of aesthetic experience is a logical outcome 
of a dialectics of negative aesthetics. For aesthetic practices of negativity are both discursive products and autonomous 
events. The autonomy of aesthetic negativity from this perspective is not only a critique of reason, but also preserves the 
boundary between the negativities of experience and the positivities of rational understanding. 
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thesis has engaged aesthetic negativity in philosophical texts from two 
perspectives: those theories which engage dialectical negativity, namely those 
of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Julia Kristeva, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Theodor Adorno and Jean-Francois Lyotard; and secondly via selected texts by 
Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray which both invite and theorise deconstructive 
practices of negativity. 
This thesis finds its answers in a dialectical method and generally critiques 
deconstructive methods. The dialectical method developed in this study marks 
the precarious gap, or irreducible inter-relation, between aesthetic experience 
and understanding. This method allows us to register the specificity of aesthetic 
experience, even as it enables an understanding of how sublime and poetic 
painting and visual art practices mobilise negativity, and how they acquire 
postmodern, post colonial and feminist identities. This method sustains an 
engagement with the de-subjectifying possibilities of paintings without 
conflating them with the feminine, or degrading the autonomy of aesthetic 
experience. 
1.2. Aims and argument. 
This thesis makes the case that selected paintings from the 17th century to the 
present, address the viewer via de-subjectifying signifying processes that invite 
the practicing of poetic or sublime negativity. Each painting is a particular 
enactment of this possibility. The argument being that these signifying 
processes make meaning fail, insofar as meaning is rendered poetically 
ambiguous or sublimely irresolvable. We might however understand something 
of such aesthetic specific practices of negativity. We can understand that these 
signifying processes disable understanding, and we might even be able to 
understand how they do so. We are also able to understand how such aesthetic 
practices of negativity are different to philosophical, or feminist practices of 
negativity. In short, although these practices of negativity register the 
autonomy of aesthetic experience, how they do so, can also be understood. 
The thesis explores the correspondences and tensions between dialectical and 
deconstructive methods through a selection of contemporary paintings and 
visual art practices. Both deconstructive practices of negativity and the 
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aesthetic negativities of poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution, de-subjectify 
the viewer/reader. This thesis endorses Christoph Menke's argument in his book 
titled The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida, that 
philosophical deconstruction presumes an antagonism between these practices 
of negativity insofar as it degrades aesthetic negativity in favour of a more 
general non-aesthetic, or textual, practicing of negativity. It is from this 
perspective that this thesis critiques Derrida's and Irigaray's deconstructive 
methods which degrade the autonomy of aesthetic negativity, and conflate the 
negativities of the feminine with those of textual and aesthetic practices of 
negativity. 
This thesis responds to such deconstructive methods by emphasising the 
irreducible inter-relation between aesthetic experience and understanding and 
by revisiting the dialectical possibilities of a discourse of aesthetic negativity. As 
such this thesis mobilises Kant's insight whereby an "aesthetic idea cannot 
become a cognition, because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an 
adequate concept can never be found" (Kant 1952, 210). It draws on Adorno's 
aesthetic theory, which like Kant's preserves the autonomy of aesthetic 
negativity. It mobilises Lyotard's diagnostic question "Is it happening?" which 
registers aesthetic negativity as an untheorisable and unspeakable event 
discursively at work in paintings. This thesis also makes recourse to Kristeva's 
poetics of negativity, and Merleau-Ponty's dialectical 'chiasm' which both invite 
the practicing of negativity. 
If these philosophers provide a theoretical platform for understanding negative 
aesthetics, this thesis also investigates how paintings deliver an aesthetics of 
negativity. Such an analytical pragmatics investigates how the modalities of 
poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution in selected paintings by CD. Friedrich, 
Nicholas Poussin, J.M.W. Turner, Glenn Brown, Jeremy Wafer, Rosa Lee and 
Therese Oulton, sustain the paradoxical threshold between the negativities of 
aesthetic experience and the positivities of understanding the discursive 
significance of such practices of negativity. 
In summary, the aims of this written thesis are to develop a dialectical 
interpretive method for both understanding some of the framing conditions of 
practices of negativity, and experiencing negativity in painting. This thesis 
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develops this interpretive method by attending to the de-subjectifying effects of 
the signifying processes called poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution in 
paintings. This dialectical method marks a paradoxical threshold between the 
negativity of aesthetic experience and understanding, which both enables us to 
understand the distinctions between various practices of negativity, and to 
understand what negativity is, even as it is also unable to deliver any aesthetic 
experience of negativity. Such delivery is the unique property, or the gift, of 
paintings and visual art practices, and of the relation between such artworks 
and the viewer. 
Mobilising negativity in painting is quite a different project to identifying its de-
subjectifying effects and its discursive contexts. Delivering an account of 
negativity in painting requires a vocabulary, a context and an identification of 
processes which invite the practicing of negativity. The ensuing investigation of 
paintings, art historical and philosophical texts, enables me to conclude this 
research project with an account of how my paintings invite a dialectical relation 
between sublime practices of negativity and a politics of the feminine. 
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Chapter One 
Poetic Ambiguity. 
2.1. Introduction. 
This chapter identifies a signifying process in painting called poetic ambiguity 
which disables the positivities of understanding and invites the practicing of 
negativity. The overall thesis will develop an understanding of an aesthetics of 
negativity in an attempt to demonstrate how poetic ambiguity continues to 
invite the practicing of negativity in contemporary paintings. In this chapter 
poetic ambiguity is identified as an effect of selected paintings by Caspar David 
Friedrich (Garden Terrace 1811-12, Cross in the Mountains 1807-8) and which 
exists as a processual encounter between the painting and the viewer where 
meaning is made ambiguous. It is such failure, or disaggregation, of meaning 
that registers as poetic experience. 
Kristeva's essay titled Giotto's Joy in her book Desire in Language: A Semiotic 
Approach to Literature and Art, 1980, translated by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine 
and Leon S. Roudiez, together with selected passages from her book Revolution 
in Poetic Language/ 1984, translated by Margaret Waller; and Merleau-Ponty's 
chapter titled The Intertwining - The Chiasm in the book The Visible and the 
Invisible, 1968, translated by Alphonso Lingis, all engage an aesthetics of 
negativity. The art historical and literary insights of J.L. Koerner in Caspar David 
Friedrich: the subject of the landscape, 1990, and Jonathan Culler's 
Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism/ Linguistics and the Study of Literature, 
1975, engage the critical possibilities of a romantic poetics. A synthesis of these 
philosophical, art historical and literary insights, together with a description of 
my own experience of Friedrich's Garden Terrace, services the development of a 
dialectical interpretive method that both enables us to identify poetic negativity 
in painting and to understand some of its discursive implications. 
Koerner's and Culler's engagements with poetic meaning register it as a 
condition of the dialectical relation between the viewer and the painting or 
literary text/ and of the complexities of signification structured by paintings or 
literary texts. Kristeva's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophical models theorise the 
14 
possibility that poetic practices of negativity de-subjectify the viewer into an 
openness to differences. Kristeva's idea of the poetic as an unstable threshold 
between the negativities of the semiotic and the positivities of the symbolic, 
makes it a condition of the subject-in-process, whose own heterogeneity is 
demonstrated in this process. It is an acknowledgement of this unassimilable 
heterogeneity that provokes the viewer of a painting or the reader of a poetic 
text, into an openness to differences. Merleau-Ponty's engagements with 
negativity are activated by a phenomenological and experiential figure called 
'the flesh', a performative process in which the viewer is unable to preserve 
hierarchical distinctions and is opened to differences. 
This chapter will demonstrate how these philosophical models contribute to an 
understanding of the complexities of the operations of poetic ambiguity, whose 
identity is not confined to anyone of these models, but whose operations are 
clarified through the comparison. Poetic ambiguity in painting cannot be defined 
by what it is, but only by what it does, and how it invites the practicing of 
negativity. It addresses the viewer as a de-subjectifying experience. Each poetic 
practice addresses this possibility differently, and each viewer brings different 
expectations and competences to their processes of interpretation. That being 
so, this thesis proposes that poetiC ambiguity has a constant identity insofar as 
it invites the practicing of negativity by disaggregating meaning, thereby de-
subjectifying the viewer. Such de-subjectification is an effect of the viewer 
being unable to install the positivities of conceptual understanding, and thereby 
unable to secure the boundaries which sustain the distinctions which secure an 
integrated 'self'. The de-subjectifying effects of poetic ambiguity are thus similar 
to the de-subjectifying effects of philosophical deconstruction. This thesis will 
demonstrate (in the last two chapters), how such resemblances are put under 
pressure by deconstructive methods which degrade the autonomy of aesthetic 
negativity. 
This chapter, like Kristeva's discussion of the Semiotic and the Symbolic in her 
book Revolution in Poetic Language, presumes that aesthetic and poetic 
experience is to some extent unspeakable. If, for Kristeva poetic negativity 
records the unspeakableness of the semiotic drives, this chapter proposes that 
poetic negativity is the effect of a particular dialectical process inaugurated and 
structured by the painting and registered as an aesthetic experience by the 
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viewer. This processual practicing of negativity resists 'being spoken' because it 
is the unique property of the experiential relation between the viewer and the 
painting. The interpretive method developed in this thesis spans the precarious 
divide between unspeakable practices of negativity which register as aesthetic 
experience, and the positivities of understanding, which enable us to identify 
and compare different practices of negativity. The chapter concludes by 
demonstrating how the negativities of poetic ambiguity are to be distinguished 
from the negativities of the feminine. 
2.2. Garden Terrace 
The following account of my engagement with Caspar David Friedrich's Garden 
Terrace 1811-12 (Figure 1) records how this painting produced an experience of 
poetic ambiguity. This painting, I suggest, engages the viewer by setting up a 
mobile, poetic and ambiguous relation between a variety of signs. For example, 
the Ruckenfigurl, a seated young woman reading a book, is turned away from 
the viewer and faces into the landscape. The meanings of this Ruckenfigur, are 
part of a signifying process that organises the viewer's interpretation, which is 
both unified and destabilized by a process of interpretation/mis-interpretation. 
This process starts as the viewer's gaze enters under the red cloth which covers 
the basket, associated with the female Ruckenfigur, and passes past the statue, 
through to the gate guarded by lions. From this threshold, which is both an 
opening and part of a strict grid of horizontals and verticals of trees, lawn and 
wall, the viewer's gaze extends into the landscape over the pOinted roofs of the 
houses and past the peaks, and continues into the mysterious and 'sublime' 
light of the far distance. This gaze then shifts to the left of the picture frame, to 
return to the foreground and into the enigmatic basket and its red hood. Here a 
divide is set up, between the foreground and the background, even as both are 
unified by the mobility of this visual circuit. Koerner claims that this painting 
establishes the "alterity of the landscape .... (which affirms) .... a split between 
the self and the world" (Koerner 1990, 114). 
This unified yet mobile circuit, available to interpretation and understanding is 
undone by poetic ambiguities, as inexplicable accommodations and resistances 
lKoerner identifies the Ruckenfigur in Friedrich's paintings as a device which endorses the subjectivity of the viewer by 
figuring an introspective and substitutional 'self. 
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Figure 1: CD. Friedrich. Garden Terrace. 1811-12 
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of meaning. For example, the circuit is disrupted when the meanings of the 
enigmatic basket are both clarified and contradicted by the metonymic slippage 
from the red cloth to the red flowers circling the base of the statue of a woman 
facing us with her arms open, and the relation between this statue of Flora, and 
the Ruckenfigur. These disruptions invite a complex array of meanings ranging 
from the inscription of a traditional sexualised femininity and its associations 
with fecundity, domesticity and nature and something else, not entirely 
specified, but hinted at as sexual and potent. These traditional feminine 
meanings are both interrupted, and reiterated by the inclusion of the young 
woman reading her book, her position in relation to the viewer, and her relation 
to the fecund figure of the statue facing the viewer. The complex poetic 
structure of the painting does "not express an either/or relationship but instead 
offer(s) several levels of interpretation" (Hofmann 2000, 251). Here 
unexplained complexities set up resistances and recuperations of meaning 
which challenge the unities described above. 
This ambiguous disaggregation of meaning registers as an aesthetic experience. 
My argument is that via such a structured2 process the viewer is opened to 
multiple and mobile disaggregations of meaning, and that such a poetic and 
aesthetic experience has both dialectical and de-subjectifying consequences 
because the viewer is unable to impose conceptual categories which secure 
unambiguous meaning and an integrated sense of self. 
The negativity of poetic and aesthetic experience is thus constituted by a 
dialectical relation between the negativities of aesthetic experience and the 
positivities of understanding. Here a double dialectics is at work: firstly insofar 
as poetic experience registers as an unspeakable practicing of negativity, and 
where such an invitation registers a dialectical relation between the negativities 
of aesthetic experience and understanding, whose positivities are displaced by 
such an event. Secondly a dialectical and processual relation exists between the 
viewer and the painting. For although the painting inaugurates poetic 
2Culler's essay registers the impact of structuralism on literary interpretation, and usefully, from the perspective of this 
thesis, identifies poetic texts as the product of certain conventions. However, against the idea that poetic meaning is only 
structured by conventions, this study registers poetic ambiguity as a practice of negativity. Aesthetic negativity from this 
perspective is mobilised by a dialectical inter-relation between the structures of the painting and the multiple. contingent 
and contextual expectations and capacities of the viewer. 
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ambiguities, the experience of aesthetic negativity can only be registered by the 
viewer, and through his or her aesthetic and conceptual resources and 
discursive presumptions. The poetic disaggregation of meaning is thus the 
dialectical product of the relation between the viewer and the painting, and an 
effect of the displacement of conceptual mastery that registers as aesthetic 
experience. 
2.3. Kristeva and dialectical negativity. 
In analysing the structure of Lyric poetry, Jonathan Culler claims that "there is 
plausibility to Julia Kristeva's claim that poetic language involves a constant 
passage from subject to non-subject, and that 'in this other space where the 
logic of speech is unsettled, the subject is dissolved and in the place of the sign 
is instituted the collision of signifiers canceling one another' "(Culler 1975, 170). 
Kristeva's essay titled Giotto's Joy in Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach 
to Literature and Art, details a dialectical poetics as an encounter with 
unassimilable difference. For Kristeva, this dialectical relation is mobilized in 
signs between the discursive positivity of the symbolic, and that which is 
heterogeneous to symbolic discourse, the negativity of the semiotic. Kristeva's 
essay investigates the dialectical relation between the negativities of the 
semiotic and the negations of the symbolic. 
In this regard, according to Kristeva, colour in Giotto's paintings in the Arena 
Chapel in Padua, has a psychological effect that exceeds an economy of 
communication and where "artistic function introduces a pivotal order into the 
symbolic order (the order of 'thought' according to Freud's terminology). This 
pivotal order - both an "energetic pressure" (instinctual drive) and an imprint 
(signifier) modifies both the symbolic .... and thing presentations"(Kristeva 
1980, 218). This dialectical, mobile pivot that colour in painting is, thus 
"suggests an elementary formal apparatus" (ibid) that is capable of addressing 
both the jouissance (Giotto's Joy) of the body, and the repression of that 
"instinctual pressure under the impact of censorship as a sign in a system of 
representation" (ibid, 219). For Kristeva, colour in painting thus conceived, 
occupies the same position as that of poetic language in literature. It is a 
register of a dialectical process which both overcomes, and preserves, the 
oppositions between 'instinctual pressures' and signification. 
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Both dialectics and negativity are terms which Hegel brought into philosophy as 
part of a form of reasoning that attempts to grasp the relationships between 
oppositions as components of a dynamic whole. According to Diana Coole, 
Hegel's development of this form of mobile and synthesizing reasoning is 
located in the understanding that finite things cannot exist on their own, but are 
part of a larger whole. The motor of dialectics is contradiction, available to 
humans through reason rather than intuition, and consists of a process of 
affirmation and denial, which overcomes dualities like being and nothingness, 
subject and object, identity and difference. This Hegelian dialectic refuses the 
fixed binaries implicit in Kantian thought. It presupposes that contradictions can 
be overcome because there is movement between oppositions, so that the 
differences between oppositions are both annulled and preserved. Diana Coole 
argues that the motor of this movement between oppositions is a process of 
dialectical negativity which for Hegel is "both a process of becoming and an 
explanation. It delineates both a choreography and a generative force. It 
describes both the rhythms of becoming and their ontology" (Coole 2000, 45). 
In Hegel's master/slave dialectic it is knowledge or self-consciousness that 
effects the reconciliation of contradictions which structure historical identities 
and inequalities. And equally important, it is the negativity of the contradiction 
between the master's being for himself (in his own desire) and the slave's being 
for himself (in fear) that is the necessary condition of that reconciliation. 
Negativity in the Hegelian sense depends on "the way in which oppositions are 
mobile, because of their internal relationships of positive and negative, and 
resolvable in so far as dialectical logic permits a both/and yet eschews its 
instability. This process 'can only be stated as an unrest of incompatibles, as a 
movement' (Logic:91)". (Coole 2000, 46) 
Kristeva's idea of dialectical negativity as a mobile process derives from Hegel. 
But for Kristeva, dialectical negativity is a mobile condition of rupture and 
rejection, rather than of reconciliation. It is against Hegel's 'subordinating' 
conception of Becoming 3 that Kristeva articulates a conception of negativity 
situated in the gap between 'the semiotic' and 'the symbolic', as the condition of 
3In Revolution and Poetic Language, Kristeva criticises Hegel for reorganising contradictions in terms of a productive 
dissolution or an affirmative negativity in which becoming subordinates and "erases, the moment of rupture"(Kristeva 
1984,113). 
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both poetic meaning and poetic rupture in texts. Colour in painting is a device 
which both unifies and shatters "meaning and its subject into a scale of 
differences" (Kristeva 1980, 221). Here, colour operates in terms of a disruptive 
process not available to conceptual and rational logic. The negativity of colour's 
'anti-logic' is a differentiating and multiplying one that exists "outside semantics 
... as dynamic law, rhythm, interval, gesture" (ibid). Colour in painting is thus a 
device for transgressing or rupturing that which is symbolically and discursively 
regulated, even as it is also ultimately subject to that regulation. Colour is a 
dialectical hinge that exists between the painting and the viewer's instinctual 
responses, and registers the ideological value that an era would place upon 
those instinctual pressures. In this schema, colour 'pulverizes' the unity of the 
viewing subject, and is a 'proto-deconstructive'4 device that displaces meaning 
and invites the practicing of negativity. 
For Kristeva this is a process in which the positivities of the symbolic are put 
under pressure from the disruptions of the semiotic, even as these negativities 
in turn, are subject to symbolic law. Such a poetiCS of colour is a momentary 
event. This is both poetiC experience and an ethical hiatus which opens the 
viewer to irreconcilable differencess. A poetic event renders the subject in-
process, oscillating between self and otherness, between the discursive 
symbolic and the unsymbolisable heterogeneity of the semiotic. This is a 
practice of negativity which registers the incommensurability of the drives and 
of discursive regulation. 
It is the dialectical disruption by the semiotic genotext of the symbolic 
phenotext, that Kristeva associates with negativity proper, for it is as a process, 
41n Revolution and Poetic Language, Kristeva marks the affinities between her conception of the semiotic and Derrida's 
terms "trace and gramme"(Kristeva 1984, 40), also conceived of as signifying disruptions. Kristeva however emphasises 
that the semiotic is tied to the body and the drives, rather than only to the play of difference in language. 
SKelly Oliver's discussion of Kristeva's Outlaw Ethics in the book titled Reading Kristeva: Unravelling the Double-bind 
makes a similar point. Oliver points out that Kristeva links identity and negativity, not in a synthetic dialectic. but as an 
unstable threshold that oscillates between law and transgression. The three discourses which negotiate this threshold are 
those of poetic language, maternity and psychoanalysis. Poetic language occupies a disruptive and negative position vis a 
vis the positivities and tyrannies of traditional philosophy and culture. "From Plato's imaginary republic to Stalin's brutal 
dictatorship, censorship has been the sign of repression, tyranny and death. Poetry signals tolerance in a society. The 
openness to poetry is the openness to difference" (Oliver 1993,182). Poetic language from this perspective is the 
enactment of an ethics of negativity. This according to Oliver is an outlaw ethics which involves destabilising or 
pulverising established identities. Poetic language from this perspective is an enactment of the 'subject-in-process' on-
trial. This is the articulation of a provisional heterogeneity that can never be fully captured by symbolic discourse and can 
only be "practiced to the point ofloss" (ibid). 
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as an untheorisable relation between the drives and conceptualisation, that 
conceptual mastery is disrupted. All other signifying disruptions are part of the 
operations of the phenotext6 and are defined as negations, not negativities7 • 
Negations from this perspective, do not constitute poetic meaning because they 
do not transgress or disrupt the symbolic order. 
Against Kristeva's distinction between non-discursive negativity and discursive 
negation, this thesis proposes that negativity exists in a dialectical relation 
between the viewer and the text, and within signification in the text itself. From 
this perspective, "colour, rhythm, interval, gesture" (Kristeva 1980, 221) are 
not necessarily understood as negativities in themselves (although they can be 
used as such) but as signifiers whose effects are activated within a relation to 
other signs. The effects of 'aesthetic ideas', like colour and tone, are part of a 
range of signs and signifying practices of negativity, whose import is always 
discursive, yet whose poetic effects in ensemble with other signs, are in some 
sense unspeakable. Unlike Kristeva, this thesis does not only associate such an 
unspeakable poetics with the disruptive qualities of colour per se, but with how 
colour, and other signifying features/ are used within the texts. 
My claim being that poetic processes address the viewer's imagination, instinct, 
embodied drives, conceptual knowledge and deeply situated ideological 
assumptions. The de-subjectifying effects of such poetic processes are not, in 
this view, an effect of the binarist and antagonistic relation between instinctual 
pressure and symbolic discourse. Instead the viewer experiences poetic 
ambiguity when he or she is unable to make meaning cohere, in spite of 
deploying a whole range of meaning making systems. Chromatic or tonal 
experience may be constituents of poetic and signifying processes which disable 
conceptual mastery. From this perspective, the antagonistic relation between 
the negativity of colour, and the positivity of understanding, is determined by a 
set of ideological interests and histories that preserve such a hierarchy, rather 
than in terms of any essential feature of colour itself. 
6For Kristeva the relation between the genotext (the semiotic disposition of the text) and the phenotext (the actual text) is a 
dialectical and oscillational one, which ruptures, rather than reconciles contradictions. 
7See Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic Language Chapter 2 Negativity: Rejection page 124. 
8In Giotto's' Joy Kristeva details how colour is used as a device which volumizes form. Here colour operates within an 
ensemble of semic devices which sets up disruptive and ambiguous reading of pictorial space and figuration. so that "color 
tears these figures away from the walls' plane, giving them a depth related to, but also distinct from. a search for 
perspective" (Kristeva 1980, 225-226). 
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Although there are differences between the understanding of the operation of 
poetic ambiguity promoted in this study, and Kristeva's dialectical poetics, 
Kristeva's model enables us to think productively about how poetic texts 
mobilize negativity, and indeed also how affective 'signs' like colour contribute 
to poetic experience. Unlike Kristeva, this chapter claims that poetic ambiguity, 
a de-subjectifying signifying process at work in paintings, is not predicated on 
the binary distinction between non-discursive drives and symbolic discourse. 
This thesis proposes that the negativities of poetic experience are dialectically 
constituted by the positivities of understanding, even as they are inaugurated 
by multiple interchanges between the viewer and the painting as an address of 
our instinctual drives, embedded knowledges and discursive prejudices. 
2.4. Romantic poetics 
According to Jonathan Culler, in his essay Poetics of the Lyric in his book 
Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism/ Linguistics and the Study of Literature, lyric 
poetry is identifiable in terms of its structure and its rules of signification. To 
write a poem is to mobilize a set of expectations of how it will be read and 
which possible interpretations may be made from it. Poetic artifacts are situated 
in aesthetic practices which involve the knowledge and participation of informed 
readers. Culler discusses romantic lyric poetry in terms of four structural 
categories: distance and deixis (the impersonality of the text and its internal 
oscillations); organic wholes (which include binary oppositions and their 
dialectical resolution by a third term); theme and epiphany (the significance of 
the poem and its poetic structure); and lastly resistance and recuperation (in 
which a variety of rhetorical operations like metaphor and metonymy are used 
to mobilize poetic meaning). This account of the structural properties of lyric 
poetry conceives of it as a discursive practice. For Culler, we read lyric poetry as 
poetic because we know what the poetic is. 
I suggest that the signifying process called poetic ambiguity is also an effect of 
particular structures. However, against Culler's structuralist account of the 
'deep structure' of poetic texts, the account of poetic ambiguity developed in 
this chapter presents it as an effect of a processual relation in which meaning is 
made ambiguous. Each painting mobilises this relation in its own particular way. 
Each artist develops this possibility from a repertoire of signifying systems, and 
each viewer brings different expectations and competences to an encounter 
with poetic negativity. 
].L. Koerner's discussion of the paintings of Friedrich, in his book titled Caspar 
David Friedrich and the subject of the landscape, explores how Friedrich's 
paintings mobilise a process which renders meaning ambiguous. This process is 
structured by two opposing terms: Erlibiniskunst and Eigentumlichkeit, in which 
the autonomy of the subject is perpetually put under pressure by the truth of 
experience. These two terms are part of a romantic repertoire that informs 
Friedrich's paintings, which according to Koerner, hover between a sense of 
belonging and a sense of estrangement, or between the incompatible functions 
of allegory and symbol. Paradox, estrangement and irony are all devices which 
unsettle the viewer, even as he/she is confirmed as the subject of the 
landscape. Such processual poetic ambiguity, semic excess and uncertainty 
alert the viewer to his/her relational incompleteness. Friedrich's trope of the 
Ruckenfigur, as the sublime wanderer, never-at-home, always in process, a sign 
of our own belatedness, is the paradigmatic emblem of this processual failure of 
meaning. This process renders the viewer as the subject of the landscape, even 
as it destabilizes that viewership. Such a poetics mobilizes binaries, only to 
confound them (compare Culler's schema in which organic wholes involve the 
negotiation of binaries and their resolution by a third term). 
For example, Koerner details how in encountering Friedrich's Cross in the 
Mountains 1807-8 (Figure 2) the viewer is positioned as if he/she had come 
across this crucifix in the mountains at a moment in time. This 'realism' flouts 
the conventions of traditional landscape painting by undercutting the traditional 
subject/object distinctions that inform it. Here the viewer is both outside this 
scene as a viewer of the whole scene, and participant in it, insofar as he/she 
identifies with the Ruckenfigur, crucified Christ. Insofar as traditional landscape 
painting established visual continuities with devices like overlapping and linear 
perspective, The Cross in the Mountains positions the viewer both across from, 
and below, the rocky outcrop on which the crucifix stands, which induces a 
sense of disequilibrium and anxiety. Oscillations between proximity and 
distance, smallness and immensity, familiarity and strangeness, establishes a 
dialectic which operates by playing system against non-system. 
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Figure 2: CD. Friedrich. The Cross in the Mountains. 1807-08 
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The averted figure of Christ, across the sublime abyss that separates the viewer 
from his substitute self, is a symbol of both becoming and loss. But this 
symbolism is itself thrown into question by the frame of this painting, which 
codes an eye, grapes and bread, which become the allegorical counterparts for 
the II Christ. This, Koerner suggests, opens up a gap in our relation to the 
painting, which then becomes an allegory for deconciliation, lack, loss and 
metaphysical dissolution. The polysemic interplay of all these elements become 
analogies for a moral sentiment, not external to us, but folded into "a 
maddening sense of enfolding without closure, of centres becoming frames and 
of tenors becoming vehicles (which) function to ward off any final statement of 
the painting's meaning. It places at the heart of our experience of the artwork 
not a single message, nor even quite the sheer proliferation of messages, but 
rather an encounter with a process and agency of mediation per se: the 
infinitely meaningful, never exhaustible 'symbol' of which nature, religion, art, 
and community are but so many local inflections" (Koerner 1990, 129). It is this 
inexhaustible process, and the proliferation and ambiguity of meaning, I 
suggest that constitutes that signifying process called poetic ambiguity. 
Koerner only attends to the negativities of what Kristeva would call the 
phenotext, a mobile and discursively active sliding and 'collision of signifiers 
canceling one another', which mobilize a set of expectations, "a set of 
conventions determining how the sequence is to be read and what kinds of 
interpretations may be derived from it" (Culler 1975, 161). This poetic process 
is one not defined by the binarist distinction between the anti-discursive 
negativities of the semiotic and the discursive negations of the symbolic, but by 
the particularities of a poetic process in which meaning is made ambiguous. 
2.5. Merleau-Ponty, practicing negativity and being open to 
differences. 
Merleau-Ponty's idea of 'the flesh' developed in The Intertwining- The Chiasm in 
his book The Visible and the Invisible, 1968, provides a different model for 
understanding how paintings invite the practicing of negativity. Merleau-Ponty's 
idea of 'the flesh' is an anti-binarist, but dialectical possibility, that opens all 
subjects (and objects), including viewers of paintings, to differences. Such an 
encounter is registered within the phenomenological experience of the subject, 
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and thus, unlike a romantic poetics, is not orchestrated by the internal workings 
of a poetic text or painting. Nor is 'the flesh' authored by the relation between 
our instinctual drives and discursive regulation. Instead 'the flesh' emphasises a 
performative and dialectical relation between all oppositions: subjects and 
objects, language and perceptual experience, understanding and aesthetic 
experience, painting and viewer, landscape and painting 9. 
Like both Kristeva's and Koerner's dialectical poetic models, which make the 
relation between texts and viewers a dynamic one, for Merleau-Ponty, the idea 
of the reversibility and intertwinedness ('the flesh') of all phenomena, is 
intended to inspire the practicing of negativity in all circumstances. To do so 
would be to realise that subjects are objects, and that language and perception 
are enfolded in one another. Such reversals displace the hierarchal relation 
between binaries. For 'the flesh' is both a mental abstraction and a field of 
carnal possibilities which displaces the Cartesian mind/body; subject/object 
split, and scrambles the categories of seeing and being seen, touch and the 
tangible. This concept of 'the flesh', whose "reversibility is always imminent and 
never realised in fact" (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 147), allows us to conceive of the 
potential of the ambiguity between relationships, for "if these experiences never 
exactly overlap, if they slip away at the very moment they are about to rejoin, if 
there is always a "shift", a "spread", between them"(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 148), 
we are caught up in a new type of being which is full of possibilities. Such a 
practicing of negativity in which our sensibility is not extracted from our being in 
the world, thus operates as a hinge in which oppositions become reversible 
variants of each other. In this schema we are invited to consider the figure of 
'the flesh' as a dialectical 'hinge' which de-subjectifies us. This de-subjectifying 
process resembles the one identified in this study, where poetic reversals, 
slippages, disaggregations and ambiguities of meaning, invite the practicing of 
negativity. 
The differences between the signifying process called poetiC ambiguity, and 
Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic exchange, are also significant. For although the figure 
of 'the flesh' pOints to the possibilities and processes of practicing negativity via 
9Merleau-Ponty's 'the flesh' has some affinities to Adorno'S negative dialectics, insofar as both these philosophers theorise 
a de-subjectif)dng and dialectical process, that deconstructs a hierarchical relation between binary oppositions. 
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texts and aesthetic events, this phenomenal practicing of negativity is not only 
authored by poetic texts or paintings whose structures de-subjectify the viewer, 
but by the impossibility of ever fixing meaning. 'The flesh' reconfigures the 
fixities of all binarist structures so that meaning is conceived of as shift between 
reader and text. For example, as an intertwining between aesthetic experience 
and understanding, so that both are reconfigured in this process. It is this 
potential reconfiguration between oppositions that opens any 'enfleshed' 
viewers to differences. 
Although written some time before The Intertwining -The Chiasm, Merleau-
Ponty's essay titled Cezanne's Doubt, anticipates some of the themes found in 
this later seminal work. Written partly from the perspective of the artist, 
Cezanne's Doubt struggles to identify what the practicing of negativity involves 
from the artist's point of view. Cezanne's isolation, rejection, doubt and 
contradictory ambitions which aimed at depicting reality while "denying himself 
the means to attain it ... by abandoning himself to the chaos of sensation, 
which would upset the objects and constantly suggest illusions" (Johnson 1993, 
63) are only one part of the equation. This negativity was transferred to the 
paintings as part of a far more ambitious project in which Cezanne's ambition is 
to make art as a "personal apperception, which I embody in sensations and 
which I ask the understanding to organize into a painting" (ibid). Such claims 
are, according to Merleau-Ponty, best met in the paintings themselves and in 
the act of painting, in which the dichotomies usually sustained in philosophy, 
between sensations and understanding, are reorganised so that the painter 
experiences himself as part of nature, even as nature is in him, and by 
extension, the painting enfolds both the artist and nature. 
In effecting this transfer, Merleau-Ponty claims that in Cezanne's paintings, 
"each stroke must contain the air, the light, the object, the composition, the 
character, the outline, and the style" (ibid, 66). Effectively then each stroke and 
each reception of those strokes, embodies (enfleshes) this mobile field of 
representation, discourse and perception in which, as Cezanne claimed "The 
landscape thinks itself in me ... and I am its consciousness" (ibid, 67). The 
painting, the landscape and the viewer, are 'enfleshed' or reversible variants of 
each other. Any 'enfleshed' viewer is unable to sustain divisions and hierarchies, 
and this mixing of understanding and experience opens up the differences 
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between these oppositions. It is this openness to otherness, or to differences 
usually suppressed in, or denigrated by, traditional binarist discourse, that is the 
practicing of negativity. This is a practice which sustains the dialectical relation 
between positivity and negativity, even as it refuses to impose a traditional 
positive/negative hierarchy on those oppositions. 
Merleau-Ponty's dialectical model conceives of the practicing of negativity in 
terms of an encounter between the painting and the viewer. This relational 
intertwining perpetually defeats a binarist template, for here understanding is 
never free from perceptual experience, or vice versa. In Cezanne's Doubt, 
Merleau-Ponty does consider the relation of colour to line, and how in Cezanne's 
paintings this results in the viewer getting lost in the relationships between the 
depiction of objects. This aesthetic negativity, however, seems to be of less 
interest to him than the very phenomenology of painting, which undercuts 
binaries and invites the practicing of negativity. 
Despite these differences between that signifying process called poetic 
ambiguity and Merleau-Ponty's figure called 'the flesh', I suggest that both 
invite the practicing of negativity and opens us to difference. In this regard 
poetic ambiguity might be understood as a modality of a discourse of aesthetic 
negativity, whose character is to display multiple differences without the 
imposition of a binarist order or of fixed hierarchies. In this schema the 
practicing of negativity is inaugurated by the structures of the painting, but 
dialectically completed by the viewer, even as this inter-relation is opened up by 
the inability to fix meaning. As in Merleau-Ponty's figure called 'the flesh', such 
a poetically ambiguous practicing of negativity opens the viewer to differences. 
In concluding this discussion of these different dialectical poetic models, 
Koerner's and Culler's insights usefully inform this investigation into how poetic 
ambiguities in paintings invite the practicing of negativity. These writers present 
the poetic as a structural feature of texts which makes meaning poetically 
ambiguous. Kristeva's and Merleau-Ponty's engagement with dialectical poetics 
and the practicing of negativity, provide useful insights into what negativity is, 
and how it de-subjectifies the viewer and how the negativities of the poetic, and 
of 'the flesh', open the viewer to differences. 
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It is a synthesis of these philosophical, art historical and literary insights that 
services my interpretive model which identifies the signifying process called 
poetic ambiguity. In this schema, poetic ambiguity is conceived of as a de-
subjectifying practicing of negativity, which exists between the painting and the 
viewer. Here the painting has the structural capacity to render meaning 
poetically ambiguous, even as the viewer is called upon to practice negativity. 
Like Merleau-Ponty's figure of 'the flesh', this dialectical process opens the 
viewer to differences and the practicing of negativity. 
2.6. Poetic ambiguity and the feminine. 
My earlier interpretation of Garden Terrace presumes that the Ruckenfigur and 
her mysterious basket inaugurate a visual circuit which unifies meanings in this 
painting. This circuit has already been identified as a movement in which the 
viewer's gaze slides from this introspective figure of the young woman and her 
covered basket, to the statue of Flora, abundantly encircled by a garden of red 
flowers, through the guarded gate and the domesticated middle distance, and 
out into the 'sublime' and luminous light to the left, and then back again into 
the red hooded basket. 
This painting which announces itself as a fiction, possibly like the book the 
Ruckenfigur is reading, engages feminine and female predicaments, but is not 
confined to them. Garden Terrace codes a split between these two female 
'protagonists', the Ruckenfigur as a sign of introspective acculturation, and the 
statue of Flora as the sign of extroverted natural experience. These inter-
relations are expanded by the image of the seated young woman, associated 
with the red covered basket, whose mysterious potency is transgressive, erotic 
and literary; and by the figure of Flora, who is no less sexualised and associated 
with the metonymic slippage of the red colour which migrates between the red 
flowers and the red cloth covering the basket. But Flora'S sexual identity 
preserves, rather than transgresses, a traditional femininity. These feminine 
identities, which hover between agency, desire, submission and transgression 
are differences which are corralled behind the closed gate, guarded by two 
stone lions. 
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Garden Terrace mobilizes two registers: an identification with the problematics 
of feminine identity coded in the foreground via inexplicable contradictions, 
ambiguities of meaning; and a unifying visual circuit in which these anxious 
differences are blended together. It is the interface of these two registers that I 
claim constitutes the most significant operation of poetic ambiguity in this 
painting. This signifying process organises any number of signs, affects and 
signifying systems in such a way as to defeat conceptual mastery and invite the 
practicing of negativity. 
We may track this proposition in the following way. The uncomfortable 
foreground, with its multiple and anxious feminine predicaments does not 
position the viewer in a binarist subject/object, self/other register. These 
differences explode oppositions, and in so doing disaggregate meaning. 
However, the unifying visual circuit of the whole, synthesises oppositions: the 
background with the foreground, the feminine predicaments and a luminous 
sublime light. In this unified circuit, these feminine problematics are synthesised 
into a composite register which links the feminine, the sublime and excess. 
Such a category, as Battersby argues in her book The Phenomenal Woman, 
endorses fixed hierarchies in which subject/ object, self/other, masculine/ 
feminine oppositions are maintained. In short, this painting mobilizes a non-
binarist negative aesthetics against a traditionally phallocentric, dialectical and 
binarist register. 
These mutually implicated contradictions produce a poetic experience full of 
complex connections and multiplicities, ambiguous flows and explosions of 
meaning, which disable the establishment of another binary whereby these two 
registers might be antagonistically positioned against one another. Instead 
these two registers are experienced as 'enfleshed' or intertwined as the viewer 
struggles to sustain an engagement with both. For me, this painting invited a 
particular kind of imaginative encounter, in which I abandoned myself to the 
disaggregation of meaning. In Merleau-Pontian terminology, I engaged the 
enfoldedness of two oppositional registers even as I realised that these two 
registers were moments of cognition operating in a field which defeated that 
understanding. I experienced this intertwining as an address of my discursive 
knowledge, of poetic affect, and as an aesthetic specific experience which 
defeats conceptual mastery. For in its own quiet way Garden Terrace, 
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addressed me as an encounter pulsing between comprehension and 
mystification, between understanding these contradictions contained in these 
intertwined registers, and an inability to understand those differences. It 
required me to occupy both positions simultaneously, and therefore to occupy 
neither. 
By way of concluding this discussion, my contention is that the negativity of 
such aesthetic experience cannot be conflated with the negativities of the 
feminine. This proposition is made against Kristeva's conflation of these two 
negativities, and preempts a later discussion of Derrida's and Irigaray's 
conflation of disruptive textual practices of negativity and the feminine. 
Kristeva's book Revolution and Poetic Language 1984, foregrounds the 
negativity of the semiotic, because it is a pre-verbal, pre-oedipal drive-driven 
field associated with the unconscious. The non-conceptualisable, 
heterogeneous, multiple and pulverising semiotic exists in dialectical relation to 
symbolic speech, writing and signification. Access to the semiotic is gained in 
the practicing of negativitylO as the mobilization of the genotext, rather than in 
the presentation of it in language and signs, in the phenotext. The poetic text 
(the phenotext) registers the semiotic (genotext) in language, through non-
conceptual, and non representational features like rhythm, interval, repetition, 
and as Kristeva claims in painting, (in her essays Giotto's Joy and Motherhood 
According to Giovanni Bellini, both in Desire in Language), also through colour 
and luminous spatialization. These semiotic features which enter into the 
symbolic as a productive rupture, are by extension associated with the 
mother/child dyad, for it is the maternal chora that is the site in which the 
speaking subject emerges, forever in-process, oscillating between the semiotic 
drives and the symbolic order. It is via this maternal chora that the negativities 
of the poetic are linked to those of the feminine. 
Confusingly, Kristeva's book titled Revolution and Poetic Language identifies the 
semiotic as both a gender-free process of signification, and as a feminine 
IOSee Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic Language Chapter IV Practice, in which she argues that poetic texts installs the 
practicing of negativity because they make apparent the contradictions entailed in signification where" the subject is a 
contradiction that brings about practice because practice is always both signifYing and semiotic" (Kristeva 1984, 215). 
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condition associated with the maternal chora 11 . According to Diana Coole, 
Kristeva makes a political move in which the "semiotic, negativity and feminine 
are synonymous terms" (Coole 2000, 220) that transgress the regulations and 
laws of the symbolic, so that identity is made multiple and heterogeneous. This 
synthesis of a signifying process, and the gendered politics of identity, conflates 
two different practices of negativity. 
My claim is that in this Kristevan schema, the negativity of the poetic services 
the negativity of a politics of the feminine. This dialectical synthesis of two types 
of negativity, in the interests of promoting or discursively shifting the interests 
of one, may well be part of a feminist politics of identity. But such a feminist 
politics is not identical to the practicing of negativity in painting. In this regard, 
this thesis mobilises Rita Felski's insights, which sustain the interaction and 
"inevitable tension between the spheres of 'feminism' and 'aesthetics' (Felski 
1997, 427). Against Kristeva's conflation of these two spheres, Felski engages 
Toril Moi's criticism of the idea that the semiotic is feminine. For Moi, the 
semiotic should be understood as "a disruptive and deconstructive force ... 
(which) undermines all fixed identities, including those of the masculine and the 
feminine" (Felski 1989, 35). In so disaggregating the feminine and the semiotic, 
Moi and Felski preserve the distinctions between semiotic practices and feminist 
politics. 
Likewise, my contention is that the aesthetic negativities of poetic ambiguity 
experienced, and analysed, in Garden Terrace are distinct from the negativities 
of a feminist politics and of feminine attributes. Although this painting makes 
connections between feminine identities, desires, submissions and 
emancipations, it slides a variety of meditations on female/feminine identity, 
which in turn enfold agency with submission, mind over matter, body into 
discourse. These poetic ambiguities scramble any neat boundaries and binaries 
which would sustain splits between the negativities of the feminine semiotic and 
the negations of the symbolic. This aesthetic specific and poetic process is not 
gendered, nor is it feminine. 
II The first chapter, The Semiotic and the Symbolic explores the contiguity between the semiotic and the maternaL although 
the subsequent chapters on Negativity, Heterogeneity and Practice focus on the gender neutrality poetic texts. 
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2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified a signifying process in painting, called poetic 
ambiguity, which disaggregates meaning and disables the positivities of 
understanding in such a way as to invite the practicing of negativity and to open 
the viewer to differences. This aesthetic practice of negativity has been 
identified via the insights of Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty, Koerner and Culler and my 
account of an experience of C.D. Friedrich's painting titled Garden Terrace. 
These philosophical, art historical, literary and experiential insights inform an 
interpretive method which registers the negativity of aesthetic experience, even 
as this method delivers an understanding of how such poetic ambiguities are 
not identical to the negativities of the feminine. 
In identifying and analysing that signifying process called poetic ambiguity, we 
engage the positivities of understanding. Such understanding cannot register 
the aesthetic practicing of negativity, which is the unique property of the 
relation between signifying processes in art works and the aesthetic experience 
of the viewer. This chapter marks a dialectical relation between poetic 
experience and understanding, in the interests of demonstrating how a painting 
like Garden Terrace disables the positivities of understanding and invites an 
aesthetic practicing of negativity, even as it registers the discursive implications 
of a politics of the feminine. 
Deconstruction, as will be discussed later, also invites practices of negativity. 
Deconstructive methods by contrast, erode the dialectical relation between 
experience and understanding and conflate different practices of negativity in 
the interests of deconstructing fixed and hierarchical assumptions. These 
discursive distinctions and competitions will be more fully addressed in chapters 
three and four. More immediately, the next chapter investigates how another 
signifying process in painting, called sublime irresolution, also de-subjectifies 
the viewer and invites the practicing of negativity. Sublime irresolution 
foregrounds an antagonistic opposition between differences, unlike the deferrals 
and slippages of meaning structured by that poetic ambiguity, which opens the 
viewer to differences. 
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Chapter Two 
Sublime Irresolution 
3.1. Introduction. 
This chapter identifies a signifying process in painting called sublime 
irresolution. Like poetic ambiguity, investigated in the first chapter, sublime 
irresolution disaggregates meaning, and the viewer's inability to resolve 
meaning registers as an unspeakable sublime experience which invites the 
practicing of negativity. Sublime irresolution and poetic ambiguity are thus 
conceived of as two differing modalities of an aesthetics of negativity. These 
first two chapters register the differences between poetic ambiguity and sublime 
irresolution. Poetic ambiguity opens the viewer to differences, whereas sublime 
irresolution provokes the viewer, by rubbing differences up against one another. 
As a second order activity, we might understand and contextualise such 
practices of negativity. The dialectical interpretive method mobilised in this 
thesis enables us to negotiate that boundary between understanding and 
aesthetic experience. This chapter demonstrates how the positivities of 
understanding are disaggregated by a dialectical and signifying relation between 
the viewer and the painting, even as it details how we might understand how 
such a practices of negativity are produced by paintings. The first two chapters 
develop an understanding of aesthetic negativity in painting in preparation for 
an investigation into the tensions and correspondences between negative 
aesthetics and philosophical deconstruction in the last two chapters. 
In identifying the signifying process called sublime irresolution in paintings, this 
chapter explores how Louis Marin, in his book Sublime Poussin, responds to 
sublime unrepresentability in Poussin's painting Landscape with Pyramus and 
Thisbe 1658. It also investigates how philosophical engagements with the 
sublime, in Kant's Analytic of the Sublime, Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy, 
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory and Lyotard's essay The Sublime and the Avante-
Garde, inform an understanding of this signifying process and of an aesthetics 
of negativity in philosophy. These insights service an analysis of the differences 
between the sublime paintings by Nicholas Poussin (Landscape with Pyramus 
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and Thisbe), J.M.W. Turner ( Seascape with Storm Coming on and The Fall of 
an Avalanche at Grisons) and Mark Rothko (Red on Maroon), so that we can 
understand how an experience of sublime irresolution is produced by paintings. 
My engagement with these paintings, and with these art historical and 
philosophical texts, is informed by an interpretive method which both records 
the negativities of aesthetic experience and enables us to understand the 
differences between these experiences. This dialectical method registers 
something of the Kantian insight that the differences between non-
conceptualisable 'aesthetic ideas' and conceptual understanding can be 
negotiated via categories of understanding. It is an interpretive method which 
has an affinity with Adorno's theory of negative dialectics and with Lyotard's 
notion of a sublime event, diagnosed by the question 'Is it happening?'. These 
philosophical engagements with the sublime inform a general discursive 
category called an aesthetics of negativity that informs philosophy and painting 
from the 17th century to the present. 
3.2. Compressions and oscillations 
In identifying the signifying process called sublime irresolution in painting, and 
detailing how it provokes the practicing of negativity, we begin with an 
investigation of Louis Marin's analysis of Poussin's painting Landscape with 
Pyramus and Thisbe 1658 (Figure 3) in his book Sublime Poussin 1999, 
translated by Catherine Porter. Here Marin identifies the sublime as " generative 
structure for a theory of the passions" (Marin 1999, 121) which summons 
affects through signs, and which exists as 
"the unrepresentable of representation, an unrepresentable aspect that 
defines neither the outside nor the inside of representation nor even a 
blind spot that would hollow out its centre; rather, it results from the very 
operation of representation, from its panic or its exuberance. Understood 
in this way, the sublime is representation at its apogee: that is, in one of 
the precise senses of the term, "that which stands above the edges of an 
already-full measure." ... "This sublime is the "almost too much" (the 
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Figure 3: Nicholas Poussin. Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe. 1658 
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expression is Kantian) of representation, its internal excess."(Marin 1999, 
120). 
According to Marin, the sublime in painting cannot be approached by 
description, but can only be summoned in signs through a process which 
produces sublime effects in the viewer's imagination. A description of Poussin's 
Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe, records the representation of a tempest 
via the effects of weather: the dark sky, lightning, agitated surfaces and 
windswept figures. Here the double lightning strike, and the conflict, tension 
and disequilibrium of the landscape, become allegories for the double anguish 
and tragic fate of the two lovers, Pyramus and Thisbe, whose tale was narrated 
by Ovid. 
For Marin, such a description of the painting is not sublime, but sets the scene 
for an experience of the sublime which is mobilized by a semic matrix, which 
gathers meanings together. I suggest that Marin's account of this matrix is 
comparable to my account of that signifying process called sublime irresolution, 
which structures meaning in such a way that the viewer is unable to synthesise 
contradictions and is imaginatively installed into an experience of sublime 
irresolution. 
For example, Marin describes Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe as a 
representation of people fleeing the forces of the tempest, whilst others observe 
the gory event of a lioness attacking a man. This lioness is in turn set upon by a 
man with spear. This narrative backdrop in which violences are performed and 
observed, preempts the same relation between violence and observation in the 
foreground in which Thisbe finds her dead Pyramus, which in turn extends to 
the viewer and the whole painting. In this process the viewer is metonymically 
installed into an affective state which renders the viewer both observer and 
violated. Such contradictory enfoldings and proliferations of meaning show 
"schematically the conflicting forces involved, their tensions and their positions 
of equilibrium" (Marin 1999, 81). 
On the one hand the painting Pyramus and Thisbe displays the multiplicity of 
passions involved in coding this terrible tragedy, even as it invokes an affective 
sense of drama, tension, fear, agitation, thrill, and incomprehension that exceed 
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this demonstration. This painting establishes a structuring 'grammar' which pits 
contradictory communicative features against one another, where the 
detachment of observation is irresolvably folded into violent experience. It is 
this contradictory signifying process that installs the viewer into that matrix, 
identified as sublime irresolution. Following Marin, my proposal is that in so 
doing, this painting de-subjectifies the viewer into the practicing of negativity. 
Here sublime meaning is not coded through the representation of a tempest, 
but within the conditions of the construction of meaning, and its disaggregation. 
In this process the viewer employs his or her cognition and imagination, only to 
have these faculties exceeded by the multiplicities, compressions and 
contradictions of meaning coded in the painting. 
The sublime terminus of this process Marin suggests is reached when the 
contradictions between observation and violent experience are superseded by 
another destabilising contradiction which presents itself to the viewer in terms 
of an encounter with the still and unruffled lake which, like a glassy eye, exists 
at the centre of this mobile and tempestuous mayhem. This contradictory 
stillness reflects not only the raging tempest, but also invites a form of 
speculation in which the viewer and the lake become interchangeable gazes, 
where the glassy eye, that is the lake, returns the all-seeing (sagelike) gaze of 
the viewer. In this exchange, subject and object, become interchangeable. This 
'sage/lake' Marin suggests, becomes the "great eye of the viewer, of the sage 
who has been brought back to himself by the representation of 
unrepresentability" (Marin 1999, 102). 
This account registers a speculative encounter between the viewer and the 
painting. The painting structures a particular kind of aesthetic experience, which 
is registered and completed in the viewer's imagination. The de-subjectifying 
effects of the dialectical relation between the painting and the viewer, disable 
conceptual mastery and install the viewer into an unspeakable practicing of 
negativity, or as Marin somewhat cryptically states, into the 'unrepresentability 
of representation'. This process, in which a dialectical and de-subjectifying 
relation is inaugurated by a painting but completed by the viewer, is 
experienced as an aesthetic event. 
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According to Adorno such an aesthetic process is "an occasion for subjective 
dissolution and reconstitution" (Huhn 2004, 8). For Lyotard the sublime is 
encountered as an unrepresentable event, only available to diagnosis via the 
question "Is it Happening?". This thesis proposes that an experience of sublime 
irresolution (as with poetic ambiguity) involves a dialectical and de-subjectifying 
process that invites an aesthetic specific practicing of negativity. This analysis 
has much in common with Adorno's aesthetic theory, Marin's account of sublime 
unrepresentability and Lyotard's diagnostic question. Although neither Adorno's, 
nor Lyotard's accounts of the sublime identify any particular signifying 
processes which register how sublime negativity is produced in paintings. 
If we return to Marin's engagement with Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe, 
this account of an experience of sublime irresolution is staged as the interplay 
of contradictions in which oppositions (between conceptual detachment and 
violent and affective immersion; between representation and the processes 
which exceed it; or between subject and object) are mobilized, heightened, and 
folded into, and on top of, one another. This account of a sublime process 
registers how these contradictions are superimposed upon one another, and 
'rubbed up' against one another, to effect maximum semic compression, 
incomprehension and a sense of the sublime. 
Marin's account of pyramus and Thisbe thus enables an understanding of the 
sublime effects of this painting, if not of experiencing sublime negativity, which 
is uniquely associated with the relation between the painting and each viewer's 
response to it. However, Marin's analysis does indicate how that signifying 
process called sublime irresolution structures the failure of meaning in this 
painting. In his analysis, this is a painting where contradictions are superseded 
by even more contradictions, so that the viewer's and the painting's 'gazes' 
become interchangeable, where subject/object distinctions are scrambled, and 
where the viewer is both violated and violator. My observation is that Marin's 
account of the sublime practicing of negativity in Landscape with Pyramus and 
Thisbe registers this disaggregation of meaning as a process of semic 
compression. I suggest that Marin's interpretation enables us to identify a 
modality of the signifying process called sublime irresolution; a modality which 
compresses contradictory meanings. 
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If Poussin's Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe thrills the viewer by installing 
him/her on a precarious sublime threshold, via imaginatively compressed and 
contradictory oppositions, J.M.W. Turner's Seascape with Storm coming on of 
1840 (Figure 4) in the Clore Gallery of Tate Britain, mobilizes the operations of 
sublime irresolution in a different way. Turner's painting also de-subjectifies the 
viewer by presenting him or her with irresolvable contradictions. Turner's 
painting sets up an oscillational operation, or modality of sublime irresolution, 
which activates the mobility that exists between oppositions. This mobile 
interchange, however, has a less dramatic, less thrilling effect than the 
compressions of contradictory meanings in Poussin's Landscape with pyramus 
and Thisbe. 
I suggest that Turner's Seascape with Storm coming on/ mobilizes 
contradictions between' a focussing event' and 'a dissipating flux', as 
differences of painterly application, or of tone and colour, within abstraction. 
For although this painting is a representation, it is barely so, even if it does hint 
at a sky, an horizon, and a menacing, black and stormy sea. Meaning, and its 
disaggregation, registers here in terms of the abstract qualities of paint. In 
particular, where the eye is caught by an accumulation of paint, light, colour 
and texture, and where such accumulations are undone by fluctuations and 
dissipations of colour, viscosity and mark. These mobile interchanges do not 
rupture or compress meaning, but are inflected as variations of the same, as a 
labile address of both a painterly and abstract affect. In encountering these 
oppositions the viewer is drawn into an ever-repeating oscillation, between 
dissolution and focus, and between two shifting registers where the image 
codes space and the sea, as plays of paint. Such oscillations suggest excessive, 
undefinable and Dionysian pleasures, in which the sublime threshold between 
comprehension, and that which overwhelms comprehension, is a positive, or 
becoming experience, rather that a terrifying or thrilling one. 
My argument is that these two paintings, Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe 
and Seascape with Storm coming on, deliver a sublime experience by means of 
two differing modalities of that signifying process called sublime irresolution. 
Understanding such sublime disaggregations of meaning, and how such 
irresolution might be delivered in different paintings, is to be distinguished from 
an aesthetic experience of sublime irresolution which disables understanding. It 
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Figure 4: J.M.W. Turner. Seascape with Storm coming on. 1840 
----------
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is this peculiar dialectical relation between the negativities of aesthetic 
experience and the positivity of understanding, that this study foregrounds. It 
does so in the interests of demonstrating that aesthetic practices of negativity 
are the unique property of the relation between the painting and the viewer, 
even as we can also understand something of that relation insofar as we can 
identify the de-subjectifying effects of aesthetic practices of negativity, how 
such negativity is mobilised in paintings, and how practices of negativity differ. 
3.3. Dialectical negativity and the sublime. 
Kant's, Nietzsche's, Adorno's and Lyotard's philosophical engagements with the 
sublime engage various versions of a dialectical aesthetics of negativity. 
a) Kant's book The Analytic of the Sublime, part of The Critique of Judgement/ 
translated by James Creed Meredith and reprinted in 1952, continuously 
struggles with the irresolutions of the sublime, even as it overcomes that 
irresolution through a dialectical solution in which sublime excess is mastered 
by the reasoning subject. Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, sketched in the first 
chapter as a mobile operation that mobilizes differences between oppositions, 
the Kantian dialectic or 'logic of illusion', according to Allen W. Wood, is 
characterised as a form of human reason "which taunts itself with a prospect of 
knowing what it can never know" (Wood 2005, 84). This paradoxical logic is 
part of reason's criticality, for it enables making distinctions between illusions 
and truth. For Kant, reason is our highest faculty, which 
"prevents us from being deceived by optical illusions, by our feelings and 
desires, by contingent logical errors of understanding, by the corrupting 
deceptions practiced on us not only by others but even more often by 
ourselves, even by the necessary illusions to which reason itself is subject" 
(Wood 2005, 85). 
For example, in his book The Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement, also found in 
The Critique of Judgement/ Kant presents a logical conundrum regarding two 
statements: "everyone has his own taste" ... and ... "there is no disputing about 
taste" (Kant 1952, 205). Here the contradictions between the thesis, in which 
judgments of taste are not based on concepts, versus the antithesis, in which 
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judgments of taste are based on concepts, are dialectically resolved when 
through a process of reasoning we conclude that a judgement of taste requires 
conceptualisation, which is independent of any aesthetic object. For it is through 
conceptualisation that we can negotiate oppositions or 'antimonies' between the 
thesis and antithesis. These are dialectically resolved through a process of 
reasoning, which concludes that judgments of taste rest on indeterminate 
concepts, as special aesthetic types of concepts that are not available to 
un d e rsta n din g . 
The Analytic of the Sublime is likewise infused with a dialectical logic whose 
terminus is always the reasoning human mind. This idea of the supremacy of 
the reasoning mind is continuously repeated in this text. It is the power of 
reason that struggles with and defeats, the shapeless indeterminacies of the 
sublime, where thought and meaning fail. In this text, Kant identifies the 
sublime as independent of any object or form, as a "presentation of an 
indeterminate concept of reason" (Kant 1952, 91) and as the outrage of the 
imagination and uncontainable in any 'sensuous semblance'. The sublime incites 
"the mind to abandon sensibility, and to employ itself upon ideas involving a 
higher finality" (Kant 1952, 92). 
This privileging of reason over sublime sense might be seen against the 
strenuous challenges that the sublime provokes. For Kant the sublime is a 
'negative pleasure' produced by an oscillational movement between a 'check to 
the feelings' followed by a 'discharge' of feeling, or by a 'mental movement' 
which agitates the mind. The sublime thus provokes both the pain (of 
meaningless irresolution) and the pleasure (of rational understanding of that 
pain). For the sublime is a "self-contradictory concept" (ibid) that defeats the 
imagination, even as this defeat alerts us to a metaphysical "supersensible 
substrate (underlying both nature and our faculty of thought) which is great 
beyond every standard of sense" (ibid). These irresolutions, challenges and 
contradictions are continuously absorbed into a dialectical process as the 
stimulus for sublime feeling. Indeed, it is the very difficulty of the sublime that 
is the basis of a moral sense, which emerges against and out of, the strenuous 
difficulties of being confronted by that which the mind cannot accommodate, an 
absolutely large object for example. A non-artistic sense of the sublime, unlike 
beauty or poetry, and not to be found in the mere sensuous resemblances of 
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painting, confronts us with irresolution and contradiction, which from a Kantian 
perspective, we dialectically overcome through the powers of reason. 
Kant's understanding of the sublime resists irresolution, suppresses negativity 
and privileges rational understanding. As such, Kant invokes a binarist dialectics 
against the negativities of sublime excess, and calls that victory, the sublime, as 
a response to paradoxes he finds when "human reason taunts itself with a 
prospect of knowing what it can never know" (Wood 2005, 84). This Kantian 
sublime records a subjectifying moment where otherness, heterogeneity, and 
sublime negativity are contained within, and regulated by, the knowing and 
reasoning subject. Diana Coole's book negativity and politics: Dionysus and 
dialectics from Kant to poststructuralism, demonstrates how the positivity of 
Kant's binarist and dialectical method is irrupted by "gaps, hiatus, lacunae, 
discontinuities, undecidables, confusions, ambiguities, inconsistencies, 
contradictions, antimonies, unknowables" (Coole 2000, 41). Negativity is thus a 
constitutive component of the Kantian sublime, but one foreclosed by the 
positivities of understanding. 
This investigation cannot fault Kant's insight developed in his book The Dialectic 
of Aesthetic Judgement which argues that the irreducible differences between 
the negativity of 'aesthetic ideas' and the positivities of understanding can be 
negotiated through processes of reasoning. Such reasoning not only preserves 
the distinctions between the negativities of aesthetic experience and the 
positivities of understanding, but also registers an understanding of that 
difference. However, Kant's theory of the sublime developed in his Analytic of 
the Sublime sustains a hierarchy in which reason subjugates the negativities of 
sublime excess. It is this dialectical hierarchy, which sustains traditional 
binaries, that is the object of post-Kantian philosophical critiques. 
Christine Battersby's book The Phenomenal Woman 1998 is exemplary of such 
a philosophical critique. Battersby is critical of Kant's binarist and dialectical 
solution because it is a philosophical system which sustains the binary in which 
a rational self is constituted by sublime otherness. For Battersby, the Kantian 
sublime 
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"requires 'excess'; it requires its 'other'; it requires a 'matter' that must 
hover always out of reach. But that 'other' - and matter - are ultimately 
constrained and pinioned in a position of fake infinity. The term that Kant 
employs for this receding (but fixed) infinity is the 'sublime' - terms which 
keep 'nature', and 'the object' and 'matter' at a distance and in stasis. 
The transcendental 'I' constructs itself as persisting and stable as it 
confronts this 'sublime' otherness that threatens to overwhelm it" 
(Battersby 1998, 79). 
Here Battersby is critical of Kant's dialectical method which preserves traditional 
and patriarchal binaries in which the negativity of feminised sublime excess is 
the constitutive 'other' to the positivities of a rational (and masculine) subject. A 
Kantian negative dialectics of the sublime, from such a feminist and 
deconstructive perspective, is problematic insofar as it preserves hierarchical 
binaries, suppresses negativity and privileges the reasoning (masculine) 
subject. 
Battersby's critique of the Kantian sublime registers the impact of a 
deconstructive sensibility, critical of binary oppositions and fixed hierarchies 
which sustain the positivities of reason, phallocentrism, a metaphysics of 
presence, and the integrated subject against the negativities of sublime excess, 
otherness, textual indeterminacy, and the feminine. Similarly, as will be 
demonstrated, Nietzsche's and Adorno's engagements with the sublime, 
register a critique of Kant's binarist dialectics of the sublime. Whereas Lyotard's 
theory re-engages something of Kant's non-conceptualisable 'aesthetic ideas', 
as the delivery of sublime experience. 
b) Nietzsche's book The Birth of Tragedy translated by Walter Kauffman in 
1967, engages an anti-binarist dialectics informed by a different conception of 
the sublime and theory of the subject. For the Nietzschean sublime is not 
organised by reason, but is discursively at work in aesthetic objects and 
practices. Nietzsche's dialectical anti-binarism is a critique of Kant's dialectical 
method which sustains the boundaries between oppositions, including that 
threshold between rational understanding and aesthetic experience. Nietzsche's 
philosophical text is written in a style of writing that is aphoristic, metaphorical 
and allusive. This style of argument synthesises aesthetic protocols with 
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philosophical understanding, so that unambiguous and rational understanding is 
disrupted. Here the de-subjectifying techniques of art are imported into 
philosophy, and pre-empt Derrida's development of deconstructive practices of 
negativity discussed in the next chapter. 
Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy is organised by a dialectical relation between 
two principles, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. This relation between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian, as complementary forces in Greek culture, is 
presented as a mobile, oscillational and becoming one. The Apollonian principle 
is associated with the visible, knowledge, individuation, light, dream and 
moderation, whereas the Dionysian is associated with excess, music, flux, 
rapture, destruction and mystery. Furthermore, the Dionysian is the 'primordial 
ground' from which the Apollonian emerges, and is also paradoxically, the 
generative field from which both these oppositions emerge. The Dionysian 
principle is both the ground, and an oppositional 'protagonist', in an ongoing 
and irresolvable contest that is both the condition of art and of life. Although 
this contest is staged in terms of Greek culture, and as a critique of classical 
Greek theatre and philosophy, which tragically suppressed the forces of 
Dionysus in its preoccupation with individuation and reason, The Birth of 
Tragedy is also implicitly a critique of Kantian metaphysics and binarist 
hierarchies. For although the Dionysian and Apollonian principles are perpetually 
in contest with one another, this contest emerges as a single generative and 
destructive stratum of life, which unlike the Kantian or Hegelian dialectical 
march of reason, is informed by forces that Nietzsche later defines as the will to 
powerl. 
Diana Coole links Nietzsche's will to power with irresolvable Dionysian and 
Apollonian rhythms, fusions, antagonisms, and with human life and aspirations 
in which \\ we are also formed and destroyed in the great effulgence of 
becoming" (Coole 2000, 91). She also links this will to power/ becoming with 
negativity, but qualifies it by claiming that this form of negativity is to be 
understood as generative, anti-rational, performative, life-affirming and beyond 
1 In The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche identifies the will to power, as a form of anonymous becoming. as a succession of 
independent processes in which things, including people, subjugate other things, which in turn resist sLlch power and 
install new subjugations and resistances. Diana Coole identifies this cycle of the will to power as "ebbs and flows. cycles 
and becomings. where the connectedness but differentiation of all things is endlessly productive" (Coole 2000. 98). 
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negation. Negation is here understood as "nihilism, metaphysical no-saying, 
dialectical negation, reactive forces, will to nothingness, guilt and ressentiment" 
(Coole 2000, 85). However, the negativity of becoming, as the will to power and 
the celebration of life (as both generative and destructive), is a critiq ue of 
Kantian metaphysics, in which the positivity of reason trumps the negativity of 
sublime excess. 
Where Kant's The Analytic of the Sublime is a systematic attempt to define the 
sublime, Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy sketchily addresses the topic of the 
sublime as both Apollonian and Dionysian. The Apollonian sublime is 
characterised as both beautiful and terrible and "where we intuitively 
comprehend their necessary interdependence" (Nietzsche 1967,45). This 
Apollonian sublime, like its Dionysian counterpart, is an experiential category 
through which the sufferings of life may be sublimated. 
Apollo "with his sublime gestures ... shows us how necessary is the entire 
world of suffering, that by means of it the individual may be impelled to 
realize the redeeming vision, and then, sunk in contemplation of it, sit 
quietly in his tossing bark, amid the waves" (ibid 45-46). 
This uplifting sublime is both the counterpart and another version of the 
Dionysian sublime in which 
"art approaches us as a healing sorceress ... She alone knows how to turn 
these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into 
notions with which one can live: these are the sublime as the artistic 
taming of the horrible" (Nietzsche 1967, 60). 
On the other hand, the sublime, and the divine, are also associated with the 
satyr, ecstatic reveler and companion to the god Dionysus in which oblivion, 
excess, contradiction, are expressed through the dithyrambic satyric chorus. 
Tragedy "is seated amid this excess of life, suffering, and pleasure, in sublime 
ecstasy" (Nietzsche 1967, 124). 
Although schematic, Nietzsche's various engagements with the sublime differ 
from those of Kant insofar as this is not the evocation of a threshold in which 
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reason resists excess, irresolution and negativity. These Nietzschean sublimities 
are not only polyvalent and unsystematic, but promiscuously slip between 
principles of individuation and of primordial oneness, and exist in art and life, as 
sublimatory thresholds which heal the horrors of life and which invite us into the 
sublime negativities of excess, rapture and dissolution. These multiplicities 
suggest a mobile matrix, informed by the irresolvable play between oppositions, 
pleasure/pain thresholds and the sublimatory effects of art. This is a sublimity 
that is both aesthetic and philosophical. For the Nietzschean sublime registers 
the production of sublimity in aesthetic objects and practices, and most 
significantly, against Kantian attempts to control the negativities of sublime 
excess within the positivities of reason, the Nietzschean sublime is a celebration 
of that negativity in both philosophy and art. The irresolvable relation between 
the organising metaphors of this text, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, 
constitutes a model for a dynamic process that de-subjectifies a reader or a 
viewer into the negativities of sublime excess. For Coole, this "differentiation 
without opposition" installs" a new economy of life beyond negation where 
Nietzsche sets becoming free from the logical synthetic march of the dialectic" 
(Coole 2000, 87). 
This discussion of Kant's and Nietzsche's philosophies of the sublime sketches 
an engagement with an aesthetics of negativity and of the sublime taken up by 
Derrida, Adorno and Lyotard in the 20th century. The significance of Kant's 
aesthetic theory for this investigation into the operation of sublime irresolution 
in painting, is his account of how the negativity of 'aesthetic ideas' may be 
approached by, but not duplicated by, the positivity of understanding. Here the 
autonomy of aesthetic experience is not reducible to a supplementary 
understanding. On the other hand Kant's engagement with the sublime, does 
set up a traditional and binarist hierarchy in which sublime negativity is 
suppressed by the positivities of understanding. Against this Kantian viewpoint, 
I suggest that sublime irresolution in art is a de-subjectifying technique that 
resists a Kantian discourse of the reasoning and integrated subject by 
confronting the viewer with that which he or she cannot conceptually master. 
Both Nietzsche's and Kant's engagements with the sublime frame a discourse of 
subjectification that emerged in modernity. Nietzsche privileges the practicing of 
sublime negativity as part of the generative and destructive processes of 
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becoming found in both art and philosophy. For Nietzsche, a sublime experience 
is a de-subjectifying opportunity to encounter such excess, in art and in 
philosophy. Whereas in the Kantian schema, we might understand that a 
sublime experience subjectifies the reader or viewer in such a binarist way that 
the rational self is defensively positioned against the negativities of sublime 
excess. These arguments about the status of aesthetic experience, and its 
subjectifying or de-subjectifying capacities, are central to the negative 
aesthetics that Adorno takes up in the 20th century. 
c) In Adorno's discussion of the sublime in his book Aesthetic Theory, published 
in 1970, translated by C. Lenhardt, and edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf 
Tiedemann, art is central to Adorno's dialectical theory. Adorno's engagement 
with the sublime in art bears some resemblance to both Kant's and Nietzsche's 
theories of it. Art for Adorno, as for Kant, has an aesthetic autonomy. Unlike 
Kant, for Adorno the sublime in art is not an opportunity to endorse reason, but 
to critique it. Adorno writes "Art is rationality criticizing itself without being able 
to overcome itself" (Adorno 1970, 81). For Adorno aesthetic practices of 
negativity, inaugurated by art works, are an immanent critique of instrumental 
reason. Artworks, in this schema, disable reason by installing the viewer into a 
process in which the positivities of understanding cannot cohere, and where 
meaning fails. This a moment or an event, in which heterogeneity, dissonance, 
the non-identical, otherness or negativity, appear out of and against the 
positivities of reason. It is this production of negativity that is the immanent 
critique of reason. 
From Adorno's perspective, art involves a processual practicing of negativity, 
and an understanding of the implications of that negativity. Here art is both 
aesthetically autonomous, a register of aesthetic experience, and a critique of 
reason. This negative dialectics marks the inter-related but irreducible 
differences between aesthetic experience and conceptual and critical 
understanding. This negative dialectics enables what Adorno calls the 'truth 
content' of the work of art. He writes "To grasp truth content is to be engaged 
in criticism" (Adorno 1970, 186). Artworks however, "do and do not possess 
truth content" (ibid 187) for although they invite interpretation and 
understanding, they also "fail to achieve what is objectively willed in and 
through them" (ibid ). Truth content, or negativity, in this schema is not to be 
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encountered through the positivities of understanding, but only through a 
process which an art work inaugurates, and which is completed in the 
experience of the viewer. This process causes the negativities of heterogeneity 
and otherness appear. These valued practices of negativity from this 
perspective, are not transformed by, or into, the positivities of understanding. 
Aesthetic negativity thus has an autonomy, even as it is the property of the 
dialectical relation between the viewer and the artwork. 
This dialectical process bears some resemblance to Nietzsche's sublime 
dialectics which operates between the dynamics of Apollonian individuation and 
Dionysian immersion. For Adorno's dialectical model also presumes a mobile 
relation between oppositions, between the universal and the particular, between 
parts and the whole, between identity and non-identity2. This process does not 
synthesise and resolve oppositions, but preserves a dynamic reciprocity, or a 
gap, between oppositions. Adorno's theory is a negative dialectics, in which art 
occupies a privileged position. "Art works crackle .... because there is a friction 
between antagonistic moments" (ibid, 254). 
Adorno's discussion of the sublime in art, registered under the topics of 
Enlightenment and shudder and The sublime in nature and The sublime and 
play in his book Aesthetic Theory, both promotes the sublime as an aesthetic 
category which articulates this immanent critique, and scrutinises the sublime in 
terms of its history and its discursive uses. Under the first topic, Enlightenment 
and shudder, Adorno associates art with tropes of the sublime, whereby art is 
both momentary and sudden, which brings "back the terror of the primal world" 
(ibid, 118). (Sublime) art is the paradoxical point between vanishing and 
preserving meaning. "The instant, which is the work of art, assumes a definite 
shape where it constitutes itself as a totality out of its particular moments" 
(ibid, 119). Art, in this schema, inaugurates a dialectical and processual relation 
between oppositions that is independent of "human meddling and purposive 
action"(ibid). This immanent process, like Kant's aesthetic theory, preserves the 
aesthetic autonomy of the art object, even as it sets up a mobile and dialectical 
2Hegel's dialectical positivity registers a negotiation between negativity and positivity, so that negativity is transformed in 
such a way that the negative becomes positive. This becoming dialectics is different to Adorno's negative dialectics where 
negativity must be preserved, but not rendered servile to the positivities of reason. Adorno's negative aesthetics preserves 
the negativity of aesthetic negativity against the traditional dialectical impulse to render negativity positive. 
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relation between this aesthetic object and the viewing subject. For Adorno this 
relation is a negative dialectics, in which mobile object/subject relations, disable 
conceptual mastery and present the viewer with heterogeneity and the non-
identical. According to J.M. Bernstein in his book The Fate of Art: Aesthetic 
Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno, Adorno's negative dialectics enacts 
a logic "which because not general, not universal, subsists only in and through 
enactment" (Bernstein 1992, 157). This practicing of negativity, via aesthetic 
objects and textual readings, is the road to "self-relinquishment" (ibid, 188). 
The goal of negative dialectics is to "use concepts to unseal the non-conceptual 
with concepts, without making it their equal" (ibid). 
Adorno's discussion of the sublime in art in the chapter titled Thoughts on a 
theory of the art work in his book Aesthetic theory compares the de-
subjectifying properties of art, and of the sublime, with Kant's version of the 
sublime which promotes "domination, power and greatness" (ibid, 281). Here 
the Kantian sublime is conceived of as a social fact that is not an immanent 
critique of reason, but a "kind of transcendence" (ibid, 282) or a positivity that 
in turn informs traditional aesthetics. It is against this traditional aesthetic 'art 
religion' that Adorno asks for a sublimity in which negativity is not 'played 
down', but where instead fundamental contradictions are brought out. Adorno 
writes 
"Whereas the traditional concept of the sublime as an infinite presence was 
animated by the belief that negation could bring out positivity, the same 
does not hold for art that aims at truth content in the context of 
irreconcilable contradictions" (ibid). 
Adorno's theory of negative dialectics significantly informs my contribution to 
negative aesthetics, which is to identify those signifying processes called poetic 
ambiguity and sublime irresolution. These signifying processes in paintings and 
visual art practices engage a de-subjectifying, processual and aesthetic 
enactment of negativity. This sublime enactment of negativity is experienced as 
an unspeakable event, which may, via second order of analysis, become 
available to understanding. Poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution also 
register a dynamic gap, or an irreducible inter-relation, between aesthetic 
experience and understanding. Where for Adorno aesthetic specific practices of 
52 
negativity in art in general register as a critique of reason, from my perspective, 
although such a critique is indubitably valuable, I am also interested in how 
paintings deliver the negativities of sublime experience. 
d) Lyotard's The Sublime and the Avante-Garde first published in Art Forum 
April 1984, translated by Lisa Liebmann, and later modified by Lyotard with 
these modifications translated by Geoff Bennington and Marian Hobson, is 
presented in The Lyotard Reader edited by Andrew Benjamin in 1989. In this 
essay Lyotard draws a boundary between aesthetic experience and 
understanding. For his question "Is it Happening?", as a diagnostic of sublime 
experience in art, is not an attempt to negotiate the dialectical relation between 
the negativities of the sublime and the positivities of understanding. For Lyotard 
sublime experience is an event that can only be approached "through a state of 
privation (where) thought must be disarmed" (Benjamin 1989, 197). Lyotard's 
response to Barnett Newman's painting is an account of a sublime experience or 
event, where thought or consciousness are disabled. 
"Newman's now which is no more than now is a stranger to consciousness 
and cannot be constituted by it. Rather, it is what dismantles 
consciousness, what deposes consciousness, it is what consciousness 
cannot formulate, and even what consciousness forgets in order 
constitute itself" (ibid). 
Lyotard traces this negative aesthetics, called the sublime, in which "aesthetics 
asserted its critical rights over art, and that of romanticism, in other words, 
modernity, triumphed" (ibid, 199). From this perspective Newman's 'now' is an 
engagement with a contradictory feeling that vacillates between the pain of 
privation before or after 'its happening', and the pleasure of 'it happening'. As 
such Newman's paintings are indebted to a European history of sublime 
interventions, both artistic and philosophical, from the 17th century to the 
present. For Lyotard, this negative aesthetics includes Boileau's, Longinius', 
Kant's and Burke's3 accounts of the sublime. Lyotard's contribution to this 
3 According to Lyotard for Boileau, "The sublime cannot be taught ... (and) ... is not linked to rules that can be determined 
through the sublime only requires the reader or listener have conceptual range, taste, and the ability 'to sense what 
everyone sense first"'(ibid, 201). Longinius' engagement with the sublime, according to Lyotard, not only responds to its 
irresistible provocation, but Longinius also "tried to locate sources for the sublime in the ethos of rhetoric, in its pathos. in 
its techniques: figures of speech, diction, enunciation, composition." (ibid, 200). The sublime from Kant'S perspective, 
according to Lyotard, is an indeterminate mixture of pain and pleasure, resulting from an encounter with an absolutely 
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discourse of aesthetic negativity is to mark sublime experience as an event via 
the diagnostic question "Is it Happening?". In registering this event 
"the art lover does not experience a simple pleasure, or derive an ethical 
benefit from his contact with art, but expects an intensification of his 
conceptual and emotional capacity, an ambivalent enjoyment" (ibid, 206). 
In the 19th and 20th centuries, according to Lyotard, art "was to be a witness 
to the fact that there is indeterminacy" (ibid). From this perspective Cezanne's 
paintings record a practicing of negativity in which little 'colouristic sensations' 
invite the viewer to "bear witness to the indeterminate" (ibid, 207). For Lyotard, 
such indeterminacy prevailed in American abstract expressionism, even if 
aesthetic objects, and paintings in particular, as the privileged vehicles for 
aesthetic negativity, were put under pressure by minimalism and art povera. 
Against this degradation, for Lyotard the contemporary avante-garde still 
registers the indeterminate for it 
"inscribes the occurrence of a sensory now as what cannot be presented 
and what remains to be presented in the decline of great representational 
painting. . .. the avante-garde is not concerned with what happens to the 
subject, but with: 'Does it happen?', with privation. This is the sense in 
which it still belongs to the aesthetics of the sublime" (ibid, 208). 
For Lyotard, this discourse of the sublime, which includes the contemporary 
avante-garde, is affected by other discourses, and in particular, by the 
discursive collusion between capitalism and the avante-garde4 . This collusion 
between art and capitalism not only registers a reality "increasingly 
ungraspable, subject to doubt, unsteady" (ibid, 209), but the "experience of the 
human subject ... (is) ... dissolved into the calculation of profitability" (ibid). In 
large object where "the imagination, fails to provide a representation corresponding to this Idea" (ibid, 203). It is in 
Burke's account of the sublime that Lyotard finds a model for his own idea of the sublime as a condition of privation. In 
Burke's Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautifill, "the sublime is kindled by the 
threat of nothing further happening" (ibid, 204). For Burke a very big object astonishes and threatens us, and art in 
distancing this menace provides relief. Sublime art from this perspective, is no longer confined to classical rules. but is the 
vehicle for intense experience. 
4Peter de Bolla's book The Discourse of the Sublime: HistOlY, Aesthetics and the Subject presents the sublime as a 
discursive effect of the discourses on debt and the capitalist economies of exchange that emerged in Europe in the mid 
16th century. 
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this postmodern era sublimity becomes a register of an instantaneous transfer 
of information, "where all is said, we 'know'" (ibid, 210) and where sublimity "is 
not longer in art, but in speculation about art" (ibid). This dismal result, 
however, is not inevitable, for Lyotard "the enigma of ' Is it happening?' is not 
dissolved for all of this, nor is the task of painting" (ibid). 
Lyotard's engagement with the sublime emphasises the Kantian distinction that 
the negativity of aesthetic ideas, as that which remains unrepresentable, or 
unspeakable, is not available to understanding. But unlike Kant's Analytic of the 
Sublime, which dialectically attempts to synthesise that irreducible relation, 
Lyotard simply marks that boundary. In so doing he preserves the autonomy 
and negativity of sublime experience, only knowable through a diagnostic 
question, 'Is it happening?'. Art is the privileged locus of the imagination's 
inability to present the unrepresentable. Sublime art, from this perspective, 
causes the imagination to fail. Lyotard's diagnostic of the sublime thus 
resembles Kant's idea of non-conceptual aesthetic ideas. Unlike Kant, Lyotard's 
register of a sublime event does not engage a dialectical relation between this 
experience and understanding it, nor to the possibilities of its production, or to 
its critical effects. Lyotard does however conceive of the sublime as part of a 
discourse of aesthetic negativity in European art and philosophy from the 17th 
century to the present, and how this discourse is impacted upon by a capitalist 
economy. 
In conclusion, both Nietzsche's and Adorno's theories of the sublime take issue 
with Kant's version of it. Where the Kantian sublime subjectifies a rational self, 
Nietzsche's and Adorno's accounts of the sublime disrupt the dialectical binary 
which sustains a hierarchy between the positivities of reason and its suppressed 
'other', sublime negativity. For Nietzsche, the sublime is a de-subjectifying 
opportunity to encounter sublime excess. For Adorno, it is a de-subjectifying 
opportunity to practice negativity. Such aesthetic practices of negativity are 
critiques of instrumental reason. Both Nietzsche's and Adorno's accounts of the 
sublime impact on Derrida's deconstructive sublime, discussed in the following 
chapter. For Derrida's deconstructive sublime is a de-subjectifying textual 
opportunity to practice (non-aesthetic) negativity. 
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Lyotard's theory of the sublime registers something of Kant's idea of the 
autonomy of 'aesthetic ideas'. For Lyotard a sublime event, diagnosed via the 
question 'Is it happening?' is an aesthetic experience which suspends time and 
disrupts understanding by being a witness to the indeterminate. Like Adorno's 
account of negative dialectics, sublime art from a Lyotardian perspective, resists 
the reductive power of understanding and theory, for it only registers as 
aesthetic experience. 
These philosophical insights provide a vocabulary for understanding that 
signifying process called sublime irresolution in paintings and visual art 
practices, which delivers sublime experience as the practicing of negativity. 
Adorno's and Lyotard's insights are particularly useful for understanding such 
aesthetic specific practices of negativity. For like poetic ambiguity, sublime 
irresolution is to be conceived of as a processual enactment of negativity, 
structured by a painting or artwork, which engages the intellectual, conceptual, 
emotional, discursive or phenomenal capacities of the viewer, only to 
disaggregate meaning by presenting the viewer with an excess of information, 
or with oppositions that cannot be resolved. 
With regard to poetic ambiguity, this disaggregation of meaning registers as an 
aesthetic event, one whose de-subjectifying effects invites practices of 
negativity and the acknowledgement of heterogeneity, multiplicity and 
differences. Sublime irresolution, however, forecloses such openness to 
differences insofar as it rubs contradictions up against one another, for example 
the differences between subject and object, understanding and experience, self 
and otherness. Sublime irresolution is a simultaneous disruption/instantiation of 
binary oppositions where the antagonisms between oppositions render this a 
threatening or thrilling event available to that diagnostic question 'Is it 
happening?'. 
Marin's analysis of such unrepresentable sublime experience in Poussin's 
painting Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe registers such a provocative 
practicing of negativity. Marin's analysis eschews a philosophical vocabulary of 
negative aesthetics and any attempt to represent the unrepresentable. By 
contrast this syncretic study of negative aesthetics in philosophy and painting, 
not only attends to the fact that paintings and artworks invite the practicing of 
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negativity, but also how they do so. The ensuing discussion investigates how 
the signifying process called sublime irresolution disaggregates meaning in 
Turner's and Rothko's paintings. It does so by attending to the differing 
modalities of sublime irresolution registered by these paintings. 
3.4. Sublime negativity in painting. 
As already demonstrated, both Poussin's Landscape with pyramus and Thisbe 
and Turner's Seascape with Storm coming on structure an experience of 
sublime irresolution. Yet, when we compare these two aesthetic practices of 
negativity, we are able to understand that there are differences in the manner 
in which they do so. Poussin's painting de-subjectifies the viewer through a 
compression of meaning which overwhelms comprehension, whereas Turner's 
does so by presenting the viewer with a mobile and oscillational operation which 
shifts between two irresolvable registers as an aesthetic experience in which 
oppositions are mutually enfolded. These differing modalities are available to 
analysis and comparison. Modalities of sublime irresolution are to be 
distinguished from typologies of the sublime. Both are categories for 
understanding the sublime. Yet they differ insofar as modalities of sublime 
irresolution are associated with a processual practicing of negativity, whereas 
typologies of the sublime are static and representational categories for 
understanding the sublime. 
In distinguishing between the modalities of sublime irresolution and typologies 
of the sublime, we might consider both the generation and disaggregation of 
meaning in Turner's The Fall of the Avalanche at the Grisons, 1810 (Figure 5). 
This painting codes sublimity via the representation of an immense and 
catastrophic natural disaster in which a house is crushed by an enormous and 
icy rock, and the atmosphere is saturated with flying debris. Here sublime 
meaning is coded via a typology of the terrific sublimes, whereby the viewer is 
confronted by, but positioned away from, the excesses and violence of nature. 
This terrific sublime, installs the viewer into a position of sublime mastery, 
similar to that of Kant's reasoning subject, whereby the dangerous excesses 
5 Andrew Wilton's book Turner and the Sublime is a catalogue of some typologies of the sublime: for example, the Classic 
Sublime, the Landscape Sublime, and the Architectural Sublime. Like the 'terrific sublime' these meaning generating 
categories are not an effect ofunresolvable meaning, but of the viewer imposing identifiable categories into the processes 
of reading. 
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Figure 5: J.M.W. Turner. The Fall of an Avalanche at Grisons. 1810 
------ -----
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and terrors of nature are safely kept at a distance. A terrific sublime from this 
perspective endorses an all seeing eye in which the viewer is positioned above 
and outside this natural disaster. Here an 'I' persists against of the sublime 
power of an overwhelming catastrophe. In terms of this analysis, this 'terrific 
sublime' is both a representational category and a subjectifying opportunity 
which keeps various discursive positions in place. For example, the perpetuation 
of those subject/object, mind/matter, culture/nature binaries that Battersby 
critically associates with the Kantian sublime. 
However such typologies of the sublime, where meaning does not fail, and 
where the viewer is comfortably able to recognise the rhetorics of a sublime 
category, are different to the modalities of sublime irresolution. This signifying 
process installs the viewer into the indeterminacies and negativities of sublime 
experience by disaggregating meaning. In this regard, Turner's The Fall of an 
Avalanche at Grisons mobilises an abstract register whereby shimmering white 
paint evokes snow, or the thick clotted streaks of grey paint resemble a cloud. 
These contradictions between reading the painting as both an abstraction and a 
representation, puts pressure on both these registers. Such dissaggregation of 
meaning registers as an unspeakable and sublime event. Yet such an 
unspeakable experience might also be analysed, so that we might understand 
the differences between various modalities of sublime irresolution, and the 
differences between such modalities and typologies of the sublime. 
My analysis of The Fall of an Avalanche at Grisons presumes that the viewer is 
positioned between a typology of the 'terrific sublime' and an abstract, aesthetic 
specific experience which transgresses6 binarist assumptions. From this 
6John Parker addresses Turner's paintings in terms ofa typology he calls 'the transgressive picturesque'. but the account he 
gives could apply equally well to Turner's engagement with the sublime. Parker claims that Turner's use of light was 
indebted to Claude, but Turner's paintings transgressed binarist pictorial conventions which established clear differences 
between the viewing subject and the depicted landscape though a "highly feminised pictorial space ... which draws the 
viewer in. increases their sense of proximity and fails to give the Claudian distance between the viewer and the viewed" 
(Parker 1998,375). This incorporation challenged traditional conceptions of how landscape painting functioned in British 
society and brought into the genres of landscape painting what 
"Reynolds and Shaftsbury felt should be excluded: the feminine, unheroic and unidealized. the evidence of labour. 
the vanity of viewpoints, the sense of uncertainty. social change and last but not least. the evidence of pictorial 
composition as a historical, social and material practice. Turner's transgression consists in his inclusion of the 
'impolite'. By doing so he disassociated the ideal that pictures should offer universal truths from the idea that such 
truths should be timeless. static, certainties. Instead he offered picturesque traps for the elite. encouraged them to 
test their education by working through his associations, only to have them realize that uncertainty and change 
were inevitable" (Parker 1998,376). 
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perspective irresolvable sublime meaning in The Fall of an Avalanche at Grisons 
is generated by the hiatus between abstraction, in which colour, tone and mark 
affectively register meaning as paint, and representation, as the coding of a 
terrifically sublime event. It is this oscillation between oppositions, between 
representation and abstraction, knowing and seeing, or between focus and flux, 
that registers as an experience of sublime irresolution. We might, as a second 
order practice, compare and analyse how that experience is delivered by these 
paintings. In this regard, Turner's engagement with the operations of sublime 
irresolution, consistently registers a generative oscillation between oppositions, 
a modality of that signifying process called sublime irresolution, which differs 
from Poussin's dramatic compressions and disaggregations of meaning. 
Sublime meaning and its disaggregating failure in Mark Rothko's paintings, is 
mobilized by the interplays of irresolvable contradictions within abstraction. 
Anna Chave writes of Rothko's painting that he 
"had come to understand the affective power of a state of irresolution or 
undecidability, but he could manipulate it now in more abstract, and so 
more direct, way. He created suspense by suspension, in other words - by 
suspending plain rectangles in a non-specific space .... In creating shapes 
that were almost but not quite focused, almost but not quite solid, he 
found a way to describe the brink between being and not-being, presence 
and absence. This, in essence was his subject" (Chave 1989, 184). 
To rephrase this quote in the language of this study, Rothko's paintings invite 
the practicing negativity, by presenting the viewer with irresolvable and sublime 
contradictions which demand both focus and non-specificity, suspension and 
solidity. Understanding and analysing this modality of the signifying process 
called sublime irresolution, is extrinsic to the instantaneous experience of a 
sublime event, as Lyotard's analysis of Newman's painting records. This 
modality does however inform an understanding of how we engage sublime 
negativity paintings, and how meaning fails in Rothko's abstract paintings, and 
how Rothko's paintings deploy sublime irresolution in ways that are different to 
Turner's or Poussin's engagements with sublime irresolution. 
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For example, if we consider Rothko's Red on Maroon 1959 (Figure 6), which is 
part of the Seagram Building series at the Tate Modern, the rectangularity and 
verticality of the whole painting is reiterated by the same orientation of the 
deep red 'figure' with bleeding edges on the 'ground' of the pale red maroon. 
Difference is marked here in terms of tonality, colour and degrees of sharpness, 
or degrees of focus. Yet these differences are also stalked by levels of sameness 
of shape and of direction. These differences and samenesses are part of an 
oscillation in which the interplays of horizontality/verticality, figure/ground, 
colour/tone, containment/dissolution, immersion/expulsion are part of a 
contradictory visual syntax that is generally identified as Rothko's oeuvre. 
However, each painting articulates its own particularity from this general 
vocabulary. In Red on Maroon this particularity is coded via the terrifying 
juxtaposition of two tonal registers which simultaneously erode the coding of 
figure/ground. For although the 'figure', the bleeding form, ostensibly sits on 
top of the 'ground', the tonality of the 'figure' as a deeper red, in fact makes it 
receed. 
This confusion is orchestrated by the conflation of categories understanding, so 
that the figureness of the 'figure' becomes contaminated by the groundness of 
the 'ground'. This sublime disorientation and irresolution produces a sense of 
affective panic, even as the viewer's gaze is drawn into pleasures and 
disorientations which are generated by the inability to separate the 
ground/figure couplet. The blurred border between figure/ground reduces 
difference because it indeterminately and irresolvably figures both. We might 
mark this experience with the diagnostic question 'Is it happening?', but I have 
attempted to demonstrate that such a sublime event is also the result of an 
intentional mobilisation of oppositions in which meaning is disaggregated and 
where the positivities of understanding fail. 
Red on Maroon does not evoke a sense of positive becoming, like Turner's 
Seascape with Storm Coming On. Instead Rothko's painting produces a sense 
of panic, disorientation, and suspense. For those multiple operations sketched 
above, like Poussin's Pyramus and Thisbe, overwhelm the viewer with semic 
excess, but do not effect any catharsis, or endpoint to the compression of 
contradictions. Rather these contradictions perpetually re-circulate as 
repetitions of colour/tone; figure/ground; blurred/border. Bersani and DuToit 
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Figure 6: Mark Rothko. Red on Maroon. 1959 
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claim that "stasis thus awaits Rothko as the terminal point in his erosion of 
differences. It is as if stultifying sameness - as immobilizing as defensive 
differences - were the secret goal of all these mobile features" (Bersani and 
DuToit 1993, 120). Chave, Bersani and DuToit attend to the modalities of 
sublime irresolution in Rothko's paintings as a register of either suspension or 
stasis. 
In mobilising this interpretive register, I accept that we bring a multitude of 
interpretive registers to our encounters with paintings and visual art practices. 
If I have explored sublime experience as a negative effect of the failure of 
meaning this does not exclude the possibility that these paintings also register 
the known and the knowable, whereby Rothko's paintings code a form of 
anguish consonant with modern alienation. Here Rothko's paintings articulate a 
type of Dionysian suffering. Such an interpretation is consonant with Rothko's 
engagement with Nietzsche's book The Birth of Tragedy. This is supplementary 
knowledge that we bring to the painting which is extraneous to an experience of 
aesthetic negativity. It is a supplement we might use to stabilise the negative 
and de-subjectifying effects of a sublime experience. 
It is against such knowable supplementarity that this thesis promotes the idea 
that negativity can only be practiced through an encounter with individual 
paintings. The interpretive model mobilised in this study, indebted to Kant's, 
Nietzsche's, Adorno's and Lyotard's theories of the sublime, is an attempt to 
come to terms with the relation between the negativities of aesthetic experience 
and the positivities of interpretive understanding. This thesis takes seriously the 
idea that aesthetic practices of negativity are in some sense unspeakable and 
resist interpretation, even as it delivers an understanding of such practices of 
negativity, and how they make meaning fail and how we might differentiate 
between them. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified a signifying process called sublime irresolution, which 
enables us to negotiate the paradoxical threshold between understanding the 
sublime, and experiencing it as an unrepresentable or unspeakable event. This 
chapter has drawn on the art historical insights of Marin and the philosophical 
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insights of Kant, Nietzsche, Adorno and Lyotard, all of whom offer differing 
accounts of how the sublime operates as a subjectifying, or de-subjectifying 
aesthetic category that invites the practicing of negativity. Marin proposes that 
we understand the sublime as an effect of the organisation of meaning, via a 
semic matrix that he identifies as a "generative structure for a theory of the 
passions" enacted through an encounter with Poussin's painting Landscape with 
Pyramus and Thisbe. For Marin "the sublime is the impossibility of a theory of 
the sublime, the display or "monstration" of its impossibility" (Marin 1999, 139). 
This chapter has argued for something similar. It has demonstrated how 
selected sublime paintings mobilise a de-subjectifying signifying process which 
disaggregates meaning. Such an event, as an aesthetic specific practicing of 
negativity, is to some extent unspeakable or unrepresentable. This chapter has 
however, argued that aesthetic negativity can be understood, but only insofar 
as we can distinguish it from other practices of negativity, analyse how it invites 
the practicing of negativity and understand it as a de-subjectifying event. The 
interpretive method mobilised in this study thus marks the irreducible inter-
relation between the unspeakableness of sublime aesthetic experience, and an 
understanding of how paintings deliver such experience. 
This method is variously indebted to the philosophical insights of Kant, 
Nietzsche, Adorno and Lyotard, but differs from such philosophies, insofar as it 
is oriented toward understanding how paintings deliver sublime and poetic 
experience. In this regard this chapter has investigated how Poussin's 
Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe, Turner's Seascape with Storm Coming On 
and The Fall of an Avalanche at Grisons and Rothko's Red on Maroon, register 
an unspeakable and sublime event, even as we are also able to understand via 
differing modalities of sublime irresolution, something of how these paintings do 
so, and how these modalities of sublime irresolution differ. 
Aesthetic negativity is not immutable, or discursively discrete. It is found in 
paintings and visual art practices, and theorised in philosophy, from the 17th 
century to the present. This thesis has identified two differing modalities of an 
aesthetics of negativity in painting, called poetic ambiguity and sublime 
irresolution. The first two chapters of this thesis have presented these two 
modalities as having relatively distinct identities. Poetic ambiguity opens the 
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viewer to differences, whereas sublime irresolution mobilises an interplay of 
oppositions that provoke or thrill the viewer. The next two chapters investigate 
how the boundaries between aesthetic experience and understanding are 
troubled by philosophical deconstruction whose methods disrupt the boundary 
between experience and understanding and degrade the autonomy of aesthetic 
negativity. 
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Chapter Three 
Deconstruction and Negative Aesthetics. 
4.1. Introduction. 
This chapter investigates the tensions and correspondences between 
deconstructive practices of negativity in philosophical texts and aesthetic 
practices of negativity in contemporary paintings and visual art practices. It 
does so by deploying the dialectical interpretive method already developed in 
this study, which sustains the irreducible inter-relation between aesthetic 
practices of negativity and understanding the implications of that negativity. By 
contrast deconstructive methods collapse such distinctions in the interests of an 
inbetweeness which deconstructs fixed oppositions and blurs boundaries, 
including the boundary between the negativities of aesthetic experience and the 
positivities of understanding. 
The previous two chapters investigated a discourse of negative aesthetics 
through a consideration of the philosophies of Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty, Kant, 
Nietzsche, Adorno, and Lyotard, and of Koerner's and Marin's art historical 
interpretations, and my own accounts aesthetic negativity in selected paintings 
by C.D. Friedrich, Nicholas Poussin, J.M.W. Turner and Mark Rothko. The 
ensuing discussion of selected texts by Derrida (Spurs: Nietzsche's styles and 
The Colossal), will investigate how deconstruction both resembles and 
challenges, such a dialectical discourse of aesthetic negativity. 
This chapter will investigate how aesthetic negativity, as an effect of the 
signifying practices called poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution, is a 
feature of Glenn Brown's paintings and Jeremy Wafer's visual art practice. This 
chapter will argue that these contemporary paintings and visual art practices 
sustain their aesthetic specificity, even as they record the impact of 
philosophical deconstruction within their differing aesthetic modalities. The 
dialectical interpretive method employed here preserves the distinction between 
an experience of aesthetic negativity and understanding the postmodern and 
post colonial identities of these painting and visual art practices. 
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4.2. Dialectical and deconstructive methods. 
This chapter registers the antagonistic differences between deconstructive 
methods, which degrade the dialectical relation between oppositions, and the 
interpretive method used in this study which sustains the dialectical relation 
between aesthetic experience and understanding, and by extension, preserves 
the autonomy of aesthetic negativity. The dialectical interpretive method 
developed in this thesis enables us to identify how sublime and poetic aesthetic 
practices of negativity de-subjectify the viewer. This method can only 'point to' 
that unspeakable enactment structured by the dialectical relation between 
aesthetic objects and viewers, in an effort to illuminate the irreducible inter-
relation between aesthetic experience and understanding. 
From this dialectical perspective we can only experience aesthetic negativity, 
although we can also understand how it is mobilised by paintings and recognise 
that poetic and sublime practices of negativity de-subjectify us, and indeed that 
they do so in different ways. Poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution can be 
understood as two differing modalities of an aesthetics of negativity. 
Furthermore, I suggest that deconstruction and an aesthetics of negativity 
might be understood as two genres of a discourse of negativity because they 
both disrupt the positivities of understanding and of meaning. We can 
understand how both deconstructive and aesthetic specific practices of 
negativity de-subjectify the viewer or reader and as such register an affinity 
with one another, even as we might also understand that these practices of 
negativity are in competition with one another. 
Furthermore, in distinguishing between, and preserving the boundary between 
the unspeakable negativities of aesthetic experience and the positivities of 
understanding, the dialectical method deployed in this study enables us to 
understand that the postmodern and post colonial critiques that paintings and 
visual art practices deliver are of a different order to sublime or poetic aesthetic 
negativity, whose failures of meaning de-subjectify the viewer. These 
postmodern and post colonial critiques are only available to a second order 
practice of understanding, which we dialectically mobilise as a positive 
supplement to the negativities of aesthetic experience. 
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Philosophical deconstruction eschews the clear-cut outcomes sketched above. 
Deconstruction refuses the establishment of boundaries that would fix 
differences and preserve the autonomy of negative aesthetics. Deconstruction is 
a practice of the inbetween that disrupts a constitutive inter-relation between 
aesthetic experience and understanding, or between negativity and positivity. 
Derrida's project of critiquing a metaphysics of presence and the integrated 
subject is conducted through a deconstructive style of philosophical argument 
that refuses the establishment of certainty and unambiguous understanding. 
Seen from this perspective deconstructive philosophy is a textual practice of 
negativity which preserves indeterminacy. 
For example, in Derrida's book titled Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, the reader is 
presented with a deconstructive philosophical style of writing that disrupts the 
rational assumptions and methods of traditional philosophy. Derrida's text 
conflates the negativities of the feminine with those of a dissimulating, quasi-
poetic and deconstructive style of writing. It also disrupts the traditional binary, 
in which the positivities of philosophical understanding exist in dialectical and 
hierarchical relation to the negativities of style. This inaugurates a 
deconstructive process which installs the reader into a textual and non-
aesthetic practicing of negativity. Such a textual and philosophical event, like 
Adorno's negative dialectics, operates as a critique of the "integrated subject" 
(Holland 1997(4). Using Christoph Menke's arguments found in his book titled 
The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida 1999 
translated by Neil Solomon, I suggest that Derrida's deconstructive methods 
found in Nietzsche's Styles, degrades aesthetic negativity in favour of a more 
general textual and non-aesthetic practice of negativity. 
Similarly, Derrida's essay The Colossal engages the sublime as a process of 
infinite dissemination, open to differences to come, even it deconstructs the 
binarist and dialectical assumptions of the Kantian sublime. Derrida's text is 
both a philosophical supplement to the sublime, which challenges Kantian 
dialectics, and a textual practice which invites a deconstructive practice of 
sublime negativity. It is thus both a 'frame', or a supplement to the sublime, 
and 'its work'. Derrida's sublime text, where understanding is perpetually at risk 
from a style of writing, installs the reader into a sublime and deconstructive 
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practicing of negativity. This deconstructive doubling of a subversive style and a 
philosophical argument constitutes both an understanding of the discursive 
implications of the displacement of the Kantian sublime with a deconstructive 
sublime, and a defeat of such understanding. 
This chapter will investigate how the deconstructive methods employed by 
Oerrida's two texts degrade the traditional and dialectical relation between 
aesthetic experience and understanding. Such degradation is part of a 
deconstructive project which blurs the distinction between aesthetic practices of 
negativity and textual practices of negativity, but privileges the latter. This 
textual displacement of the autonomy of aesthetic negativity is part of the task 
of deconstructing the settled assumptions of a Western philosophical tradition 
and its all-pervasive metaphysics of presence 1 . 
By contrast, the differentiating dialectical interpretive method developed in this 
study preserves the particularity of aesthetic specific practices of negativity, and 
enables us to make distinctions between experience and understanding. It 
enables us to understand, to some extent, what negativity is, and how it might 
be mobilised in paintings. However, this is a method which leaves the delivery 
of practices of negativity to that unique relation between paintings/visual art 
practices and viewers. Poetically ambiguous and sublimely irresolvable paintings 
and visual art practices, from this perspective engage 'proto-deconstructive' 
practices of negativity, as aesthetic experience. 
4.3. Deconstructive quasi-poetic/feminine style. 
The first chapter of this thesis investigated how the signifying process called 
poetic ambiguity in CO. Friedrich's painting titled Garden Terrace, de-
subjectifies the viewer by disrupting binary oppositions. Oeconstructive texts 
likewise invite de-subjectifying 2 practices of negativity, and do so by 
1 A metaphysics of presence, emanating from Greek philosophy, "is fixed in the concept of totality which dominates 
Western philosophy"'(Derrida 1978, 102). In his essay titled Violence and Metaphysics in his book Writing and Difference. 
translated by Alan Bass, Derrida exempts Levinas from that violence by claiming that Levinasian metaphysics "calls upon 
the ethical relationship - a nonviolent relationship to the infinite as infinitely other, to the Other - as the only one capable 
of opening the space of transcendence and of liberating metaphysics"(ibid). 
1 To 'de-subjectify' is the inverse of to 'subjectify'. This inversion carries with it the histories and discursive values 
associated with a discourse of subjectification in which the boundaries and certainties of 'the self are maintained. 
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disrupting binary oppositions and by conflating different negativities. In his book 
Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles 1979, translated by Barbara Harlow, Derrida invites 
the practicing of negativity3 by redeploying Nietzsche's ideas on the questions of 
truth and 'woman'. As Keith Ansell-Pearson puts it: 
"What Derrida is doing in Spurs is enlisting Nietzsche's attempt to write 
with style(s) (conceived of as a feminine operation) in the cause of 
deconstruction and its critique of the metaphysics of presence" 
(Patton1993, 35). 
Derrida makes the case that Nietzsche's style, as a spur or a weapon and a 
device for distancing and protecting, invokes not the 'figure of woman' but 
'Nietzsche's woman'. Here 
"coiled in the labyrinth of the ear '" a tapestry or curtain ... rises ... at the 
sound of a powerful contralto voice ... . This vOice, like the best of man ... 
to be found in woman, appears to transcend the difference between the 
sexes" (Derrida 1979, 43). 
Here the "question of style becomes a question of strategy in which the 
possibility of a 'radically deferred, indeterminate style of writing' is explored in 
order to avoid all essentialisms and stable categories" (Patton 1993, 35). This 
indeterminate style of writing, which produces a processual and disruptive form 
of readership, invites the practicing of negativity by conflating the negativities of 
the feminine with a quasi-poetics. 
3To make the claim that Derrida's deconstructive texts invite the practicing of negativity is to risk a deconstructive 
criticism that negativity exists in a dialectical relation to positivity; a relation, philosophical deconstruction would critique. 
Derrida's essay From Restricted to General Economy in Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, compares 
Hegel's concept of negativity to Bataille's laughter. Such laughter "exceeds dialectics and the dialectician". and what 
Heger calls abstract negativity",.Bataille pulls out of dialectics. He withdraws it from the horizon of meaning and 
knowledge" (Derrida 1978, 323). Laughter, poetry and deconstruction are not bound by a dialectics where negativities are 
servile to sovereign positivities. Instead, from Derrida's perspective deconstruction, laughter and poetry are opportunities 
to open up the space between positivity and negativity. In mobilising the term a 'deconstructive practicing of negativity'. I 
am aware that there is a certain transgression being played out here, for deconstruction is never purely a practice of 
negativity or of positivity, but a practice which doubles these distinctions. That being so, I maintain that deconstruction 
does invite the practicing of negativity, and that deconstructive practices of negativity are similar to aesthetic practices of 
negativity, insofar as both are de-subjectifying opportunities. Furthermore aesthetic negativity may be conceived of as a 
proto-deconstructive practice, which deconstruction displaces in an attempt to occupy the privileged discursive position 
that aesthetic negativity, as the sovereign purveyor of negativity, has in modern culture. The ensuing discussion will make 
the case that deconstructive and aesthetic practices of negativity are two competing genres of a discourse of negativity that 
has several articulations, 
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Style/woman-as-untruth ('Nietzsche's woman') does not pertain to real women, 
but to a discursive position open to both women and men, yet it bears the 
imprint of women's supposed 'identity' figured as non-identity. 
"Perhaps woman - a non-identity, a non-figure, a simulacrum - is 
distance's very chasm, the out-distancing of distance, the interval's 
cadence, distance itself ... at once divergence, distance and the 
distantiation of distance, the deferment of distance, the de-ferment, 
mocking, sympathetic, seductive. Yes, life is a woman!" (Derrida 1979, 
53). 
This dissimulating 'femininity', seductive, distanced and divergent, is a resource 
for women and men, insofar it makes possible the transgression of static truths 
and hierarchical foundations. To embrace of the negativities of the feminine is 
to acknowledge a variety of alterities that are usually repressed in western 
culture and philosophy. This figure of 'Nietzsche's woman' is a 'spur' for the 
practicing of deconstructive negativity which defeats/protects the distancing 
techniques of reason which sustain dichotomies between, for example the 
aesthetics of style and philosophical reasoning. 
In Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, the conflation of the negativities of the feminine, a 
political project, with the negativities of a quasi-poetic style, a deconstructive 
project, is not without its gains and its losses. As several feminist 
commentators have noted, a deconstructive project, which marks alterity as 
feminine, elides the regulatory and repressive operations of the trope of 'women 
as otherness', and how this affects real women in patriarchy4. This conflation of 
the feminine with a quasi-poetic style, services a deconstructive project that 
hovers between the textual and the political practicing of negativity. This is a 
4Gayatri Spivak in her essay titled Displacement and the Discourse of Woman claims that "a deconstructive discourse, even 
as it criticizes phallocentrism ... must displace the figure of the woman twice over ... as a double displacement into the sign 
of the abyss" (Holland 1997,48). This view conceives of 'Nietzsche's woman' as a figure which displaces the realities of 
women, and this displacement ensures that female identity is associated with dissimulation, seduction and untruth. Within 
such a brutal economy of exchange, 'Nietzsche's woman' is not a deconstructive figurative matrix available to both women 
and men, but the mark of a hierarchy which sustains masculine ressentiment, as the will to power. .lanet Lungstrum, by 
contrast argues that the "Nietzschean woman is, above all, a new dialectical art of palingenesis: a creativity of self-renewal 
that demands a male-female symbiosis, a bisexual agon without resolve and without synthesis" (Burgard 1994, 137). 
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deconstructive practice that Irigaray invokes as part of a deconstructive 
discourse of ecriture feminine, discussed more fully in Chapter Four. In 
Irigaray's text, the philosophical degradation of poetic style services a becoming 
politics of the feminine. 
Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles doubles the negativity of the "dissumulatress, an 
artist, a dionysiac", with a "radically deferred, indeterminate style of writing" 
(Patton 1993, 35). Such heterogeneity forecloses the possibility of mastery, 
that is the mastery or distancing of understanding. We are invited to 'conclude' 
that 'Nietzsche's woman' (a style of doing philosophy) is a figure of such 
dissimulating heterogeneity, that it deconstructs our habits of mastery oriented 
toward schematic clarity and truth. Instead meaning is deferred in the interests 
of indeterminacy, dissimulation, non-mastery and a perpetual agonistics. 
'Nietzsche's woman' produces the reader as "a bisexual agon, without resolve 
and without synthesis" (Burgard 1994, 137). The 'lesson' we learn from this 
deconstruction of conceptual clarity, truth or mastery, through a performative 
and processual agonistics of a dissimulating, seducing style which is never 
reducible to itself nor becomes the antithesis of that which it deconstructs, is 
that philosophy is 'shot through' negativities that are constantly deferred. 
Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles is a philosophical and processual opportunity to 
encounter those repressed negativities. 
Such a deconstructive practicing of negativity is the possibility of encountering 
alterity in a philosophical text. Derrida claims that such an understanding of 
"deconstruction is not an enclosure into nothingness but an openness to the 
other" (Kearney 1993, 31). Jonathan Roffe in his essay Deconstruction as Ethics 
in the book Understanding Derrida clarifies how such openness to the other 
situates alterity, otherness, "at the heart of language" (Roffe 2004, 38). Roffe 
claims that for Derrida, the generalising nature of philosophical ethics and 
morality is itself a form of violence, where 
" 'law, the power of resolution, and the relationship to the other, are once 
more part of the archia, they lose their ethical specificity' ... that is 
metaphYSiCS - is itself a threat to ethics" (ibid) .... "Western philosophy is 
predicated on a fundamental necessary exclusion of alterity in order to 
create order, truth, subjectivity, and all of those deep philosophical values" 
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(Roffe 2004, 41) .... "this hierarchy itself, just like the traditional self-other 
dyad must be undone: there is no fundamental, transcendent asymmetry 
between self and other in either direction, but a radical and universal 
disequilibrium, where all sameness is dissolved into a web of otherness" 
(ibid). 
This critique of a metaphysics of presence does not mean that a new binary is 
installed, rather "self and other emerge together through what Derrida here 
calls 'the work and peril of interrogation' - an unsure, difficult and risky process" 
(ibid, 42). It is this practicing of negativity within deconstructive philosophy, 
which can never secure an ethics of the self, or of alterity, but which is an 
address of multiple differences that is the "condition of possibility for any ethical 
act" (ibid, 43). 
Derrida's Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles invites such an ethical moment, whereby a 
traditional style of philosophical argument is displaced/infected by its 'others': 
the negativities of a feminine dissimulating, and a quasi-poetic deconstructive 
style of argument. 'Nietzsche's woman' thus does not invite the binarist 
negativities of the 'will to power's, but installs an undecidable practicing of 
negativity, a textually deconstructive process of reading. The reader is 
confronted with two moments. Firstly, in which he or she is opened up to the 
negativities of, and differences between, the feminine and a dissimulating quasi-
poetic style. Secondly, even as he or she is also presented with a displacement, 
or a deconstruction, of traditional philosophical assumptions and methods which 
preserve the differences between aesthetic experience and philosophical 
understanding. It is such doubling, between a process which produces 
distinctions, and a process which displaces differences (that interminable 
differance6 between difference and deferral), that delivers the reader to 
5Diana Coole explores Nietzsche's practicing of negativity in which" the will to power, as the mode of becoming. is only a 
more sophisticated and integral metaphor for the force and form, excess and creative individuation, pulsing opening and 
closing, that Nietzsche had formerly imagined in a state of contradictory tension. The abundant energies (will) of the 
cosmos manifest themselves in a continuous process of creating and destroying, forming and deforming (power). but these 
two aspects are now inseparable. They are not simply synthesized, but are the very phenomenality of phenomena" (Coole 
2000, 93). 
6 Alan Bass in his translators' introduction to Derrida's book titled Writing and DifJerence 1987. reminds us that for 
Derrida, the term difJerance does not" function simply as either difJerence (difference) or as difJerance in the usual sense 
(deferral), and plays on both meanings at once" (Derrida 1967, xviii). It is against the reduction of terms to a totality. or a 
structure which seeks to present the whole, and against Structuralism in generaL that the neologism for which Derrida is so 
famous, must itself remain undecidable. 
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deconstructive undecidability. 
Derrida's Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles is a thus text which invites the practicing of 
negativity, for it instantiates an undecidable process of reading which 
sustains/erodes differences. The reader is unable to conceptually master 
meaning. This deconstructive failure of meaning, like the negativity of poetic 
ambiguity and sublime irresolution, is a de-subjectifying event. There are thus 
significant correspondences between aesthetic practices of negativity and 
deconstructive practices of negativity in terms of their de-subjectifying effects 
and their disaggregating methods, but not in terms of their discursive 
commitments. We might recall that Garden Terrace both unifies the viewer's 
experience in terms of a binarist discourse which sustains subject/object 
distinctions, even as it disaggregates that experience by also presenting the 
viewer with an anti-binarist, poetic displacement of meaning. Like 
deconstruction, this is a de-subjectifying process which invites the practicing of 
negativity7. The ensuing discussion records something of the discursive 
competition between aesthetic negativity in painting and philosophical 
deconstruction. 
I suggest that Derrida's Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles invites the practicing of 
negativity by conflating the negativities of the feminine with those of a quasi-
poetic style of doing philosophy8. In so doing, this philosophical text 
deconstructs, and degrades, the positivities of a traditional style of philosophy. 
This is a method which ruptures the traditional dialectical hierarchies in which 
7Christoph Menke compares Derrida's and Adorno's approach to the practicing of negativity, which both deploy 
'processuality'. For Derrida, the text infinitely and interminably constitutes the reader differently at each encounter. via 
processes which displace meaning. For Adorno, the aesthetic object inaugurates a failure of meaning by setting up a 
dialectical relation between oppositions. This involves a 'hesitation' between mimesis and meaning. This process of 
repetitive and mimetic re-enactment constitutes meaning and its failure. Here the aesthetic object inaugurates a practicing 
of negativity, which de-subjectifies the viewer. Such correspondences between Adorno's aesthetics of negativity and 
Derrida's philosophical deconstruction, according to Menke, are put under pressure by Derrida's insight that .. the 
aesthetics of negativity betrays its own insights into the logic of negativity by remaining aesthetics" (Menke 1999, 162). 
8Elizabeth Grosz identifies a structure for how deconstruction produces a sense of indeterminacy. It is this indeterminacy 
that I suggest invites the practicing of negativity. According to Grosz deconstruction is a" threefold intervention into the 
metaphysical structures of binary oppositions: I.the strategic reversal of binary terms. so that the term occupying the 
negative position of the binary is placed in a positive position, and the positive in the negative position: 2.the movement of 
displacement, in which the negative term is displaced from its dependent position and located as the very condition of the 
positive term; and 3. the creation or discovery of a term that is undecidable within a binary logic. insofar as it includes both 
binary terms. and yet exceeds their scope. It is a term which is simultaneously both and neither of these terms."(Grosz 
1989,xv.) 
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the negativities of dissimulation, otherness, the feminine and the aesthetic, 
constitute the positivities of (masculine) reason. Here feminine and poetic 
negativities are reconstituted as textual negativities, no longer bound by a 
dialectical and hierarchical relation to the positivities of (masculine) reason. 
They exist en bloc as a compendium of heterogeneous negativities whose 
untruth, feminine dissimulation and quasi-poetic style disrupts the positivities of 
a traditional and rational style of philosophical argument. 
If in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles Derrida disrupts a traditional and binarist 
hierarchy whereby the positivities of a philosophical argument trump the 
negativities of a poetic style, this text also disrupts a traditional aesthetics of 
negativity which sustains the dialectical distinction between aesthetic practices 
of negativity and the positivities of understanding. For in associating the political 
negativities of the feminine, with the aesthetic negativities of the poetic, the 
discursive boundaries of both are disrupted, even as negativity as a general 
tendency is preserved. For Derrida, it is only when the poetic infects and is 
infected by other discourses, that aesthetic negativity is displaced from its 
traditionally privileged position. Indeed it is through a general, and non-
aesthetic, practicing of negativity that the boundary which preserves and 
privileges the autonomy of an aesthetics of negativity, may be deconstructed. 
Derrida makes this point in his book Writing and Difference 1978, translated by 
Alan Bass: 
" The poetic or the ecstatic is that in every discourse which can open itself 
up to the absolute loss of its sense, to the (non)-base of the sacred, of 
non meaning, of unacknowledged play, to the swoon from which it is 
reawakened by a throw of the dice. What is poetic in sovereignty is 
announced in 'the moment when poetry renounces theme and meaning' " 
(Derrida 1978, 261). 
Friedrich's Garden Terrace, we might recall, also disables meaning and opens 
the viewer to differences via the aesthetic operations of poetic ambiguity, 
whose negativities, as demonstrated in the first chapter, are not reducible to 
the feminine. If the aesthetic practicing of negativity inaugurated by poetic 
ambiguity in Friedrich's painting so resembles deconstruction, we might 
consider that negativities of poetic ambiguity in particular, and the aesthetics of 
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negativity in general, are a privileged resource for philosophical deconstruction. 
I suspect that this is indeed the case. That being so, deconstructive methods 
degrade aesthetic negativity in the interests of promoting more dispersed non-
aesthetic and textual practices of negativity. 
According to Christoph Menke in his book titled The Sovereignty of Art: 
Aesthetic negativity in Adorno and Derrida, Derrida critiques negative aesthetics 
because this a discourse in which aesthetic negativity is privileged over other 
practices of negativity. From this perspective aesthetic negativity is a form of 
negation dialectically constituting the positivities of traditional philosophical 
aesthetics. Negative aesthetics thus sustains a dialectical relation between 
experience and understanding, a relation philosophical deconstruction seeks to 
disrupt. From this perspective, even if negative aesthetics remains one of the 
most radical approaches to the discipline of philosophical aesthetics, it remains 
for Derrida "within the limits that have been inviolably drawn for this 
philosophical discipline" (Menke 1999, 163). 
For Menke, Derrida's condemnation of negative aesthetics because it is tied to a 
traditional and dialectical aesthetics, should be seen against Adorno's defence of 
it. We might recall that for Adorno, the negativities of (particular) aesthetic 
specific practices place reason in crisis, whereas for Derrida, textual negativity 
(generally) disrupts all established discourses and practices, including the 
discourse of aesthetics. According to Menke, 
"Derrida has expanded this critique far beyond its primary contents into a 
general critique of all aesthetics as the subjugation ("making servile") of 
the potentialities of negativity" (Menke 1999, 163) .... "The marginalization 
of aesthetic experience, especially of one whose negativity has already 
been recognized, is for Derrida nothing less than the complicity of tropes 
aesthetics with "metaphysics", that is, in Derrida's usage, with that 
approach to our discourses that reconstructs (reenacts) their useful 
functioning" (ibid, 164). 
Bearing these insights in mind, we are better placed to understand the 
disruptive features of Derrida's text Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles. Firstly it disrupts 
a rational style of argument associated with the Western philosophical tradition, 
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by infecting it with a Nietzschean style of argument. Secondly, this disruptive 
philosophical style of arguing is characterised as a quasi-poetic style, even as 
this deconstructive method degrades the boundaries between philosophical 
understanding, aesthetic experience and the feminine. The degradation of these 
boundaries disrupts the aesthetic autonomy of aesthetic experience. In 
instantiating this disruptive logic, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles conflates the 
negativities of the feminine with those of the deconstructive, dissimulating 
quasi-poetic style. 
4.4. Deconstruction and the sublime 
The previous chapter investigated Kant's, Nietzsche's, Adorno's and Lyotard's 
philosophical accounts of the sublime. These philosophies of aesthetic negativity 
variously present the sublime as a subjectifying or de-subjectifying effect of the 
dialectical relation between unspeakable aesthetic experience and an 
understanding of that experience. This aesthetics of negativity also informs 
Derrida's discussion of the sublime in The Colossal, in the chapter titled 
Parergon, in The Truth in Painting 1987, translated by Geoff McLeod and Ian 
Bennington. Here Derrida critiques the binarist and dialectical assumptions of 
the Kantian sublime by recourse to a deconstructive method. This method 
mobilises a sublime practicing of negativity that might be called a 
deconstructive sublime. According to Bernstein "Deconstruction, the working of 
the sublime, is sublime" (Bernstein 1992, 171). 
Derrida's deconstructive sublime is a textual operation that disrupts a traditional 
metaphysics of presence, which itself contains and preserves binarist 
hierarchies that privilege reason and the integrated subject. As discussed 
earlier, this metaphysics of presence is defended by Kant's version of the 
sublime. Derrida's text deconstructs this Kantian version of the sublime and 
installs the reader into a deconstructive practicing of negativity. Here the 
negativity of the sublime is the 'work' of deconstruction, a double event, where 
the deconstructive text is both 'frame' and 'work'. Here, the sublime is not an 
effect of aesthetic negativity, but a textual and processual enactment, or a 
deconstructive practicing of negativity. The sublime from this perspective is 
unknowable, undecidable excess, which only appears through a textual process 
where meaning and understanding fails/emerges. For Derrida this 
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deconstructive process is called the passe-partout, both a frame - a 
supplementary understanding, and the work - a deconstructive practicing of 
negativity. This passe-partout by-passes traditional dialectical distinctions 
between the disruption and construction of meaning, and is undecidably both. 
The passe-partout also disrupts the boundary which preserves the autonomy of 
aesthetic negativity, inasmuch as it figures a non-aesthetic or textual practice of 
negativity. From this perspective the 'truth in painting' exists between 
"the outside and the inside, between the external and internal edge-line, 
the framer and the framed, the figure and the ground, form and content, 
signifier and signified, and so on for any two-faced opposition" .... "The 
passe-partout which here creates an event must not pass for a master 
key. You will not be able to pass it from hand to hand like a convenient 
instrument, a short treatise, a viaticum or even an organon or pocket 
canon, in short a transcendental pass, a password to open all doors, 
decipher all texts and keep their chains under surveillance" (Derrida 1987, 
12). 
In contrast to this view, for Adorno, the truth content of art is an aesthetic 
specific practicing of negativity, organised by the dialectical relation between 
the aesthetic object and the viewer, where meaning and understanding also 
fail/cohere. For Adorno it is the property of art to mobilise that dialectical 
relation, and sublime art is one of negativity's privileged moments through 
which the autonomy of aesthetic negativity is sustained. The correspondences 
between Derrida's and Adorno's texts, relate to their common commitment to 
the practicing of negativity, inaugurated by textual or aesthetic processes which 
causes meaning to fail/emerge. It is the status of that process that is the 
contentious point here. For Adorno, such processes are aesthetic and 
autonomous and operate as an 'immanent critique of reason', whereas for 
Derrida aesthetic negativity is caught up in a philosophical aesthetics of 
negativity which services a master-narrative of a metaphysics of presence. 
Against this possibility, Derrida's deconstructive sublime, as the articulation of 
the uncontainable figure of the passe-partout, de-subjectifies the reader by 
displacing a binarist format, associated with a Kantian dialectics of the sublime 
and a dialectics of aesthetic negativity in which aesthetic autonomy is secured, 
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with an infinite process of dissemination, open to the differences and 
multiplicities of meanings to come. 
Derrida's practicing of negativity in The Colossal engages a type of language 
that is antithetical to the differentiating impulses of the interpretive method 
deployed in this thesis, which does not mobilize negativity but makes 
distinctions in the service of understanding how negativity is mobilised in art 
and deconstructive philosophy. As such this thesis will to some extent violate 
deconstructive principles and methods, and in so doing distort the practicing of 
negativity that Derrida's text makes possible. This disclaimer is necessary, for 
what follows is a second order activity, and an attempt to understand the 
implications of Derrida's text, so that we might assess how the aesthetic 
negativities of sublime irresolution in painting and visual art practices are at risk 
from, and in competition with, a deconstructive and textual sublime. 
Derrida begins this discussion of the sublime with a double: the colossal 
column, in which the differences between the words column and colossal are 
synthesised via the notion of 'cize', a doubled word which means both measure 
and cut, which serves as an entry into Kant's theme of the colossal, found in 
The Analytic of the Sublime. Here the column is the frame (the parergon) to the 
colossal 'work' of the sublime, which remains unrepresentable. 
In the Kantian schema this colossal sublime, which pertains to the reasoning 
mind, is a word which approximates the unrepresentable, which however, is 
represented by this word, the colossal. As such, Derrida draws our attention to 
the idea that the colossal (sublime) can only be 'almost representable' or 
'almost too large'. For Derrida this 'almost too' "did not slip from the Kant's 
pen" (Derrida 1987, 125), but is a qualification mounted by Derrida which 
emphasises that the sublime is approached through the representations of 
language, and therefore strictly cannot avoid being understood. Nor is it only 
the property of the reasoning mind; it can only be 'almost unrepresentable' by 
reason of its (colossal) size (cize) as an effect of a textual discourse. Derrida 
continues this assault by associating this 'almost-too-Iarge' colossal size of the 
sublime with" the phallus, which doubles as a corpse; but never be in a hurry 
when its a matter of erection, let things happen" (ibid, 127). Such ironic double 
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play displaces/endorses the reasoning Kantian sublime subject position, by 
revealing its discursively embodied and detumescent/erectile masculinity9. 
The style of this philosophical text is saturated poetic strategies, with doublings, 
allusions, metaphors and disruptive conflations. For this text both produces 
understanding, but undercuts it at the same time, and the reader is left 
floundering, at risk, catapulted into multiple and unstable meanings. This is a 
style of philosophical writing in which the reader is unable to impose a rational 
order, or sustain the distinctions between understanding and practicing a 
deconstructive and philosophical negativity. 
However this text also to some extent enables us to understand that it is a 
philosophical critique of the dialectical and binarist 'violence' of the Kantian 
sublime. For Derrida, in Kant's version of the sublime "pleasure only 'gushes 
indirectly.' It comes after inhibition, arrest, suspension ... followed by a brusque 
outpouring ... the accumulation presses to the limit" (ibid, 128). The violence of 
this rupture joins pleasurable attraction and repulsion, so that the poles of 
positive and negative irresolvably reverberate. For Kant, such sublime 
irresolution becomes 'a negative pleasure' (ibid, 129), a dialectical pleasure 
operating between sublime experience and understanding. Derrida's critique 
being that such a dialectics preserves a binarist hierarchical relation between 
reason and its 'others'. 
It is this violence that Derrida deconstructs, so that the negativity of otherness, 
and the disruptiveness of textual practices of negativity are preserved, even as 
they are paradoxically rendered 'positive'. For the practicing of negativity 
instantiates an ethical openness to difference, a positive outcome. However, in 
contrast to Kant's binarist and dialectical account of the sublime which sustains 
a binarist hierarchy between the negativities of otherness and the positivities of 
reason, in Derrida's account of the sublime, binaries are strategically reversed, 
so that the positivities of rational understanding are not secured against the 
negative pleasures of sublime experience, but are displaced by a deconstructive 
9Dorothea Olkowski claims that where Derrida genders the sublime as an embodied and masculine event he sustains the 
traditional phallocentric binary whereby the sublime constitutes masculine identities. Women in this schema remain the 
constitutive and excluded outside to a masculine economy, where the sublime is a category premised on the "cize of man 
that goes back through Kant to Plato and Oedipus and beyond" (Holland 1997, 19). 
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practicing of negativity. Such deconstructions are effected through that 
undecidable figure called the passe-partout, which operates between the 
positivities of philosophical understanding, and the negativities of an 
argumentative style, that opens the reader to infinite differences 'to come'. 
Here "the cise of the colossus is neither culture nor nature, both culture 
and nature. It is perhaps, between the presentable and the 
unrepresentable, the passage from one to the other as much as the 
irreducibility of the one to the other. Cise, edging, cut edges, that which 
passes and happens, without passing, from one to the other" (ibid, 143). 
This disseminating cise, this inbetweeness, or the "passing-from-one to-the-
other" (ibid, 144) is a displacement of a dialectical and binarist subject position 
figured by Kant's Analytic of the Sublime. 
The closing passages of The Colossal consider how the Kantian sublime is 
structured not only by the (colossal) inadequacy of reason, but this possibility 
also figures a "colossal Darstellen, of the erection there in front (Ia-devant) ... 
which "rises up and rises up again in its immense cise" (ibid) as a "Colossal 
Fort: da." (ibid, 145). It is this colossal binary that Derrida breaks up via a style 
of writing, which is structured by repetitions and double meanings (traits) which 
enact a deconstructive process that undercuts clear rational argument. Here the 
'argument' is made via the deferrals and indeterminacy of a quasi-poetic 
language saturated by metaphor, allusion and ambiguity. We might approach a 
fuller mis/understanding of this deconstructive process, by way of a 
consideration of Derrida's conclusion to this essay. Here he quotes Kant's text, 
in which the mathematical sublime is figured as 
"A tree judged by the height of man gives, at all events, a standard for a 
mountain; and, supposing this is, say, a mile high, it can serve as unit for 
the number expressing the earth's diameter, so as to make it intuitable; 
similarly the earth's diameter, for the known planetary system; this again 
for the milky way; and the immeasurable host of such systems, which go 
by the name of nebulae, and most likely in turn form such a system, holds 
out no prospect of a limit (Meredith, 105)" (Derrida 1987, 146-7). 
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This substitutional, linear and dialectical logic quoted above is pre-empted in the 
foregoing quote, by a different deconstructive logic, in which Derrida uses a 
quasi-poetic, or deconstructive style, which mimics this infinitely proliferating 
logic, but displaces it through the 'traits' of dissemination. Derrida's 
deconstructive poetics goes like this: 
"death knell (g/as) and the galactic of the Kolossus. In the interval 
between the mathematical sublime and the dynamic sublime, a tree had 
been projected into the Milky Way. There a bridge over the abyss which 
threatens to swallow everything, on the edge of which the analytic of the 
sublime is broached. Now this whirlpool which tears up the tree and throws 
it, immensely, into the milky dissemen (fa dissemence)" (Ibid, 146). 
It is between these two versions, between Kant's linear and substitutional logic, 
and Derrida's sublime and disseminating excess, that the reader negotiates 
some mis/understanding/experience of the sublime. Dissemination is the 
privileged term here, and is part of a deconstructive process in which the 'trait' 
figures a different sublime threshold, not predicated on the oscillational, and 
dialectical, relation between oppositions, between terror and thrill, or attraction 
and repulsion, but as the workings of a deconstructive "parergon: neither inside 
nor outside, neither above nor below, it disconcerts any opposition but does not 
remain indeterminate and it gives rise to the work. It is no longer merely 
around the work" (Derrida 1987, 9). The 'trait' according to Julian Wolfreys 
"always implies a repetition, of withdrawal or retreat, and return or re-
markability" (Reynolds 2004, 87) and 
"leaves a mark, but one that never returns as itself. Whether one is 
speaking of trait or subjecti/e, one is therefore concerned with 'lines of 
demarcation, marks or boundaries, limits, frames, and borders that leave 
traces of having overstepped the mark'. Such an act of overstepping 
dismantles the most reassuring conceptual oppositions ... This border is 
named by Derrida as the parergon in The Truth in Painting" (ibid, 88). 
It is the passe-partout, a double sided metaphor for this parergonal framing, 
that opens up the "possibility for decryption and framing the reading to come" 
(ibid, 89) that constitutes a possibility for a 'deconstructive sublime', not framed 
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by the metaphysics of the (present) subject, but as an invitation to the 
practicing of sublime deconstructive negativity. This passe-partout is identified 
by Wolfreys as 
"both a master-key, a shibboleth ... allowing access anywhere or to any 
encrypted secret, and also as a frame composed of two sheets of 
transparent material mounted back to back; moreover it is also the 
adhesive tape holding the two sheets together. The figure of the passe-
partout is thus an excessive and sublime, trait in its own right, having no 
single identity but providing the function of techne by opening up the 
possibility for decryption and framing the reading to come" (ibid). 
Despite this production of indeterminate meaning, we are invited to conclude, 
and register via the positivities of understanding, that Derrida's sublime and 
deconstructive disseminations displace the linear and substitutional logic of 
Kant's mathematical sublime, and disrupt the boundary between sublime 
experience and understanding which secures the autonomy of aesthetic 
negativity. We are also invited to conclude that the style or method of argument 
is itself a form of argument, one which de-subjectifies the reader, and where 
such a practice of negativity is itself an alternative form of philosophical 
'argument'. 
In concluding this discussion of Derrida's deconstructive sublime, such infinite 
and sublime disseminations, open to meanings to come, disrupt a dialectics of 
the integrated subject and a metaphysics of presence. Instead a deconstructive 
'metaphysics of absence' figures sublime infinities to come and displaces a 
dialectical Kantian sublime discourse which sustains hierarchical and binarist 
distinctions. By extension, this is also a defeat of the autonomy of aesthetic 
negativity, also informed by a constitutive and dialectical relation between 
aesthetic experience and understanding. This defeat of the autonomy of 
aesthetic negativity, constituted by the dialectical boundary between 
experience and understanding, is effected by the boundarylessness of a 
deconstructive sublime. The Colossal, like Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles articulates 
and "ground(s) the nonaesthetic sense of negativity" (Menke 1999, 167). In 
this Derridaen arrangement negativity shifts from being servile in aesthetics to 
being sovereign in non-aesthetic and deconstructive texts. 
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The casualty of this deconstructive 'victory' is aesthetic negativity, of which 
poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution are exemplary. This thesis has 
demonstrated that these de-subjectifying signifying processes, like 
deconstruction, also invite the practicing of negativity and place reason in crisis. 
However, against Oerrida's efforts, which renders negativity servile in aesthetics 
and sovereign in deconstruction, I suggest that aesthetic and deconstructive 
practices of negativity are neither servile nor sovereign in relation to one 
another, but different practices of negativity. For where aesthetic practices of 
negativity engage a dialectical relation between experience (in which meanings 
are deployed employed and disaggregated) and understanding (which frames or 
supplements that experience), deconstructive practices of negativity degrade 
that boundary, and implode that dialectical relation. I suggest that 
deconstructive and aesthetic practices of negativity, despite their structural 
differences, are equally capable of critiquing a discourse of reason and of the 
integrated subject. Neither is the privileged purveyor of negativity, and both are 
irreducible, but related, genres of a larger discourse of negativity. 
That being so, it is also necessary to register the discursive competition and 
structural differences between aesthetic negativity and deconstruction. As 
argued above, aesthetic negativity requires a boundary between the negativities 
of experience and the positivities of understanding in order to sustain its 
autonomy, or negativity, that cannot be appropriated by reason 10 . From this 
perspective Adorno's insights are very productive, insofar as he conceives of 
aesthetic negativity as a critique of reason. Aesthetic negativity may therefore 
be conceived of as a discursive, and even political, response to a capitalist and 
instrumentalist modern culture. Its criticality is even more valuable in 
contemporary society ever more taken up with accumulation and instrumental 
reason. This does not mean that aesthetic negativity is the only practice of 
negativity, but is one amongst several, including that of deconstruction, whose 
aims are to disrupt and critique dominating rationalities. 
Perversely perhaps, philosophical deconstruction invites and abuses its own 
critical inSights. For the logic of the passe-partout requires the erosion of 
IOChristoph Menke's The Sovereignty of Art makes the case that aesthetic negativity is sovereign because of its autonomy. 
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boundaries and the conflation of negativities in a double act which both 
preserves and displaces the boundary between practicing negativity and 
understanding. However, against this interpenetrating and anti-hierarchical 
logic, Derrida sustains a hierarchical boundary between deconstructive 
negativity and aesthetic negativity. Seen from this perspective, a deconstructive 
sublime practicing of negativity, figured in The Colossal, is a displacement of 
traditionally sovereign aesthetic negativity in art, so that this sovereignty shifts 
to philosophical deconstruction. Such degradation of aesthetic negativity has 
had discursive effects, not least of which the degradation of painting as the 
supposedly privileged locus of aesthetic negativity. 
The ensuing discussion of contemporary paintings and visual art practice 
registers the impact of that contest in which deconstructive methods have 
degraded the autonomy of aesthetic negativity. This discussion demonstrates 
that Glenn Brown's and Jeremy Wafer's works engage deconstructive insights 
within the modalities of poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution, even as they 
sustain aesthetic practices of negativity. Such deconstructively attuned 
modalities are available to the positivities of understanding, whereas the 
negativities of aesthetic experience disaggregate unambiguous or resolvable 
meaning. This dialectical arrangement challenges a deconstructive enterprise at 
odds with both the autonomy of aesthetic experience and dialectical relations 
which sustain/negotiate the distinctions between oppositions. 
4.5. A postmodern sublime 
Glenn Brown's painting practice addresses two versions of the sublime. Firstly, 
identifiable in terms of a science fiction genre, as a version of the terrific 
sublime, which positions the viewer in front of vast and dystopian galactic 
events; and secondly via a signifying process where meaning is rendered 
sublimely irresolvable. The former may be understood as an exemplar of a 
traditional aesthetics of the sublime which sustains binarist distinctions and 
traditional hierarchies, whereas the latter disfigures such distinctions by 
engaging that signifying process called sublime irresolution within the style of 
these paintings. This disruptive style copies, dissimulates and seduces like 
'Nietzsche's womanrJ.l. 
11 To quote from the Serpentine Gallery Catalogue Essay on the work of Glenn Brown by Alison Gingeras, Brown says 
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With regard to the first category, Brown's two enormous paintings The Loves of 
the Shepherds (after "Doublestar" by Tony Roberts) 2000 (Figure 7), and Dark 
Angel (painting for Ian Curtis) after Chris Foss 2002 (Figure 8), code an 
immense and potent energy, galactic distance, the triumph of technology, and 
the ascendancy of man in an encounter with inhuman alterity. The Loves of 
Shepherds, like Turner's The Fa/! of an Avalanche at Grisons, uses the shock 
tactics of the terrific sublime that both overwhelm the viewer and secure his or 
her safe and distanced viewership. The Loves of Shepherds delivers this 
traditional aesthetics of the sublime as an encounter between solar power and 
human technological endeavor. Here the sublime otherness of galactic or solar 
energy threatens those dystopian machine-worlds being drawn toward it. 
Dark Angel, like The Loves of Shepherds, depicts dystopian and technologically 
developed colonies/space ships adrift in the universe. Both paintings address 
the viewer in terms of the traditional coding of an encounter with sublimity, via 
the typology of the terrific sublime and the genre of Science Fiction imaging, as 
the autonomous subject standing before, and contemplating, an infinite, 
sublime and excessive space. This genre of infinite spatial extension establishes 
a distance between self and otherness 12, and reiterates the traditional dyad in 
which the self is opposed to, and constituted by, otherness. What we encounter 
in these science fictions by Brown is the subject in control. For unlike aesthetic 
practices of negativity, these paintings subjectify the viewer by sustaining a 
binary, where optical control (of the viewer being able to see everything) 
contains and regulates that which is represented (sublime, non-human and 
infinite otherness). These are not deconstructions of the traditional sublime 
subject position. They do not mobilise the signifying process called sublime 
irresolution, nor do they invite the practicing of negativity. 
"my bodily involvement is as a voyeur. It sounds dreadful, but I am perhaps only here in spirit. I could partake in the 
pleasure of the paint, but I prefer the invisible hand a/the dematerialized artist, making dematerialized/ake brush marks 
(author's emphasis)". (Gingeras 2004,16) Gingeras describes Brown's style of painting in terms of its "intricate 
accumulations ofthin swirls of alternating colours. These perfectly flat, highly controlled pools of paint mimic the vigorous 
strokes ofa brush as well as the sensual materiality of thickly applied paint." (Gingeras 2004, 16) 
12It is such distancing techniques that both Derrida and Zylinska critique. Derrida does so in Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles in 
his mocking style where he both invokes and denies 'Nietzsche's woman', as the figure of distance. Zylinska's book On 
Spiders, Cyborgs and Being Scared: The Feminine and the Sublime explores the work of women artists (Orlan, Anderson 
and St Aubin de Teran) which challenge such distancing techniques associated with the terrific sublime and with Kantian 
subject-object distinctions, by challenging the active/passive dichotomies that sustain binarist hierarchies and gendered 
differences and distances. 
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Figure 7: Glenn Brown. The Loves of Shepherds 
(after "Doublestar" by Tony Roberts). 2000 
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Figure 8: Glenn Brown. Dark Angel 
(painting for Ian Curtis) after Chris Foss. 2002 
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Secondly, Brown's paintings do engage a sublimely irresolvable process when 
he copies/distorts the paintings of old, and modernist, masters, (Rembrandt, 
Fragonard, van Dyck, Dali and Auerbach). The paintings The Riches of the Poor 
2003 (Figure 9), Dark Star 2003 (Figure 10) and Sex 2004 (Figure 11), are 
recognisable both as copies and as new interventions. The style of these 
paintings render the lusciousness of the original, via a painstakingly precise 
technique which mimics to a large extent the style of Auerbach (although also 
that of Dali). Style becomes a virtuoso performance in which every mark is 
perfectly rendered. This virtuoso style is experienced as a "thrilling event", 
even as it is understood as optical mastery13. These oppositions proliferate and 
overlap, so that this style of painting becomes so overcrowded with unstable 
oppositions that it registers the signifying process called sublime irresolution. In 
this process, as in Poussin's Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe, sublime 
meaning is not registered in what is represented, but via a process where the 
excesses of meaning disable conceptual mastery. 
I suggest that this failure of meaning is inaugurated by the irresolvable interplay 
of oppositions. For on the one hand, these paintings by Brown register an 
experience of abjection 14, whilst on the other this virtuoso style of painting 
registers a knowing optical mastery. For example, in Dark Star 2003, a 
distorted copy of a painting of a young woman by Rembrandt is represented as 
a leering old crone. In The Riches of the Poor 2003, a skinless and ecstatic 
figure is rendered as a copy of Auerbach's agonistic and authentically 
expressive style of painting, so that perfectly rendered 'faux' paint reads as 
flesh. Or, in Sex 2004, a representation of van Dyck's portrait of a man is 
debased as a portrait of a blind, but seeing creature whose clouded eyes 
suggest an unspeakable and disgusting threshold, and whose coloured nose 
suggests something of a liar15 . 
13This interface between experience and understanding in amplified by an actual encounter with these paintings. where the 
virtuosity of style registers as a visual experience of the painting. 
141n Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection 1982. translated by Leon S. Roudiez, Kristeva makes connections between 
the sublime and abjection. The sublime is that unstable threshold which registers the abject. even as it is also an aesthetic 
opportunity to control that threatening otherness. According to John Lechte. from Kristeva's analytical perspective '"the 
abject is above all ambiguous. the inbetween, what defies boundaries .... Abjection. therefore. is fundamentally 'what 
disturbs identity, system, order''"(Lechte 1990, 161). 
15The children's story of Pinocchio's nose elongating as he lies, is the basis of this interpretation. 
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Figure 9: Glenn Brown. The Riches of the Poor. 2003 
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Figure 10: Glenn Brown. Dark Star. 2003 
91 
Figure 11: Glenn Brown. Sex. 2004 
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These representations and condensations of meaning, and this style of painting, 
set the scene for a process in which meaning fails. I suggest that this failure is 
inaugurated by the inability to synthesise an understanding of these disgusting 
degradations of the originals, and their abject consequences, with an experience 
of the style of painting, in which every detail is perfect and controlled. In this 
process irresolvable contradictions emerge between understanding and 
experiencing the effects of optical mastery, and equally of experiencing a sense 
of abjection, even as one understands how it produced. Meaning is disabled 
when too many oppositions are crowded into and over, one another. These 
overlappings and deferrals effect a sublime and irresolvable charge, a moment 
within and outside of understanding that registers as an aesthetic specific 
practicing of negativity. 
This promiscuous and vulgar style 16, like 'Nietzsche's woman' dissimulates, for it 
codes visual mastery, even as it represents that which is awful, repugnant, and 
abject. In Brown's painting titled Oscillate Wildly 1999 (Figure 12) the precision, 
perfection and seduction of the style, offsets that which is also present (in 
representation), and absent (as a register of the disavowed, the base, and the 
unspeakable), and contained as a discursive register in the viewer's 
imagination. This is a sublime threshold that registers the abject terror of the 
represented/implied slithery, self-consuming, colourless, ever proliferating, 
creeping, impotent 'thing'. It is a threshold where meaning coheres, only to fail. 
The viewer is unable to resolve interpenetrating registers where absence and 
presence, otherness and selfness slide into, and over one another. These 
binaries refuse to cancel one another out. Here order will not prevail. 
Furthermore, the abjection that confronts us in an encounter with these 
sublimely irresolvable paintings by Brown, is not only that which disturbs 
identity, system, or order, but is also a dissimulating and pleasurable 'play' at 
such a disturbance. For although both order and disorder are powerfully coded 
in Brown's style of painting, the sublime exchange that operates here is still 
pleasurable, a perpetual on/off and irresolvable beat, which simultaneously 
16Brown claims "My desire to paint with detail and dexterity is due to the fact it is seen as bad taste' .... 'To use skill and 
craftsmanship is vulgar to the art establishment". (Gingeras 2004, 17) 
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Figure 12: Glenn Brown. Oscillate Wildly. 1999 
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invites the positivities of visual mastery and the negativities of abject disgust. It 
is this playful deferral between these two registers that resists the development 
of a hierarchy between these two opposing terms. These terms are irresolvably 
and simultaneously rendered both positive and negative. 
In these paintings, the modality of that signifying process called sublime 
irresolution thus registers both a compression of signifiers, and a pleasurable 
interplay of oppositions as we have seen in Poussin's and Turner's paintings. 
But the modality of sublime irresolution employed in Brown's paintings is also a 
copying and dissimulating play which renders meaning excessive. We might 
identify this as a postmodern sublime modality, both playfully knowing and 
experientially abject. This dissembling modality, like 'Nietzsche's woman', 
pretends to be what it is not. For knowing play and abject experience are 
contaminated by the idea of the copy, even as the boundaries between what is 
experienced and what is understood are mutually eroded and enfolded. Such 
incomprehension registers as a sublimely irresolvable event. This modality also 
resembles the disaggregations of meaning in deconstruction. But unlike 
Derrida's passe-partout, this modality of sublime irresolution does not open the 
viewer to differences 'to come'. Instead the viewer remains caught up within 
differences which irresolvably rub up against, over, and within one another. 
Brown's sublimely irresolvable paintings sustain a traditional negative aesthetics 
of the sublime where experience and understanding, abject play and knowing 
disruption, are irresolvably positioned in and against one another. Such 
dissaggregations of meaning register as an aesthetic experience, not as textual 
disruption, nor as philosophical mis/understanding. 
These paintings also engage a register of understanding that is extrinsic to the 
experience of sublime irresolution sketched above. This register is activated by 
categories of understanding, imported into an encounter with these paintings, 
so that we are able to identify these paintings as examples of a postmodern and 
a deconstructive sensibility. For these paintings by Brown are an appropriation 
of Auerbach's authentically expressive modernist style. In Brown's paintings this 
style is delivered as trope, a pastiche of Auerbach's style of painting. This trope 
is not internal to the processes of viewing, but is imported into it as a 
deconstructively appropriate understanding of Auerbach's style and of the 
discursive implications of it. Such knowledge enables the viewer to understand 
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how Brown's paintings mimic Auerbach's agonistic painterly gestures, but 
render these copies of that modernist master, via a style of painting, as the 
complete absence of paintbrush marking. This mimicry or play erodes the 
meaning of the brushmark as an expression of an agonistic sensibility, and 
figures this appropriative style as a postmodern pastiche of Auerbach's 
modernist agony and authentic feeling. Brown's practice thereby knowingly 
deconstructs those modernist assumptions by debunking Auerbach's authentic 
agonistics via a postmodern style of painting. 
In conclusion, Brown's sublimely irresolvable genre of paintings register the 
impact of deconstruction by engaging both a supplement which enables us to 
understand how these paintings disrupt modernist assumptions, and also a 
particular modality of sublime irresolution which to some extent resembles 
Derrida's figure called 'Nietzsche's woman'. Yet Brown's paintings also sustain a 
dialectical and irreducible relation between experience and understanding. For 
these paintings thrill and terrify the viewer as an aesthetic specific and sublime 
event in which meaning and understanding fail. These paintings are the 
articulation of a negative aesthetics whose modalities resemble those of 
philosophical deconstruction, yet whose affects are aesthetic specific. 
4.6. A post colonial sublime poetics of the inbetween. 
Jeremy Wafer' visual art practice has a great affinity with Derrida's 
deconstructive sublime, even as this practice registers as aesthetic experience. 
Like Derrida's deconstructive figure of the passe-partout in his text The 
Colossal, Wafer's practice figures an infinite displacement of meanings to come. 
This syncretic visual art practice blurs the boundaries between the sublime and 
the poetic, between sculpture, painting and photography and deconstructs the 
binarist assumptions of South African colonial and modernist landscape painting 
by deploying a post colonial sublime poetics of the inbetween. 
We might start with Wafer's interrogation of sublimity in terms of two themes: 
landscape and infinite systems. South African colonial and modernist sublime 
landscape painting, for example, in the works of Thomas Baines and Pierneef17, 
17Thomas Baines' sublime paintings register a subject position that requires a division between the viewer and the 
extended, empty and luminous landscape. These paintings represent a colonial subject position, curious about the 
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mimicked its metropolitan referents, insofar as such landscape painting 
sustained the traditional and distancing relation between sublimity and the 
viewing subject. These traditional and colonial practices presumed a vertical 
relation between the viewer, standing in front of the sublime landscape, and the 
painting, which in turn represented an infinitely extending space within the 
picture plane. Wafer's photographic/painting work titled Nhlube and Ochre, 
2002 (Figure 13) sets up the same bodily relation between the viewer and 
vertical representation so that visual and embodied mastery is problematised. 
Nhlube and Ochre, a double image of a photograph and a painting, which exists 
in both one meter and two meter square dimensions, presents the viewer with a 
sublime experience inaugurated by a spatial encounter which challenges the 
verticality of a viewer's relation to the vertiginous image on the wall. For the 
photographic aerial view of Nhlube (Figure 14) taken by the South African Office 
of the Surveyor General from an aircraft on a specified flight plan at a particular 
time and date, is not a view into an infinitely extending space, but is rather a 
view down on to a specified place, articulated via an anonymous matrix which 
organises imaging in terms of an infinite, but rational grid. The viewer may have 
no knowledge of this matrix, but is in no doubt that the all encompassing view 
he/she is presented with of a particular place exists in a different and 
vertiginous, plane to that which he/she usually associates with sublime 
landscape paintings. The corresponding ochre disc, by contrast sits reassuringly 
in its 'proper' place on the wall as a perverse grounding to that vertiginous 
drop. This spatial positioning between verticality and vertigo is the first sublime 
opposition. 
Furthermore, the painting/ochre disc itself exists between two oppositional 
registers. On the one hand it is an address of rational and numerical systems 
which code height in terms of the protocols of a contour map, and on the other, 
it works with the language of painting in that it is a colour field with a delicately 
friable and painterly surface. This doubling slams affect and concept together 
topographical details ofthe vast South African landscape and at a remove from it indigenous inhabitants. Pierneef extends 
this colonial perspective into his modernist renditions of the South African landscape. Pierneefs paintings register the size 
and emptiness of the landscape, by juxtaposing this awesome beauty with singular domestic and European style houses. 
Such juxtapositions render the landscape a figure of the European and white imagination, a space of apartheid. and a locus 
of Afrikaner identity. 
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Figure 13: Jeremy Wafer. Nhlube and Ochre. 2002 
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Figure 14: Jeremy Wafer. Nhlube. 2002 
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and this is the second instance where the viewer is irresolvably positioned 
between these two meaning generating registers associated with the sublime. 
The aerial photograph, paired with the equal sized ochre disc painting 18 (with 
topographical markings, and the contour lines which designate the heights and 
depths of the companion photograph), sets up further contradictions. This 
pairing invites a disruptive and sublime comparison: for on the one hand, the 
position of the numbers on the ochre disc and the reading of hills and valleys in 
the photograph are understood as co-ordinates; yet conversely this 
understanding slips and refuses purchase when the two images are seen 
together for we cannot apprehend space and comprehend measurement at the 
same time. It is this inability to see and think simultaneously, together with the 
contradictions noted above, that constitutes the third sublime 'cut' of these 
works, and the viewer's imagination is opened up to that violence that is 
associated with the experience of the sublime. 
As we have already seen, Derrida in The Colossal associates this violent and 
sublime exchange with a Kantian dialectics which preserves subject/object; 
self/other dichotomies. Wafer's Nhlube and Ochre does not endorse such a 
binary code, but problematises it. For although this image assembles binary 
oppositions (vertigo/verticality, affect/concept, perception/thought), the overall 
effect of these assembled meanings does not effect the strenuous irresolutions 
of the sublime in which differences are implacably held against one another. 
Instead, in Nhlube and Ochre sublime signifiers are arranged in a way that they 
defer and slip into and around one another. For example, this image is an 
encounter with visual plenitude in the form of an information laden photograph, 
whose plenitude is matched by the adjoining panel, and whose pure painterly 
affect is activated, and disrupted, by alien conceptual numerical codes. These 
interpenetrations of meaning result not only in a sublime gap that opens up 
between concept and affect, but also produce a poetic ambiguity/undecidability 
about the status of these readings. It is this sliding, or displacement of 
meanings between oppositions, and over and under them, that installs the 
oppositional and binarist logic of sublime irresolution, into a slippery and mobile, 
18The ochre is collected from mine dumps in Johannesburg and mixed with acrylic paint and applied by hand. 
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deconstructive poetics. The modality of sublime irresolution in Nhlube and Ochre 
is an effect of the rubbing together of concepts and affects in an indeterminate 
way, that forecloses an economy of appropriation or mastery. 
In Nhlube and Ochre, visual mastery is simultaneously evoked and displaced. If 
alterity is coded in these works it is through the metaphor of distance, which is 
affectively coded in the vertiginous drop of the aerial photographs, and 
mathematically coded as variations in height in the paintings. But the very 
mechanisms for the evaluation of this distance are troubled by the 
contradictions between the two images, by the inability to see and think 
simultaneously. This is a practice informed by inbetweenesses, not irresolvable 
difference: between vertigo and verticality, between conceptualisation and 
affective experience, where meaning slips between these oppositions. It is this 
hiatus that produces a displacement of visual mastery. This irresolution and 
undecidability in Nhlube and Ochre is thus another articulation of Derrida's 
passe-partout, where meaning undecidably and multiply slips between 
oppositions, and where this process opens the viewer to differences 'to come'. 
In Wafer's work this sublime practice of negativity delivers critiques, not only of 
the integrated subject and of instrumental reason, but also of the political and 
cultural imperatives of post-apartheid South Africa. These cultural imperatives 
demand a critique of mastering metropolitan subject positions, and install new 
post-apartheid subjectivities. But crucially this replay exists as an aesthetic 
specific encounter between the viewer and the aesthetic object (the double 
image), and not as an effect of a philosophical and textual practice of 
negativity. In this regard, Wafer's practice sets up a dialogical encounter which 
installs the viewer into the practicing of negativity and the defeat of binarist 
hierarchies, with no degradation of the aesthetic responses of the viewer. 
For example, when we consider Wafer's photographs of ant holes and termite 
mounds, like Derrida's disseminations in the concluding paragraphs of The 
Colossal, whereby "this whirlpool which tears up a tree and throws it, 
immensely, into the milky dissemen (fa dissemence)" (Derrida 1987, 146), 
these photographs are a meditation on an economy of infinite dissemination 
that does not invoke the mastering subject. For Termite Mound 2001 (Figure 
15) and Anthole 2001 (Figure 16) are portals into non-human systems which 
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Figure 15: Jeremy Wafer. Termite Mound. 2001 
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Figure 16: Jeremy Wafer. Anthole. 2001 
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are infinitely repeated in nature. Landscape here is invoked as the site of infinite 
and organic systems of co-operation. Such systems of co-operation may invite 
analogies of human co-operatives, but the significance of these images lies in 
their lack of the 'will to power' that inevitably accompanies human co-
operatives. In that sense they stand as meditations of post-human organic 
wholes, reminiscent possibly of Delueze's perpetually becoming Rhizomes, 
devoid of authorship and exemplars of a post-human order. Or to say it 
differently, these photographs invite a critique of the modern autonomous, 
rational and integrated subject by presenting the viewer with a metaphor for 
infinite and organic systems of co-operation. 
In Termite Mound and Antho/e this sublime impulse is preoccupied with infinitely 
proliferating systems, like Derrida's disseminations sketched in The Colossal. 
For termite mounds and ant holes are parts of infinitely extended, and indeed 
colossal systems of subterranean co-operation. The idea of a co-operative 
suggests an economy, but not one predicated on exchange, on binarist 
hierarchies, or on capitalist exploitation. Rather the economy of a non-human 
co-operative implies an ideal economy in which order and productivity are 
linked. We are installed into the infinite dis-seminations of meaning invited by 
deconstruction, although this is an idealised process in which non-human 
alterity remains the privileged trope. Derridaen deconstruction would seek to 
problematise, not idea lise, such alterity. 
If Termite Mound and Antho/e invite a consideration of infinite dis-semi nations, 
so too does the double image Nh/ube and Ochre which positions the viewer in 
the terrain of the mathematical sublime, within a logic of immense 
mathematical proliferation. This logic is informed by an actual matrix from which 
the aerial photographs are anonymously ordered by the artist on the internet. 
This matrix is assembled by the Surveyor General's Office, which makes 
available to the public, aerial photographs taken of the entire surface of South 
Africa. Such photographs exists in terms of designated flight plans by aircraft 
taking these high resolution images, which are made available in scales of 
1: 10,000 to 1: 100,000. The availability and production of these images which is 
both scheduled and random, enables the coding of an infinite number of 
possible outcomes. It is the infinite size of these proliferating matrices that 
----
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cannot be thought, even as they point to an economy of colossal, rational and 
random, dis-semination 19 . 
This sublime and deconstructive logic is taken back into painting in Red Field 
2002 (Figure 17) which exists as a flat surface punctuated by a grid of raised 
'blisters' and painted uniformly with a mixture of industrial red oxide and acrylic 
primer. The paint and primer produce a sumptuous and tactile painterly surface 
in which the trope of the brush mark, as an index of the tradition of abstract 
painting, figures a human presence. However, what also engages the viewer is 
the arrangement of the grid which suggests an infinite code (taken from the 
random permutations of the roll of a dice) whose logic is not apparent. It is the 
mysteriousness of this seemingly random logic that draws the viewer into the 
consideration of a size that cannot be thought, and this realisation demands of 
the viewer a loss of mastery and submission into an infinite and random excess. 
Such sublimity in Red Field is also offset by the full-blooded red colour, the 
trace of the human painterly mark, and above all by the metaphorical 
associations that are evoked by the 'blisters' themselves. For these features are 
an elaboration of a culturally alert schema which exists throughout Wafer's 
oeuvre as an engagement with the African practice of bodily scarification 
through the amasumpa motif. In traditional Zulu pottery raised blisters of clay 
are arranged in patterns which echo the practice of producing geometrically 
ordered markings on the skin though rupturing and infecting the skin, so that 
the livid scars leave their mark. The 'blisters' in Red Field take on another 
meaning when considered in this light. For they mark a syncretic encounter, as 
an exchange between elaborate Zulu social and aesthetic codes, and the 
practice of minimalist and Western abstract (modernist) painting with its 
sublime metaphysics of absence. This doubling of genres in Red Field 
prevaricates on the issue of economies of appropriation or of squandering. As 
such, from a eurocentric perspective, the 'blisters' in Red Field ambivalently 
code an opening toward cultural alterity (even as their arrangement in a 
random grid, codes an openness to the alterity of the infinite). This double 
19Following Olkowski's critique of Derrida's The Colossaf, which argues that Derrida follows Kant and Plato by 
associating the sublime with an economy of the colossal, we might note that Wafer's practice is an addition to those 
masculinist ambitions. 
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Figure 17: Jeremy Wafer. Red Field. 2002 
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openness to alterity, situated in an ethics of being-open-to difference, obscures 
the operation of an economy of appropriation whereby culturally discrete (Zulu) 
codes are pressed into the service of cultural hybridisation. This pressing (as 
the articulation of an economy of appropriation) however remains unstable, its 
operations are poetically ambiguous, even as both genres are amplified, rather 
than diminished, in this exchange. This image (like the many other Wafer 
images that employ the same syncretism) poetically synthesises African and 
European value systems, without hierarchy, as the articulation of a new, and 
ideal, post-apartheid order. 
Syncretic openness to difference, to the inbetween, characterises Wafer's 
practice. It has a hybrid identity, operating between sublime tension and poetic 
deferral, between aesthetic experience and deconstructive supplementarity, and 
between differing cultures. As such Red Field invites correspondences between 
a mathematical sublime and its infinite dis-semination, but slides this economy 
of sublime 'gifting', via the exchanges of competing cultural power, into an 
ethics of being-open-to-difference. We will return to Wafer's preoccupation with 
sustaining a perpetual openness-to-difference, but for the moment we need to 
consider how the sculptures, which are also exhibited with the photographs and 
paintings, operate as aesthetic specific markers of poetic presence, which to 
some extent resist the deconstructive supplementarity that otherwise informs 
Wafer's practice. 
Where the photograph/painting couplet in Nhlube and Ochre codes an 
irresolvable relation between verticality and vertigo, affective experience and 
conceptual understanding, and thereby invoke an experience of sublime 
irresolution, the Spindle 2002 (Figure 18) sculptures address the viewer as 
discrete and poetic objects. They bear the imprint (as does all of Wafer's work) 
of minimalist modularity and materiality, but they also code the classical 
balance and spirituality one associates with the work of Brancusi. These 
spindles, in spite of their industrial materiality, address a register of idealised 
human feeling and poetic desire. This is communicated in terms of the painterly, 
chalky white surface which bears the traces of sculptural molding and aesthetic 
desire, and also via the arched form of these pOinted 'pods', and their seemingly 
random display on the floor. These are forms which are full but not replete, for 
they give off subtle poetic pleasure. They are gifts rather than puzzles. They 
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Figure 18: Jeremy Wafer. Spindle. 2002 
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confirm presence and desire, and are not an address of an agonistics of visual 
mastery and of spectatorial displacement. As such they operate as an antidote 
to the project of sublimely deconstructive dis-semination found in the 
photographs and paintings. They provisionally 'repair' an integrated subject 
even as they install the viewer into an openness-to-difference. They are par 
excellence, exemplars of an aesthetic specific poetic ambiguity. 
These ovaloid forms, here generically designated as Spindles, appear in various 
guises in Wafer's oeuvre. They also appear with raised markings that resemble 
Zulu amasumpha motifs, and again raise the issue of cultural syncretism and 
the ethics of being-open-to-difference. As such they figure as symbols of an 
idealised moment of cultural integration, which is open to ideological 
appropriation, and hence to a form of closure within idealisation. 
It is perhaps against this possibility of appropriation and idealised closure that 
we need to consider Wafer's consistent engagements with landscape, infinite 
systems, borders, maps, alterity and an ethics of displacement. For these 
meditations offer no closures, nor any irresolution, but are engagements with 
systems of infinite and sublime dissemination, as aesthetic specific modalities 
which resemble Derrida's figure called the passe-partout. These modalities 
invite a practicing of negativity not predicated on binarist hierarchies, but one 
open to multiplicity and differences. 
Such modalities appear in a variety of Wafer's works, but for the moment we 
will confine ourselves to an engagement with Stones 2001 (Figure 19). This 
work consists of 100 framed photographs of stones which are 10 centimeters 
square in size. These stones are not significant in any way except that they 
were found and photographed in Nieuw Bethesda, a small and isolated town in 
the center of the country in the Karoo which has attained an iconic status 
because of it centrality, its isolation and its artistic and religious culture2o • Nieuw 
Bethesda has presence. Wafer's photographic exhibition of its stones on a one 
kilometer stretch of fence near this town is a literal displacement of this 
presence. These 10 centimeter square photographs were placed exactly 10 
20Nieuw Bethesda has developed into a cultural center over the last 20 years, building on the reputation of outsider aI1ist 
Helen Martins whose home and garden are a testament to spirituality and creativity, 
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Figure 19: Jeremy Wafer. Stones. 2001 
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meters apart along a one kilometer distance of farm fencing within walking 
distance of the town. Indeed the end/beginning point of this intervention is so 
situated that the viewer can see the grid of the town spread out before 
him/her. This work was extended as these photographs were then placed on 
fences along the main highway at 100 kilometer intervals between Nieuw 
Bethesda and Durban, and could, as the artist suggests, by extension be placed 
every 1000 kilometers between Durban and Australia. These photographs were 
also displayed as a single image of 100 by 10 square centimeters in a line 10 
meters long at the Grahamstown festival in 2001. Here we encounter infinite 
systems of proliferation and substitution, registered within the (Kantian) 
mathematical sublime, where "the immeasurable host of such systems, which 
go by the name of nebulae, and most likely in turn themselves form such a 
system, hold no prospect of a limit" (Derrida 1987, 147). 
Stones are not only an infinite set of substitutions of the terrain, of the material, 
the stones, of this town, but are also as a set of photographs which mark an 
indeterminate fence in the Karoo. Fences are not only boundaries which contain 
and defend livestock, possessions, rights, but carry the ideas and histories of 
economies of exchange, of rights of mastery, of exclusion and inclusion. In so 
activating a fence, Wafer also activates its relation to histories of appropriation 
and colonisation, between Boer and Xhosa or the Koi San, or between farmer 
and squatter. The photograph of the stone on the fence, and not in the gallery, 
is of course the most peculiar and disruptive feature of this work, implying not 
only a conceptual critique of the nature of fences and of colonisation, but also of 
the relation of art to that of the physical landscape. 
For this work is an artistic intervention into the landscape, its location on the 
fence figures both a phenomenal experience and a conceptual critique of 
colonial landscape painting, which disavows such phenomenality, and 
historically was pressed into the service of the mastering white and European 
subject. As such Stones, challenges the traditional representations of the 
sublime found in colonial and easel paintings by displacing distancing notions of 
mastery with an immediate experience of a particular place and its histories. 
This experience is paradoxically again displaced by the photograph of the 
photograph, in which the viewer is left with a sense of multiple displacements, 
discomforts and imaginings. It is this very deconstructive discomfort, this 
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production of a sense of alterity, which provokes the viewer into a consideration 
of an ethics of displacement, in which this erosion of visual mastery is infinitely 
multiplied by the systemic repetition and proliferation (trait) of the motif. Here 
the viewer is installed into a deconstructive post-colonial economy of infinite 
and sublime dis-semination. 
If Stones registers a deconstructively appropriate understanding, it does not 
degrade aesthetic experience. It presumes both a phenomenal/aesthetic 
experience and an interrogation of that phenomenality. Such (deconstructively 
appropriate) doubling between affect and concept consistently characterises this 
practice. We might recall how in Nhlube and Ochre, the signifying process called 
sublime irresolution confronts the viewer with a compendium of binary 
oppositions, yet is displaced into a poetics of ambiguity, which renders this 
aesthetic experience as hybrid, impure and inbetween. The same migration 
between aesthetic experience and conceptual understanding features in Red 
Field which negotiates the interface between western and Zulu aesthetic 
traditions. Traditional aesthetic experience only registers in those sculptural 
poetics of the Spindle sculptures, which repair that dialogical relation between 
the aesthetic object and the viewer, even as it sustains a poetic practice of 
negativity. 
Wafer's visual art practice thus records something of the methods of Derrida's 
deconstructive sublime. Yet it does not degrade aesthetic practices of negativity 
or conflate different practices of negativity. This visual art practice breaches 
differences, even those antagonisms between an aesthetic of negativity and 
deconstruction. It does so by sustaining aesthetic specific practices of 
negativity, even as it blurs the boundaries between sculpture, photography and 
painting. This post colonial sublime poetics of the inbetween engages the 
differences between deconstructive philosophy and visual art practice, and 
between western and African aesthetic values, even as it delivers a critique of 
traditional sublime and colonial assumptions. 
In this process both the traditional identities of sublime irresolution and poetic 
ambiguity have been rearticulated. For although Wafer's practice employs the 
irresolvable contradictions between oppositions, between affect and concept for 
example, these oppositions are not recirculated, but are displaced by a sublime 
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poetics. This sublime poetics registers an openness to differences, and as such 
records the impact of deconstruction, which erodes the boundaries between 
discrete discursive practices. 
4.7. Conclusion. 
This discussion of the paintings and visual art practices of Brown and Wafer is 
framed by the tensions and correspondences between philosophical 
deconstruction and aesthetic practices of negativity. This chapter has made the 
case that Derrida's two texts investigated in this chapter, not only deconstruct 
the rational, dialectical and binarist assumptions of traditional (Kantian) 
philosophy, but also disrupt the dialectical relation between experience and 
understanding and degrade the autonomy of aesthetic negativity. In Spurs: 
Nietzsche's Styles Derrida's quasi-poetic style invites a deconstructive practicing 
of negativity which always doubles as (an inadequate) form of philosophical 
argument. Such deconstructive practicing of negativity requires the 
conflation/doubling of the boundary between processual enactment as 
experience, and understanding the philosophical consequences of such 
deconstructions. It is this doubling that deconstructs conceptual mastery and 
opens readers to difference. Likewise Derrida's text, The Colossal ruptures the 
boundary between a textual practicing of negativity and the philosophical 
deconstruction of the Kantian sublime. This text produces a deconstructive 
sublime, both a textual practice of negativity and a philosophical argument, 
which instantiates a sublime inbetweenness 'to come'. 
This chapter has made the case that these deconstructive methods degrade the 
autonomy of aesthetic negativity. For although both aesthetic and 
deconstructive practices of negativity de-subjectify reader of texts and viewers 
of paintings, their methods for doing so differ. A deconstructive method 
ruptures boundaries (between aesthetic experience and understanding), 
conflates oppositions (quasi-poetic style and the feminine), and defeats/invites 
philosophical understanding. By contrast, the interpretive method deployed in 
this thesis identifies aesthetic practices of negativity in paintings and visual art 
practices which sustain a dialectical relation between the viewer and the 
painting. Aesthetic practices of negativity sustain their autonomy by preserving 
the gap between experience and understanding. Even if aesthetic practices of 
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negativity, of which poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution are exemplary, 
de-subjectify the viewer by conflating oppositions in ways that resemble those 
of deconstruction, this failure of meaning registers as an experiential and 
aesthetic specific event not identical to deconstructive textual practice or 
deconstructively appropriate understanding. 
In comparing the differences between deconstruction and aesthetic practices of 
negativity, this chapter has also demonstrated how contemporary paintings 
register the impact of both. In this regard, Brown's paintings register the 
aesthetic negativities of sublime irresolution even as these paintings also 
deconstruct modernist assumptions and blur the boundary between knowing 
play and abject experience. The modality of sublime irresolution employed in 
these paintings registers the impact of deconstruction, being comparable to 
Derrida's figure called 'Nietzsche's woman'. Wafer's visual art practice also 
registers the impact of a deconstruction, insofar as Wafer's visual art practice, 
like Derridaen deconstruction, disrupts boundaries between for example, 
sculpture, photography and painting and between the signifying processes 
called sublime irresolution and poetic ambiguity. Wafer's practice deconstructs 
the binarist assumptions of traditional colonial landscape painting, and registers 
a modality of Derrida's deconstructive figure called the passe-partout, even as 
they sustain their aesthetic specificity. 
This account of the tensions and correspondences between Derrida's two 
deconstructive texts, and these contemporary painting and visual art practices, 
has been an attempt to mark, and to some extent stabilise, the unstable 
threshold between practicing negativity and understanding its discursive 
significance. This chapter has also been an attempt to negotiate the unstable 
boundary between negative aesthetics and philosophical deconstruction, whose 
de-subjectifying operations have so much in common, yet where these 
processual enactments of negativity register a discursive competition. Against 
the degradations of aesthetic negativity by philosophical deconstruction, this 
study makes the case for a certain kind of discursively situated aesthetic 
autonomy, whereby aesthetic practices of negativity in contemporary paintings 
and visual art practices effect their own aesthetic and disaggregating 
'deconstructions', even as they register the impact of deconstruction in how 
they do so. These insights enable me to suggest that aesthetic negativity and 
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deconstruction are two competing genres of a discourse of negativity, which are 
themselves embroiled in an irresolvable and irreducible inter-relation. 
Although this discussion registers the indubitable value of the aesthetic 
practices of negativity, it is also driven by a curiosity to find out how paintings 
deliver such practices of negativity. The next chapter extends these insights into 
a discussion of how the contemporary paintings of Rosa Lee and Therese Oulton 
both engage and resist the deconstructive imperatives of Irigaray's feminist and 
philosophical project, called ecriture feminine, which also invites practices of 
negativity. 
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Chapter Four 
Ecriture feminine and aesthetic practices of negativity. 
5.1. Introduction. 
This chapter explores the relation between the negativities of ecriture feminine 
and the aesthetic negativity of sublime irresolution in contemporary (feminist) 
paintings. This discussion challenges some of the deconstructive methods of 
ecriture feminine, which conflate textual and aesthetic practices of negativity 
with the feminine. This chapter demonstrates how selected contemporary 
paintings by Rosa Lee and Therese Oulton record the impact of ecriture 
feminine within the modalities of sublime irresolution, even as they invite 
aesthetic specific practices of negativity. 
In negotiating the relation between a deconstructive discourse of ecriture 
feminine and aesthetic negativity in painting, this chapter deploys the dialectical 
method mobilised throughout this study. This interpretive method presumes 
that poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution are aesthetic practices of 
negativity which de-subjectify the viewer by disabling conceptual mastery, but 
do so from within the boundaries of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic negativity 
from this perspective has an experiential and de-subjectifying autonomy which 
cannot be appropriated to the positivities of understanding, including that of a 
deconstructive supplement or a feminist politics. We engage the positivities of 
understanding as a second order practice insofar as we are able, for example, 
to distinguish differences between the political negativities of the feminine and 
aesthetic practices of negativity. Ecriture feminine, like Derridaen 
deconstruction, refuses such a dialectics, and disrupts phallocentric assumptions 
in philosophical texts by conflating a politics of the feminine with deconstructive 
and aesthetic practices of negativity. 
Even if this thesis challenges the methods of ecriture feminine, it also values a 
deconstructive and feminist political project. My argument is not that paintings 
challenge phaliocentric values, but that aesthetic practices of negativity cannot 
be conflated with a politics of the feminine. Insofar as aesthetic practices of 
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negativity are overwhelmed by such a politics, feminist deconstructive theory 
erodes, and degrades, the specificity of paintings and visual art practices. 
Against such an outcome this study preserves the distinction between aesthetic 
negativity and a politics of ecriture feminine. To do so is to insist that the 
disruptions of paintings cannot be subsumed into the deconstructively 
appropriate understandings we bring to aesthetic experience. 
5.2. Ecriture feminine. 
This chapter takes Irigaray's essay Speaking of Immemorial Waters in her book 
Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Gillian C. Gill in 1991, as 
exemplary of a deconstructive and feminist ecriture feminine. Speaking of 
Immemorial Waters, like Nietzsche's and Derrida's deconstructive texts 
discussed earlier, disrupts a traditional philosophical style of argument with a 
poetic, feminine and deconstructive style of writing. Ecriture feminine is 
associated with the feminist writings of Helene Cixous and Luce Irigarayl, and 
to some extent with Julia Kristeva's notion of a disruptive and feminised 
semiotic, but also developed elsewhere2 . Ecriture feminine presupposes an 
essential feminine language which deconstructs pha\locentric assumptions by 
"posing plurality over against unity, multitudes of meaning as against single, 
fixed meaning, diffuseness as against instrumentality. That is to say whereas 
Western discourse - 'the masculine' - tends to limit meaning by operating a 
linear and instrumental syntax, a feminine language would be more open, would 
set up multiplicities of meaning" (Annette Khun in Felski 1989, 32). 
According to Christine Battersby, an Irigarayan feminine aesthetics, (in contrast 
to a masculine aesthetics), involves jamming the 'theoretical machinery' of a 
hegemonic phallocentric discourse of art and painting, which preserves the 
otherness of the feminine. For a female optics and topography 
lAccording to Toril Moi the term ecriturefeminine is linked to Cixous' disruptive, poetic and feminine style of writing. 
which derives from Derrida's notion of difJerance. Similarly, Irigaray's engagement with difJerance is identified as "Ie 
parler femme, or 'womanspeak'" (Moi 1985, 144). However, for the purposes of this study, and in keeping with the 
proliferation of the term ecriturefeminine in subsequent deconstructive feminist writing, this term ecriturefeminine. 
designates an entire field of feminist textual and sexual politics emanating from deconstruction. 
2For example see Joanna Zylinska's Decriture feminine: the discourse of the feminine sublime in On Spiders, Cyborgs and 
Being Scared: The Feminine and the Sublime and Andrea Duncan's This phenomenological ecriture in The FeminineCase: 
lung, Aesthetics and Creative Process eds. Tessa Adams and Andrea Duncan. 
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"involves a different relationship to time and space. Irigaray opposes an 
optics that privileges straight lines, particles and clean-cut identities. 
Instead she proffers a morphology of the female body, structured by 
gradation, shadows, flows and intensive magnitudes." (Battersby in 
Deepwell 1995, 131). 
Irigaray's feminine aesthetics, like deconstruction, disrupts boundaries between 
the personal and the political, a politics of the feminine and negative aesthetics, 
aesthetic experience and philosophical understanding, the body of the artist and 
the artwork, craft and high-art, to name but a few. It is an aesthetics that 
knows no boundary. It is a 'sublime' negative aesthetics that will not submit to 
rational understanding, nor service a metaphysics of presence (of the integrated 
and phallocentric subject), nor indeed traditional aesthetics. This is a negative 
and feminine aesthetics 'to come'. 
This conflation of traditional oppositions, as the articulation of an essential 
feminine imaginary/aesthetic, is also a very precise strategy which not only 
resembles a deconstructive master-narrative, but also deconstructs this, in the 
service of a disruptive mistress-narrative. Ecriture feminine, from this 
Irigarayan perspective, inspired a generation of feminist art theorists seeking to 
ground and identify an aesthetics of the feminine. In this regard Joanna 
Zylinska's book On Spiders, Cyborgs and being Scared: The Feminine and the 
Sublime is a particular articulation of ecriture feminine. This book collapses 
distinctions between the negativities of the feminine and the sublime, and the 
deconstructive practicing of negativity. Zylinska calls this process decriture 
feminine. Such sublime interventions are textual practices which 'retreat' into 
metaphor and the poetic. Decriture feminine does not capitalise on difference 
and embraces 
"femininity as a mark of non-binary difference ... it challenges the ideas of 
clarity, mastery, presence. Celebrating the event, immersion or plunge, it 
collapses distinctions between theory and practice, or primary and 
secondary texts .... Contradictory, insubordinate and a-rational, decriture 
feminine is also a discourse of transgression .... The self no longer remains 
'at certain distances' from its source of enticement and fascination, but 
rather embarks on a fearful encounter with the other who poses a threat 
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to its integrity but who also offers a promise of bliss Uouissance)" 
(Zylinska 2001, 77). 
This sublime and textual encounter is not predicated on an economy of 
exchange, but in terms of an economy of the gift. Such gifting invites Irigaray's 
ethics of sexual difference, as an amorous body-to-body encounter, which 
disrupts the standard subject/object, mind/body, aesthetic/ethical oppositions. 
Instead the feminine sublime is a 'poethics' "the conjunction of poetry and 
philosophy" (ibid). This is an ethics of "uncertainty and undecidablity" (ibid). As 
suggested before decriture feminine is also a version of Derrida's infinitely 
disseminating master trope, the passe-partout. This decriture feminine sublime 
inhabits excess, the everyday, alterity, heterogeneity and the minuscule. It 
scrambles distinctions that would sustain the differences between the aesthetic 
and the philosophical, or between the feminine and practices of negativity. 
Decriture feminine, like the de-subjectifying processes called poetic ambiguity 
and sublime irresolution, can only be experienced as an event as a 
"writing of an impossible description" (ibid, 37) and "understood as an 
occurrence, a flash, or a permanent beginning which undermines the 
continuity of being with its immediacy and its constant return to a zero 
point" (ibid, 38). 
This deconstructive and feminine sublime infests a traditional aesthetics of the 
sublime with an ethics of alterity. Such an event collapses the distancing 
techniques of a metaphysics of presence and refigures the sublime as an effect 
of a new kind of theory/practice called the feminine sublime. I suggest that 
Zylinska's account of this decriture feminine presents it as a philosophical 
supplement, not a textual practicing of negativity. It synthesises a negative 
aesthetics of the feminine with a politics of the feminine, and displaces aesthetic 
experience into deconstructively appropriate understanding. 
Against a deconstructive discourse of ecriture feminine (which includes decriture 
feminine) this thesis challenges the idea that there is an essential feminine 
language of painting, which operates as the negative inversion of a supposedly 
universal masculine language of painting. Negative aesthetics, I suggest, are 
not the preserve of the feminine. The aesthetic specific negativities of poetic 
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ambiguity and sublime irresolution theorised in this thesis, involve signifying 
processes which disable conceptual mastery irrespective of one's gender or 
cultural identity. From this perspective, aesthetic experience can be gendered 
by importing a conceptually available supplement which gives such experience a 
particular kind of identity. Such supplements do not invite aesthetic practices of 
negativity, for these supplements engage a negative politics of the feminine 
that is distinct from aesthetic negativity. This thesis consistently presents the 
relation between aesthetic negativity and the politics of the feminine as a 
dialectical one. For example, the associations between the feminine and 
decoration, or between the feminine and a morphology of flows, gradations and 
intensities are discursive constructs and are not informed by any essential link 
between a politics of the feminine and negative aesthetics, but by a set of 
discursive interests which strategically link the negativities of the feminine to 
those of textual or aesthetic disruption. 
It is from this dialectical perspective that this investigation approaches 
Irigaray's Speaking of Immemorial Waters as a text which employs a 
deconstructive method that disrupts phallocentric assumptions. Here style and 
politics are conflated in the service of doing philosophy. This is a text that is 
both a practicing of negativity, and a theory about that practice: it is both the 
'work' and a philosophical supplement to that deconstructive 'work'. This 
deconstructive text addresses the phallocentric assumptions of Nietzsche's Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, and deconstructs these by bringing forward the repressed 
and essential 'languages' of the feminine: fluidity, openness, amorousness, 
mimicry, poetic unruliness and multiplicity. This text collapses the distinctions 
between the political negativities of the feminine and poetic/sublime style. 
We have seen how Derrida effects a similar collapse by associating the feminine 
with a quasi-poetic style, via the figure of 'Nietzsche's woman' which delivers 
the reader to an agonistics of undecidability. Irigaray's Speaking of Immemorial 
Waters invites a textual practicing of negativity and a feminist politics of 
becoming, whereby the negativities of the feminine are rendered positive3 . Even 
if Irigaray's text invites a textual practice of negativity, this textuality is to some 
3This political practicing of negativity is indebted to Hegel's dialectic, in which contradictions may be overturned via a 
process whereby the negativities of the feminine are rendered positive. This dialectical process is an address of identity 
politics, not of textual deconstruction. 
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extent, available to the positivities of understanding. For in struggling with the 
indeterminacies of this text we can stabilise such practices of negativity with 
supplementary conceptual understanding, which enables us to understand the 
philosophical implications of such practices of negativity. Any reader of this text 
may well experience the negativity of this lyrical, amorous, feminine, 
deconstructive and poetic style of writing which disables understanding, but 
such readers are also invited to understand the discursive meanings and 
philosophical/political consequences of those meanings and that style of writing. 
The following section is an attempt to understand how Irigaray's philosophical 
and deconstructive text conflates, or doubles, the negativities of the feminine 
with the negativities of the poetic and the sublime. 
5.3. Speaking of Immemorial Waters 
Speaking of Immemorial Waters is a critique of Nietzsche's book Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: a book for everyone and no one, in which Irigaray exposes the 
phallocentric 'violence' of this book, by means of an outright tirade against its 
central themes: the eternal return, the abyss, and the will to power. This 
critique is delivered as a feminine and amorous mimicry of the style of 
Nietzsche's book, which is itself written in an allusive, poetic and metaphorical 
style. Irigaray installs an alternative, and feminised, moment of becoming into 
the assumptions of the phallocentric text she has just critiqued, through a fluid 
and watery feminine poetics which is positive, multiple, mobile and 
heterogeneous. This is a philosophical and deconstructive manoeuvre which 
conflates a poetic style with the feminine. It is this doubling of these negativities 
that deconstructs the phallocentric assumptions of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
The idea of doubling is central to Irigaray's philosophy, and according to 
Margaret Whitford, this philosophy is intentionally contradictory, where 
differences between the sexes are emphasised because "woman is not self-
identical ... As the figure of the 'two lips', she is neither one nor two" (Whitford 
1991, 138). For example, Irigaray uses hybrid terms like the 'other of the 
other', or the 'neither one nor two' as undecidable metaphors in which the' 
reader is exposed to both a philosophical argument and a feminised, amorous 
and poetic experience. This is a philosophical exercise which uses (and abuses) 
a poetic style (and its non-philosophical negativity) in the service of feminist 
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deconstruction. Jonathan Culler illustrates this point by quoting from Derrida's 
Marges, that the initial reversal of hierarchical oppositions is the first step in this 
process which must be followed by another which "through a double gesture, a 
double science, a double writing, (which) put(s) into practice a reversal of the 
classical opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is on that 
condition alone that deconstruction will provide a means of intervening in the 
field of oppositions it criticizes" (Derrida in Culler 1983, 85 -86). 
Irigaray disrupts Nietzsche's text, through a form of writing that doubles and 
proliferates oppositions. For Speaking of Immemorial Waters deconstructs the 
phallocentric assumptions of Zarathustra, whilst invoking the generative 
energies of a feminine becoming. This text is both a textual practicing of 
negativity and a deconstructive feminist supplement to that practice. As such it 
engages a feminist politics of sexual difference which maintains the differences 
between the sexes, and actively promotes the idea of a becoming feminine 
imaginary4. 
The Irigarayan idea of the feminine imaginary might be understood as a hold-all 
term which encompasses imagination, myth, discourse, embodiment and 
psychic construction, in which certain identities are produced and reinforced s. 
Irigaray is quite clear about what constitutes a masculine imaginary, as almost 
all existing western cultural, aesthetic, philosophical forms and forces are 
constructed by it. Its chief character is identified as an 'economy of the same' in 
which woman is the 'Other of the Same'. In contrast to this masculine economy 
for Irigaray a feminine imaginary is still yet to be developed. It is a becoming 
imaginary in which 'woman' is "neither the one nor two. Rigorously speaking, 
she cannot be identified as one person or two. She resists all adequate 
definition. Further she has no proper name." (Irigaray 1985, 26). If a 
phallocentric6 aesthetic imaginary is the current norm in Western society, a 
feminine imaginary is 'still to come'. 
4Irigaray draws on both Freud and Lacan's accounts of the imaginary, a term which applies to all embodied subjects, and 
which Elizabeth Grosz defines as "an internalized image or map of the meaning that the body has for the subject, for others 
in its social world, and for the symbolic order conceived of in its generality (that is, for culture as a whole)" (Grosz 1989, 
xviii) 
5See Margaret Whitford's discussion of Irigaray's feminine imaginary in her book Philosophy in the Feminine 1991. 
6Elizabeth Grosz identifies phallocentricism as a term in which "patriarchal systems of representation always submit 
women to models and images defined for and by men" (Grosz 1989, xx). 
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Where becoming is a privileged term in Irigaray's philosophy, so too is the idea 
of disruption. For "the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which 
women would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical 
machinery itself ... (and where) ... the feminine finds itself defined as lack, 
deficiency, or as imitation and the negative image of the subject, they should 
signify with respect to this logic a disruptive excess is possible on the feminine 
side" (Irigaray 1958, 78). "It involves speaking from a position in the middle of 
the binaries (the so called 'excluded middle'), affirming both poles while undoing 
their polarisation" (Grosz 1989, 132). 
Margaret Whitford illustrates the workings of Derridaen deconstruction by 
claiming that once the violence of the hierarchies has been exposed or 
recognised 
"one attempts to prevent the opposition from merely reasserting itself by 
introducing some term or mechanism which prevents the field from 
returning to its original state. One can call these terms indecidables, 
undecideables, that is to say, terms which cannot be said to be one or 
other of the previous terms ..... The most familiar of the undecideables is 
of course differance, which can mean both difference (spatial) and 
deferment (temporal). However, to prevent the movement or the play 
which continuously displaces metaphysical oppositions from solidifying or 
ossifying by its attachment to a single term, Derrida uses ... different 
'nicknames' for differance .. , arche-writing, dissemination, supplement, 
parergon, hymen, trace, iterability and so on" (Whitford 1991, 127). 
I suggest that Irigaray's Speaking of Immemorial Waters deconstructs 
Nietzsche's text by 'jamming' an undecidable, namely a poetiC style7 , as an 
amorous mimicry of Nietzsche's own poetiC style into the business of doing 
feminist philosophy, whilst undoing the assumptions of phallocentric philosophy. 
7 Irigaray's deconstructive use of a poetic style is not the same as the quasi-poetic style in Derrida's Spurs: Nietzsche's 
woman. Derrida's quasi-poetic style self-consciously disrupts the aesthetic properties of the poetic by rendering it 
philosophical and critical. Irigaray's text also doubles a poetic style with the business of doing feminist philosophy. but 
does so in such a way that infuses this style with an affective quality that exceeds argument. 
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For example, in Speaking Of Immemorial Waters, Irigaray writes in the first 
person, as an 'I' who addresses 'you' (Zarathustra/Nietzsche), which sets up an 
intimate address, from which she castigates him as a lover might do. 
"I am thrown into despair by this irresolvable oscillation ... But isn't this 
your game to ceaselessly to bring the outside inward" (Irigaray 1991, 12), 
and "your whole will, your eternal recurrence, are those anything more 
than the dream of one who neither wants to have been born, nor continue 
to be born, at every instance of a female other ... Eternal is the joy that 
carries with it the joy of annihilation, the affirmation of destruction" 
(Irigaray 1991, 27) .... "Such is the failure of the man who does not make 
his own boundary out of the skin of the other. He is turned back to the 
other side of the limit. A catastrophe that would have no place to be if he 
obeyed the music of that female other. If he let her carry him along 
without forcing her to follow his rhythm alone" (Irigaray 1991, 36). 
In her critique of the sublime abyss she castigates Nietzsche for his terror of the 
fluid, multiple feminine other; a sublime terror which requires Zarathustra to 
sustain the distinctions between self and other and to remain perilously above 
the fluid, multiple, ever-evolving and immemorial waters of the feminine 
sublime. 
"So it happens that you believe that between the one and the other is the 
void. The effect of difference is so powerful that its misperception reams 
our bottomless chasms .... You bustle around so much just to keep on the 
move ... And the lure of the void under your steps you respond to by 
trying to make yourself lighter than you are. So that you don't plummet 
like a stone. And you hold so tightly to your circle as if it stopped you 
falling! Turning endlessly above the abyss, as if finding in that movement a 
fragile equilibrium" (Irigaray 1991, 44-45). 
These themes are repeated again and again in this text, even as the fluid and 
lyrical style8 of writing, as a philosophical strategy, mimics a poetic style. 
8Elizabeth Weed notes that Irigaray's disruption of the logic of western and phallocentric syntax via the figure of 'woman' 
is not new, and her use of style is a cunning and strategic problematization of intelligibility, whereby the reader is both 
taken into the text, but also unable master of it. "For it is precisely the thematizable, the demonstrable, the formalizable, as 
she says in This Sex, that one must write against" (Weed 1994, 86). Irigaray's project however extends beyond Derridaen 
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Irigaray's use of poetic style which is feminised, is a deconstructive device, 
which jams "the theoretical machinery" of both traditional and Nietzschean 
philosophy, even as it prevents a violent hierarchy from reappearing in the text, 
one which would reinstall another binary opposition between Irigaray's text, and 
the text she is critiquing. Here a poetic style operates as an 'undecidable', laced 
with feminine becoming, textual multiplicity, and sublime excess. 
Irigaray's deployment of ecriture feminine is both consonant with and resistant 
to Derrida's figure 'Nietzsche's Woman'. Speaking of Immemorial Waters 
enables Irigaray to speak as a woman9 , and not like a woman. This is a political 
practicing of feminine negativity, not only a textual practiCing of negativity. Like 
Derrida's deconstructive texts, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles and The Colossal, 
Speaking of Immemorial Waters is characterised by an openness to multiplicity, 
fluidity and ever-proliferating difference, but unlike Derrida's texts it does not 
only challenge the reader with textual indeterminacy, but also presents the 
reader with a politics of the feminine. Irigaray's text thus invites double 
practices of negativity, the negativities of textual/aesthetic indeterminacy and of 
a politics of the feminine. The former is deconstructive, whereas the latter 
engages something of an Hegelian diaiectic10 whereby the negativities of the 
feminine are rendered positive. Here the positivity of the feminine is secured, 
unlike deconstructive practices which sustain an undecidability between 
positivity and negativity. 
This textual politics, or ecriture feminine, enables Irigaray to detail a version of 
the feminine sublime. In the section titled Her Ultimate Depth Never Returns To 
The Light Of The Day, Irigaray writes: 
"And the sea can shed shimmering scales indefinitely. Her depths peel off 
into innumerable, thin shining layers. And each is the equal to the other as 
it catches a reflection and lets it go. As it preserves and blurs. As it 
captures the glinting play of light. As it sustains mirages. Multiple and still 
far too numerous for the pleasure of the eye, which is lost in that host of 
undecidability into that of a female positivity, which in turn is itself rendered undecidable, as the operation of style. 
9Strictly speaking Irigaray invites not ecriture feminine, but Ie parler femme. 
10 Chapter One sketched this becoming process as an effect of dialectical negativity. Hegel's discussion of the master/slave 
dialectic in the book titled The Phenomenology of Spirit, details a dialectical process in which the contradictions between 
oppositions may be overcome, because the internal relationship between positivity and negativity can be rearticulated. 
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sparkling surfaces. And with no end in sight. And the surfaces are all 
equally deep and superficial. Unless one of them is made into a bridge that 
holds the person up, prevents him from sinking, that crosses over, but 
never penetrates" (Irigaray 1991, 46) ... "No rapture, no perch is greater 
than the sea. And man has still to come who will live that love out beyond 
the reach of any port. Letting go of his rock, his ship, his island, and even 
that last drop of oil on water, and so that he can feel the intoxication of 
such vastness" (Irigaray 1991, 47). 
Irigaray thus deconstructs the phallocentric assumptions of Nietzsche's 
(sublime) text Thus Spoke Zarathustra/ and simultaneously repositions the 
sublime as an effect of infinite, rapturous, amorous, watery and becoming 
feminine sublime. In so doing she invites a particular feminist supplement to the 
aesthetic category of the sublime. This is a sublimity not characterised by the 
will to power, the abyss and masculine ressentiment, or a masculine imaginary 
structured by an economy of the same (of exchange), but by a vast, affective, 
seductive, non-hierarchical, loving feminine imaginary situated in an economy 
of the gift, of the 'other of the other'. The openness and positivity of this 
operation which delivers this sublimity, is associated with a feminine imaginary, 
to which 'man' (including Nietzsche/ Zarathustra) is 'still to come'. 
S.4. Deconstruction and dialectics. 
The interpretive method employed in this written thesis cannot invite practices 
of negativity, even as this method enables us to make distinctions between 
different practices of negativity, and to understand the differences between 
aesthetic practices of negativity and deconstructive philosophical textual 
practices of negativity. Indeed, this method allows us to understand the 
discursive competition between philosophical deconstruction and ecriture 
feminine/ and aesthetic practices of negativity in painting and visual art 
practices. 
The previous section offered an interpretation of how Irigaray's text invites the 
reader into a deconstructive practicing of negativity, via textual processes which 
have no boundary, and which like the sea are infinite, mobile, becoming, 
feminine and sublime. These are the 'immemorial waters' that will not be 
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contained or mastered by phallocentric discoursell . These are eternally 
becoming waters, indebted to Nietzschean and Hegelian becomings, but not 
confined to a masculinist politics of ressentiment12 . This is a sublime event 
structured by a love 'to come'13, and the articulation of a feminine imaginary, 
not contaminated by a masculine economy of the same, but opened to the 
multiplicity of non-hierarchical difference, to love, all of which might be available 
to men, but whose 'home' is with the feminine. This feminine sublime is a 
discursive possibility which privileges the feminine, but which also keeps the 
edges between oppositions blurred in the interests of the figure of the 'neither 
one nor two'. This is a deconstructive operation, where the differences between 
the practicing of negativity and an understanding of that negativity, are unclear. 
The ensuing discussion will explore how the contemporary painting practices of 
Rosa Lee and Therese Oulton engage the negativities of a politics of the 
feminine and the negativities of aesthetic specific signifying processes. This 
discussion presumes that these negativities are not reducible to one another. 
For example, a decorative style of painting, insofar as it is associated with the 
negativities of the feminine, registers a particular historical and discursive set of 
interests unambiguously available to understanding. In this regard, Lee's 
paintings engage feminine decoration, but disrupt the traditional assumption 
that such decoration is confined to the negativities of the feminine, by installing 
decoration into the positivities high art. This is a conceptually available, and 
dialectical manouevre, one which reverses masculine/ feminine and high-
art/craft binaries so that the negativity of denigrated feminine histories is both 
preserved and rearticulated in terms of a positive, and becoming feminine 
imaginary14 and a feminist politics of identity. This dialectical operation 
engages the positivities of understanding, and is a subjectifying event that is 
quite different to the de-subjectifying effects of poetic ambiguity and sublime 
11 By developing an account of the link between the feminine and the fluidity of water, Irigaray challenges Nietzsche's fear 
of water, his elemental love of the sublime abyss, and of eternal recurrence. 
12Ressentiment is a Nietzschean term, to be distinguished from resentment. Ressentiment is a negative form of the 'will to 
power', insofar as it maintains fixed hierarchies, between good and evil for example. 
13Frances Oppel's article titled 'Speaking of Immemorial Waters ': Irigaray with Nietzsche in Nietzsche, Feminism and 
Political TheOlY, ed. Paul Patton, offers a similar interpretation. 
14Rosemary Betterton in her essay titled Bodies in the Work: The Aesthetics and Politics of Women 's Non-representational 
Painting, details how some contemporary women abstract painters, mobilize strategies like mimicry, the critique of 
binarism, the celebration of the feminine, and the interrogation of female embodiment in the interests of the articulation of 
a feminine imaginary addressing gendered power relations. 
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irresolution. These insights oppose the deconstructive methods of Irigaray's 
ecriture feminine sketched above, which blur the boundaries between 
oppositions in the interests of an indeterminate 'neither one or two'. 
Selected contemporary feminist writing16 draws on the insights of ecriture 
feminine in an effort to theorise a feminine aesthetics of negativity17. Irigaray's 
deconstructive model is powerful and influential. But there is also 'violence' to it. 
Irigaray's Speaking of Immemorial Waters not only conflates the negativities of 
the feminine with those of deconstructive textual disruption, but like Derrida's 
texts discussed in the third chapter, also erodes or degrades, the autonomy of 
aesthetic experience. Irigaray follows Derrida by strategically violating settled 
norms which sustain the boundaries between philosophical understanding and 
aesthetic practices of negativity. In eroding this boundary, Irigaray challenges 
the supposedly phaliocentric and universal identities of both. Following Irigaray, 
Elizabeth Grosz claims 
"when poetry is separated from prose on the one hand and non-fiction or 
theory on the other, the self-image of phallocentric knowledge is 
preserved. It is only when the poetic text threatens to insert itself into the 
very heart of 'serious' theoretical writings, blurring the boundaries 
between poetry, fiction and knowledge, that discourses more amenable to 
16See Christine Battersby Just Jamming: b-igaray, painting and psychoanalysis in New feminist art criticism. in which she 
demonstrates how Irigaray's feminine aesthetics disrupts the binarist assumptions of Lacanian psychoanalysis by deploying 
a feminine optics based on female bodies. Janis Jefferies Text and Textiles: weaving across the borderlines details how 
textiles, associated with the feminine, disrupt the traditional binary between craft and high art. Hilary Robinson in Border 
Crossings: womanliness, body, representation makes the case that art works made by women register an essential 
embodiedness that articulates a feminine imaginary to come. Indeed the she-artist is the site of becoming. of the 'more 
than' and the 'inbetween'; all operating as emblems ofa feminine deconstructive sublime. All these texts can be found 111 
New Feminist Art Criticism: Critical strategies ed. Katy Deepwell. 
17See Griselda Pollock' chapter title Gleaning in history or coming after/behind the reapers: the feminine, the stranger and 
the matrL-..; in the work of Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, in generations and geographies in the visual arts: feminist reading. 
Here Pollock details a different feminist negative aesthetics, in which a sub-symbolic register. called the matrixial, is both a 
subjectifying moment and a filter for "archaic sensations and the most archaic forms of meaning, pictograms" (Pollock 
1996, 268). Although this is another version of Kristeva's maternal semiotic, this matrixial register is another manifestation 
of ecriture feminine in painting. Andrea Duncan's essay titled This phenomenological ecriture in The Feminine 
Case:Jung, Aesthetics and Creative Process, synthesises Kristevan and Irigarayan insights with those of Jung to make the 
point that paintings register an archaic relation inaugurated by our phenomenal relation to our mothers. Such feminine 
negative aesthetics in painting, like Irigaray's essay Speaking of Immemorial Waters. is an articulation of an anima 
consciousness. Although also available to men, this phenomenological ecriture has a special relevance for women, 
according to Duncan, insofar as this fluid and lucid domain of the feminine offers a renewal of a sublime relationship 
between mother and daughter, long buried by cultural matricide. 
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the positive inscription of the female body may be established" (Grosz 
1989, 130). 
Here poetry is overtly feminised and pressed into the service of feminist 
deconstruction. Irigaray also challenges the supposed autonomy of knowledges 
which purport to be universal. She states that when a language "presents itself 
as universal, and which in fact is produced by men only, is this not what 
maintains the alienation and exploitation of women in and by society?" 
(Irigaray in Grosz 1989, 128). 
The appropriation of poetic style into deconstructive philosophy in the interests 
of disrupting the traditional dialectical relation which sustains the differences 
between aesthetic experience and understanding, may well service Irigaray's 
feminist deconstructive project. However, it rather limits the possibilities for 
painters who wish to retain aesthetic specific practices of negativity in painting, 
even as they might also be interested in challenging phallocentric assumptions 
and developing a feminist discourse of desire. Irigarayan ecriture feminine sets 
up a prescriptive norm for feminist art practice which involves rejecting 
traditional aesthetics practices, because of their purportedly contaminating 
phallocentrism and aesthetic autonomy. 
Against this deconstructive norm, the dialectical method deployed in this thesis, 
sustains the distinctions between the political negativities of the feminine and 
the aesthetic specific negativities of poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution. 
This dialectical method presumes that aesthetic negativity has a certain 
discursive and structural autonomy. Aesthetic practices of negativity from this 
perspective are not reducible to the positivities of understanding, even if we are 
able to understand something about them and their differences. This thesis thus 
challenges deconstructive methods which degrade aesthetic practices of 
negativity by conflating them with other negativities, or stereotyping them as 
instruments of a phallogocentric discourse. Such degradation 18 has been grist to 
the mill of deconstruction also interested in subverting the de-subjectifying 
effects of negative aesthetics. 
18Therese Oulton makes a similar point where she criticises deconstruction for 'cleaning out' the language of painting. She 
claims "You don't get a clean language: you've got a debased form" (Lee 1987, 22). 
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Rita Felski's book Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social 
Change, published in 1989, makes the claim that a feminist aesthetics can only 
be a political project theorised as an adjunct to feminist theory in general. For 
Felski aesthetic meaning is constructed in terms of a broader and intertextual 
network of styles, genres and conventions. Felski's book is critical of a 
trajectory of what she calls negative aesthetics, which finds its feminist 
articulation in 'ecriture feminine'. This articulation of a subversive, 
deconstructive critique of patriarchy, Felski considers to be an impossible 
aesthetics of the feminine: the conflation of the political and the aesthetic. 
However, where Felski is generally opposed to a discourse of negativity, my 
research project takes negativity as its central theme: the aesthetic specific 
negativities of poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution, the philosophical 
negativities of dialectics and deconstruction and their political and discursive 
effects, and the negativities of the feminine and of female experience. The 
following discussion of Rosa Lee's paintings is an exploration of how this 
practice registers both the negativities of a feminist politics of identity and the 
negativities of the aesthetic specific operations of sublime irresolution, and 
explores how these irreducible practices of negativity exist in a dialectical 
relation to one another. 
5.5. A feminine sublime. 
The title of Rosa Lee's painting Speculum No.7, invites association with the title 
of Irigaray's book Speculum of the Other Woman translated by Gillian C. Gill. 
and published in 1985. Irigaray's book sketches a feminine imaginary which 
exists beyond the specularization of a patriarchal economy of the same. 
Speculum of the Other Woman registers a feminine imaginary and operates as a 
critique of the tradition of western philosophy by exploring the essential 
differences between women and men. In this text Irigaray reinterprets the 
western philosophical tradition from the perspective of women so that the 
negativity of the feminine is rendered positive. 
I suggest that Lee's painting, like Irigaray's Speaking Immemorial Waters, 
engages a feminine imaginary and a politics of the feminine, and the autonomy 
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of aesthetic experience 19 . Lee's Speculum No 7. 1990 (Figure 20) presents the 
viewer with puzzles. Is it an abstraction, or is it figurative? Betterton suggests 
that this painting confounds meaning through a process in which a 
"geometrically generated structure resists the assumptions of the intuitive 
nature of creativity, but at the same time underpins a surface which is 
detailed and decorative. Against the search for purity, closure and control, 
the contained object and the finished statement in minimalist painting, her 
work offers openness and the willingness to let the impurity of life spill into 
paint."(Betterton 1996, 103). 
Even if Betterton's account of this painting registers an inability to close an 
experience of this work with a conceptual supplement, it does sketch a 
discursive field that this painting is embedded in: decoration, minimalism and 
negative aesthetics. 
In this regard Lee's Speculum No.7 mobilises a consistent trope of minimalism, 
that of repetition 2o, but this repetition is rendered open, impure and excessive 
through its painterly qualities, which not only sustain the materiality of paint, 
but where repetition is rendered decorative21 . Neither decoration, nor repetition 
are innately gendered, but in so figuring repetition as decorative, this painting 
invites a gendered reading, whereby such repetitive, intricate, controlled 
'embroidery' as paint, signifies oppressed female histories and repressive 
19Lee also distances herself from a frame which would attempt to capture her work only in terms of a feminist politics. She 
claims" I have become more interested in establishing or searching for patterns in the work ... more insistent rhythms. than 
about mere decoration, the superfluous detail which earlier paintings were grappling with" . She continues "In the end. 
meaning is embodied in the activity. What 1 know or can predict gives way to what is unfolding in front of me. The desire 
for both complication and simplicity. The slow, concrete building up of layers, the sense of furrowing backwards into the 
strands, the establishing of a rhythmic kind of progression - a routine, the juxtaposition of colours which end up denying 
themselves (Todd Gallery Catalogue 2000). 
2oYayoi Kusama's visual art practice deploys similar strategies, whereby through excessive repetition, Kusama disrupts, 
feminises or indeed even makes 'hysterical"' the hard edge, controlled and masculinist protocols, offor example, Donald 
Judd's Minimalism. Judd was Kusama's "first boyfriend" (Hoptmann 2000. II). Kusama synthesised this excessive 
feminised Minimalism with traditional Japanese Nihonga painting and with Pop Art and Abstract Expressionism. in the 
service of a libidinal and obsessive painting and sculptural practice which served as a sublimation for her obsessional 
neurosis. In an interview with Damien Hirst she claims "I have been suffering from this disease for more than fifty years. 
Painting pictures has been a therapy for me to overcome the illness" (Hoptman 2000, 136). If Kusama's painting practice is 
born of individual experience, such experience also bears the marks and scars of being a woman, and of deploying such 
negativities in the service of rendering the negativities of the feminine, positive. 
21See Margaret Walters, Rosa Lee: Painting as Lace-Making in Modern Painters Spring 1992. Also Warped: Painting and 
the Feminine, Angel Row Gallery, Nottingham 2001, and Permission to Speak: Worcester City Museum and Ali Gallery 
Jan 1969. 
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Figure 20: Rosa Lee. Speculum No7. 1990 
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feminine crafts22 . This painting thus 'jams' the negativities of the feminine craft 
and decoration into the protocols of high-art minimalism. Such disruptions are a 
political and clearly understood strategy, one which renders the negativities of 
feminine and decorative craft, positive. 
Yet as Betterton notes, in Speculum No.7 meaning proliferates and exceeds 
understanding. Such aesthetic disaggregations of meaning register as a 
particular type of experience which challenges or critiques conceptual mastery. 
Such a negative aesthetics is not feminine, but following Adorno, is an 
immanent form of criticality that displaces conceptual mastery and political 
understanding. I suggest that this painting both invites the positivities of 
understanding a feminist politics, and an aesthetic practicing of negativity which 
exceeds such understanding. These two moments exist in a dialectical and 
irreducible relation to one another. 
Lee's painting titled Screen 1998 (Figure 21) likewise positions the viewer 
between two registers: aesthetic experience and political understanding. The 
screen that this painting is, codes both a rigid and mathematical underlying 
structure, even as its repetitions shimmer and mobilize the eye, so that visual 
mastery is disabled. In this regard, the distinction between 'figure' and 'ground' 
is problematised so that the viewer is confused about the status of the rigid and 
blocked matrix. These unresolvable oppositions are however displaced by an 
infinitely mobile and shimmering surface, whose own identity is unclear. Is this 
an organising or dissolving matrix underneath an infinitely proliferating 'skin/ 
fabric' of paint? Questions arises as to whether this is a knitted, embroidered or 
painted surface, even as its painterliness is evident. And given that it is paint, 
how can paint be so woven? These unresolved oppositions, secrets, 
displacements and questions invite a sublime practicing of negativity. 
We may try to understand this experience of sublime negativity, by attending to 
its modalities. For this is an experience of sublime irresolution with no sublime 
cut, or rupture or thrill. This is a sublimity of the minuscule, the secret, the 
22Lee associates the decorative with women when she says "those humble arts, known sometimes as 'crafts' - borne of 
necessity, diligence, a desire to enrich through embellishment and adornment - all those anonymous women through time, 
all those hours dedicated to clothing and feeding and embroidering, making, bending and sweeping ... (Lee in Warped: 
Painting and the Feminine curated by Maggie Ayliffe, 2000, 6). 
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Figure 21: Rosa Lee. Screen. 1998 
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over-elaborated, the obsessive .... not attuned to synthesis, or binary 
oppositions. It shimmers, pleases and defeats comprehension. We might thus 
give this experience of sublime negativity an identity, for such a sublime 
experience with no cut, which situates the viewer within shimmering, obsessive, 
secretive excess and hovers between painting and embroidery registers a 
feminine imaginary. Like Irigaray's sublime poetics sketched in Speaking of 
Immemorial Waters, the uncontainable excess registered in Screen could be 
understood as an example of the feminine sublime. It is when we conceptualise 
such aesthetic experiences, when we attend to the way they are organised, that 
we give them an identity and a politics. 
The distinction between an experience of sublime negativity, and an 
understanding of the discursive and political implications of these experiences, 
is made possible by the dialectical interpretive method consistently mobilised 
throughout this thesis. These two paintings by Rosa Lee can be understood as a 
feminist deconstruction of the masculinist assumptions of minimalism by 
figuring decoration as excessive repetition. Furthermore, we might also 
understand the modality of sublime irresolution employed in Lee's paintings as 
an example of the feminine sublime. But these understandings are not the same 
as an aesthetic experience of negativity, which disables understanding. 
5.6. Recuperating and subverting tradition. 
Rosa Lee, in her 1987 essay titled Resisting Amnesia: Feminism, Painting and 
Postmodernism explores how Therese Oulton's paintings recuperate the 
traditions of painting and resist philosophical deconstruction. Lee claims that 
Oulton's paintings are a "questioning of tradition - a renewal through disruption" 
(Lee 1987, 22). 
Likewise, this discussion explores how selected paintings by Therese Oulton 
both deploy, and subvert, the traditions of western oil painting. For example, 
Oulton's practice engages a traditional repertoire of painting: the tactile 
properties of paint, chiaroscuro, the representation of both monumental and 
minuscule scale, to name a few. It is practice that operates between abstraction 
and landscape painting. Yet Oulton's practice subverts this traditional repertoire 
by challenging some of its subjectifying effects by deploying the de-
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subjectifying signifying process called sublime irresolution. Oulton's painting 
practice thus has affinities with deconstruction insofar as it subverts the 
phallocentric assumptions of traditional Romantic sublime landscape painting, 
but its de-subjectifying operations are different to those of deconstructive 
philosophy. 
For example, Oulton's painting titled Dissonance Quartet No.1 1985 (Figure 22) 
is not unlike Turner's The Fall of an Avalanche at Grisons in its coding of 
sublime energy. Dissonance Quartet No.1 is not a representation of anything 
known 23 , but an abstraction that is not quite abstract, for it still defines space, 
but a space in which scale is distorted. Even as it intimates the fantastically 
large, it also insists on its own material facticity, in terms of the repetition of 
motifs and the small delicately layered brushmarks. Stuart Morgan's review of 
Oulton's work explores how this disruption works: 
"Faced by walls of worked impasto, the viewer struggles for dominance. 
Inability to tell parts from wholes, to know whether imagery is intentional 
or accidental ... forces a postponement of consumption .... Scale is lost: 
this could be a view down a microscope or a mountain seen from a 
helicopter. Coordinates jar: the fleshiness of the great Venetians, the 
apocolypticism of the British Romantic landscape tradition .... All these 
planned disjunctions result in an art that heightens and exposes tensions 
revealed in the work of the eye - tensions between mind and body" 
(Morgan 1985, 118). 
Such practices of negativity in Dissonance Quartet No.1 install a process of 
reading which positions the viewer on a sublime threshold. When I interviewed 
Oulton, she identified this sublime 'edge' as being on the edge of 
representation, and that this position "tips you out of the known and toward a 
boundary that you don't wish to approach" (Interview with Lola Frost in 
September 2004). Oulton's practice, like Turner's, engages the traditional 
23Mick Finch identifies this feature ofOulton's practice as :faktura', a term which insists on the the facticity of painting in 
itself, where it is not a model for the socio-philosophical. This feature of painting 'in-and-for itself elides the 
appropriation of painting to modes ofthinking informed by unambiguous understanding. From this we might conclude that 
Oulton's paintings hover between 'faktura', as painting-in-itself and "painting as representation (which) empowers that 
which is known prior to making the painting"(Finch 1997,20). 
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Figure 22: Therese Oulton. Dissonance Quartet No. 1. 1985 
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meanings of the sublime in which nature is rendered awesome and terrifying, 
but she pushes the boundaries of representation in the interests of a subversive 
sensibility which does not settle and which perpetually defers and destabilises 
meaning. This disabling of the positivities of understanding, like deconstructive 
practices of negativity, produces an agonistics of the sublime. But unlike 
deconstructive practices, such an agonistics is not produced by degrading the 
aesthetic specific traditions of painting, but by amplifying them. 
In this regard, Oulton's painting titled Co un terfoil 1987 (Figure 23) resists the 
scopic mastery of the unimpeded view of the landscape that Turner's painting 
The Fall of an Avalanche at Grisons opens up, in which the viewer is positioned 
above a catastrophic and sublime event. In Turner's painting scopic mastery is 
endorsed as an overall view of a natural disaster and the otherness of nature. 
Counterfoil, by comparison, refuses such a bird's eye view and a binarist 
politics associated with phallocentric domination 24 . By refusing an all-seeing 
gaze this painting inaugurates what might be construed as a feminist 
deconstruction of the phallocentric assumptions of Turner's painting. 
Counterfoil is not limited to such a feminist and deconstructive interpretation, 
insofar as it also engages the viewer in terms of aesthetic specific practices of 
negativity. For example the painting frustrates the normal expectations of 
landscape painting by collapsing spatial representation and by presenting the 
viewer with piecemeal engagements with surface flatness and the viscous 
thickness of paint. The viewer's gaze moves in and out of focus, attentive to 
forms which are variations of the same, to surfaces which shift, to the interplay 
between viscosity and opacity of paint. As Andrew Renton remarks 
"contrapuntal rhythms of generation, regeneration, and degeneration are 
set up ..... The object of Therese Oulton's paintings becomes the removal 
of the object; the gentle dismembering of the skeletal form. What is 
disclosed is nothing but the fragile seams and spaces, breaks and flows, of 
an ever renewing texture" (Renton 1990, 8). 
24See Chapter 9 "Phallogocularcentrism": Derrida and Irigaray in Martin Jay's Downcast Eyes: the Denigration of Vision 
in Twentieth-Century Thought. 
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Figure 23: Therese Oulton. Counterfoil. 1987 
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In inviting both an aesthetic specific, and a deconstructive feminist 
interpretation, Counterfoil critiques the assumptions of phallocentric hierarchies 
found in the tradition of Western and modernist oil painting, even as it registers 
the richness and power of aesthetic practices of negativity embedded in that 
tradition. 
David Peter Gidal and Angela Moorjani 25 identify Oulton's practice as a 
dialectical mobilization of contradictions, even as it also exceeds containment in 
the idea of dialectics. Peter Gidal identifies this dialectic as "an operation and a 
process at each moment and in each gesture against the coming-into-being of 
excess. Thus this painting cannot be consumed as spectacle". Rosa Lee 
identifies the lack of closure as the refusal of any single meaning, whereas 
Stuart Morgan identifies this mobile dialectics as "hovering between polarities" 
(Morgan 1986, 5). I suggest that all these commentators attend to how 
Oulton's practice mobilises that signifying process called sublime irresolution. It 
is this aesthetic specific practicing of negativity that distinguishes Oulton's 
painting practice from Irigaray's philosophical deconstruction. For Oulton's 
practice is not only a feminist deconstruction of the protocols of scopic mastery. 
It also positions the viewer within the problematics of traditional sublime 
concerns: on the 'edge' between cognition and affect, between (the alchemy of) 
the material and the spiritual, between abstraction and figuration and between 
subversion and regeneration. Oulton's paintings engage an irreducible inter-
relation between the aesthetic negativities of sublime irresolution and the 
positivities of a feminist politics. 
Oulton's practice marks the field of the sublime in particular way. If we consider 
the two paintings titled Samphire 1988 (Figure 24) and Correspondence No.2 
1990 (Figure 25) both are characterised by abstract rhythmical cellular 
proliferations that do not code any sense of landscape. What they do code is the 
sensuousness of paint and a mobile visual field interrupted by contrasting 'zips' 
of colour. In the case of Samphire this is a diagonal and vibrant 'dance' whereas 
in Correspondence No.2 these differences are vertical strips of 'light'. In both 
cases the differences between the figure and the ground are only marked in 
terms of light over dark. Yet what is also apparent is that these differences are 
25See David Cohen: The Jell'els Of Art Histol)! in Modern Painters Spring 1988; Peter Gidal: Fool's Gold catalogue 
Gimpel Fils 1984; Angela MOOl:iani in Dislocating the Maternal Metaphor in The Aesthetics of Loss and Lessness 1992. 
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Figure 24: Therese Oulton. Samphire. 1988 
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Figure 25: Therese Oulton. Correspondence No.2. 1990 
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new formulations of the same. In Samphire the lively yellows and blues are a 
reconfiguration of the browns and pinks, whereas in Correspondence No.2 the 
vertical 'zips' on the right, are a play on the accumulations of the light of the 
'seams' in the overall field, whereas the broader vertical band is an 
accumulation of the 'milkiness' of the insides of these molecular permutations. 
And finally on top of both these vertical interruptions are crescent like 'figures' 
composed of further elaborations of these already established motifs. 
In understanding how sublime irresolution is deployed in these paintings we 
might observes that there is a logic at work here: all parts are part of the whole 
and all differences are elaborations of the same, in an ongoing, mobile and 
becoming operation. Here oppositions slide in and out of one another and 
become new formulations of the same. We might therefore identify this 
modality of sublime irresolution as a mobile becoming feminine sublime. This 
infinitely proliferating and mobile field of vision, is comparable to Irigaray's 
'immemorial waters' figured through repetition, touch and infinite becomings. 
This becoming sublime is also indebted to the tradition of Western painting, and 
in particular Turner's paintings, which also engage a mobile and oscillational, or 
becoming modality of that signifying process called sublime irresolution. 
If Oulton's earlier paintings, like Counterfoil, Samphire and Correspondence 
No.2 were enthusiastically taken up by feminist commentators because these 
paintings critique phallocentric values in the tradition of painting, and articulate 
a becoming feminine imaginary, her recent paintings are more concerned with 
the subversive possibilities contained within the tradition of painting. When we 
consider the two paintings Clair 2002 (Figure 26) and Obscur 2002 (Figure 27), 
the oppositions between light, dark and clarity and obscurity are contained in 
their titles. The visual vocabularies of Obscur and Clair are not dissimilar to 
those of Correspondence, given that the relation between the figure and the 
ground is one where each is still a logical permutation of the other. Each 
painting emerges out of an intentionally generated contradiction. To quote 
Oulton 
"like a religious drama, so that the excess of light and of dark is always a 
'becoming grey'. This is a fresh conceptual dilemma and a source for new 
motifs - situated in the logical problematics of visibility and non-visibility. It 
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Figure 26: Therese Oulton. Clair. 2002 
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Figure 27: Therese Oulton. Obscur. 2002 
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is a drama between going towards too much and too little and what that 
does to the motifs" (Oulton interview with Lola Frost September, 2004). 
In Obscur and Clair, the tending toward dark and light in either, and the 
consequent grey/blue of each, is the result of the application of the 
recuperative and subversive logic that is found throughout this practice. In this 
regard Oulton recuperates Turner's engagement with colour and light, 
conceived of as symbols of a becoming and regenerative divinity. But Obscur 
and Clair also subvert the symbolic meaning of colour and light in Turner's 
paintings, and instead mobilise an intentional set of contradictions in which 
meaning is deferred and multiplied. For example, the darkness and lightness of 
these paintings engages an oppositional logic insofar as in the smallest fractals 
contained within these tonal registers, become in turn, sparkling components in 
a drama of clarification and obscurity. 
Oulton's practice provokes critical thinking as to what its subversions achieve, 
but it also goes beyond such criticality and most significantly, it invites an 
aesthetic specific practicing of negativity. Against the presumptions of ecriture 
feminine, in Oulton's paintings, such negativity is not gendered or essentially 
linked to a feminine imaginary, but is the outcome of an intentional mobilization 
of contradictions contained in the language of painting. Oulton's painting 
practice both recuperates and subverts the traditions of painting, figured by her 
romantic and modernist forbears. This is a practice which dialectically 
synthesises aesthetic practices of negativity with a feminist and deconstructive 
supplement. These two discourses are not conflated in this practice, nor is the 
aesthetic specificity of sublime irresolution degraded. The way sublime 
irresolution is organised in this practice, as a mobile and becoming event, 
oscillating between oppositions, registers a bewildering array of engagements 
and subversions that refuse any closure or any position. This is an aesthetic 
specific practice of negativity which, like Irigaray's Speaking of Immemorial 
Waters, "defers the possibility of ultimate arrival" (Zylinska 2001, 38). 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the differences between Irigaray's feminist 
deconstructive and textual practice of negativity, and aesthetic practices of 
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negativity in selected contemporary painting by Rosa lee and Therese Oulton. It 
has demonstrated how Irigaray's Speaking of Immemorial Waters, like Derrida's 
Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles discussed in Chapter Three, collapses the distinction 
between textual/aesthetic disruption and the feminine. Like Derridaen 
deconstruction, ecriture feminine degrades traditional distinctions which sustain 
the differences between the negativities of aesthetic experience and the 
positivities of understanding, and blurs the boundaries between aesthetic 
negativity and a feminist politics. 
This investigation has negotiated this interface between ecriture feminine and 
contemporary paintings by deploying the dialectical interpretive method 
mobilised throughout this thesis. This method presumes an irreducible inter-
relation between the unspeakableness of aesthetic experience and the positivity 
of analysis and understanding. From this dialectical perspective we are able to 
understand the correspondences between a deconstructive feminine sublime 
and the modalities of sublime irresolution in Lee's and Oulton's paintings; and 
the differences between a feminist politics of ecriture feminine and the 
negativities of aesthetic experience. 
To make this claim is to resist that well developed discourse, generally called 
ecriture feminine, that so excited a generation of feminist artists and theorists 
in the 1980' and 1990's in its promise to deliver a negative aesthetics of the 
feminine. Against this possibility, this chapter has argued that aesthetic 
negativity has no feminine, or masculine, gender. Instead this chapter has 
made the case that an aesthetics of negativity inhabits selected contemporary 
(feminist) paintings and that its de-subjectifying modalities are not confined to, 
even if they bear the imprint of, deconstructive and feminist interests. 
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CONCLUSION 
6.1. Theoretical contribution. 
This written thesis investigates aesthetic negativity in paintings as a 
contribution to a revival of negative aesthetics after the impact of philosophical 
deconstruction. It does so by identifying two signifying processes called poetic 
ambiguity and sublime irresolution which disaggregate meaning in paintings and 
visual art practices. The thesis sustains the relation/divide between the 
negativities of aesthetic experience and the positivities of understanding, even 
as it offers an account of how paintings deliver aesthetic negativity, and 
investigates some of the discursive implications of that delivery. 
The thesis has explored the tensions and correspondences between negative 
aesthetics and philosophical deconstruction. It has investigated how 
deconstructive methods oppose dialectical methods by blurring the boundary 
between experience and understanding, thereby degrading the autonomy of 
aesthetic negativity. By contrast, the dialectical method deployed in this study 
sustains the boundary between experience and understanding which preserves 
the autonomy of aesthetic experience, even as this method enables us to 
differentiate between different practices of negativity so that, for example, the 
negativity of a politics of the feminine is not conflated with the negativity of 
aesthetic experience. 
In spite these antagonisms, this thesis has also investigated how aesthetic 
practices of negativity in paintings, and deconstructive non-aesthetic practices 
of negativity resemble one another insofar as both de-subjectify viewers of 
paintings and readers of texts. This investigation also recorded resemblances 
between Derrida's deconstructive figures (for example 'Nietzsche's woman' and 
the passe-partout) and the modalities of sublime irresolution and poetic 
ambiguity in Brown's and Wafer's paintings and visual art practices; and 
between Irigaray's 'immemorial waters' and the modalities of a feminine 
aesthetics of the sublime in Lee's and Oulton's paintings. Understanding the 
modalities of sublime irresolution and poetic ambiguity and their resemblances 
to deconstructive figures and methods, is not identical to experiencing the de-
subjectifying effects of aesthetic practices of negativity. 
148 
This thesis has had a lot to say about understanding something of the negativity 
of aesthetic experience. We are able to understand the identities of poetic 
ambiguity and sublime irresolution, how they differ, their discursive situation, 
that they de-subjectify viewers and how they do so. We are also able to 
understand that deconstructive and aesthetic practices of negativity differ and 
that the negativities of sublime and poetic experience are different to a politics 
of ecriture feminine. This thesis has demonstrated that postmodern, post 
colonial and feminist paintings and visual art practices register the impact of 
deconstruction within the modalities of poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution 
at work in such work, even as they also engage the autonomy of aesthetic 
experience. 
This written thesis has consistently presented aesthetic negativity as the 
property of the dialectical relation of between the viewer and the painting, and 
as an effect of the irreducible inter-relation between unspeakable experience 
and understanding. This study has developed this insight by recourse to various 
philosophical theories of negativity, in particular to the insights of Adorno. If 
philosophy provides a vocabulary for understanding aesthetic negativity, 
philosophy also threatens the discursive autonomy of an aesthetics of negativity 
insofar as a philosophical 'frame' threatens to displace the aesthetic 'work' of 
negativity. This divide, and the power relation set up by it, is also implicit in the 
dialectical method employed in this thesis. However against any idea that this 
thesis is the primary and dominant text, this study demonstrates that 
understanding negativity is a second order practice, not reducible to the 
autonomy of aesthetic experience which remains, as Marin and Lyotard claim, 
to some extent unspeakable or unrepresentable. It is these irreducible but 
interrelated differences between a first order aesthetic practicing of negativity 
made possible by paintings and visual art practices, and a second order of 
understanding how paintings deliver such practices of negativity, that has been 
the pivotal object of this investigation. 
There are two reasons for the centrality of this insight and these dialectical 
methods. Firstly, this insight resists the collapse of aesthetic practices of 
negativity into (deconstructive) theory. In particular where paintings and visual 
art practices are 'known' as versions of their deconstructive supplements, 
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instead of being encountered for their own disruptive effects. This thesis has 
argued that the disruptions of aesthetic practices of negativity are degraded by 
deconstructive methods and by ecriture feminine whose textual/sexual 
disruptions conflate aesthetic negativity with a politics of the feminine. 
Secondly, in sustaining the irreducible inter-relation between aesthetic 
experience and understanding (and the autonomy of aesthetic experience), this 
thesis revisits the dialectical possibilities of negative aesthetics, but registers the 
impact of deconstruction. Even if aesthetic experience has its own unspeakable 
autonomy which registers as an event, such a practicing of negativity exists in a 
disruptive relation to the positivities of understanding. From this perspective 
aesthetic negativity is a 'deconstructive' and de-subjectifying technique that 
pre-empts, and extends beyond, philosophical deconstruction. That being so, 
this thesis has been an effort to negotiate the unstable and irreducible inter-
relation between aesthetic negativity and deconstruction. 
This study has recorded my interpretive encounters with paintings and visual art 
practices dating from the 17th century to the contemporary. Such encounters 
have been amplified by both the philosophical insights sketched above and the 
interpretive accounts of others, but are primarily structured by visual art 
practices and paintings themselves. This privileging of the 'truth of experience' 
needs to be seen in the context of critical discourses which ask us to 
interrogate, and understand such truths and experiences. Bearing this in mind, 
this thesis has demonstrated that paintings and visual art practices are 
privileged sites of negativity, and as such are complex, profound and critical 
interventions. This study engages this aesthetic richness as a contribution to a 
renaissance of negative aesthetics after its encounter with deconstruction. 
If these are the theoretical achievements of this research project, we may also 
consider what its means were. 
6.2. Negative aesthetics and deconstruction. 
The first two chapters of this thesis developed an understanding of how the 
signifying processes called poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution invite the 
practicing of negativity. These chapters detailed how these processes are 
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encountered in selected paintings by c.o. Friedrich, Poussin, Turner and 
Rothko. These engagements were informed by the art historical insights of J.L. 
Koerner and Louis Marin, whose writings engage those signifying processes 
without theorising them. The philosophical insights of Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty, 
Kant, Nietzsche, Adorno and Lyotard inform an understanding of what these 
two signifying practices entail, and how they invited the practicing of negativity. 
The first chapter considered how Kristeva's and Merleau-Ponty's dialectical 
theories, following Hegel, negotiate the contradictions between oppositions so 
that negativity is both preserved, and in some way rendered positive. From a 
Kristevan perspective, poetic events disrupt the discursive logic of the symbolic 
phenotext by mobilising the heterogeneities and negativities of the semiotic 
genotext. The outcome of such disruption is the practicing of negativity, which 
for Kristeva has the positive effect of producing an ethics of the sUbject-in-
process. 
Merleau-Ponty's contribution to this understanding of the negativities of poetic 
ambiguity, is his philosophical and phenomenological notion of ' the Flesh', which 
likewise defeats conceptual mastery and mobilizes negativity via an 
understanding of the intertwinedness of all phenomena and discourses. Here 
the practicing of negativity is both preserved, and rendered positive, because it 
opens us up to differences. Kristeva's essay titled Giotto's Joy and Merleau-
Ponty's chapter titled The Intertwining - The Chiasm enable us to understand 
the de-subjectifying effects of practicing negativity. However where these two 
philosophical texts emphasise the negativity of instinctual drives and of 
phenomenological experience, this research project is oriented towards the 
capacities of paintings, whose aesthetic and signifying operations de-subjectify 
the viewer by disaggregating conceptual mastery and opening the viewer to 
differences. 
Jonathan Culler's structuralist insights, and J.L. Koerner's analysis of the de-
subjectifying effects of Friedrich's painting The Cross in the Mountains, present 
poetic ambiguity as an effect of structures of signification and of a romantic 
syntax. These insights enabled me to argue that the negativity of poetic 
ambiguity in paintings is not inaugurated only by our unconscious drives or 
phenomenal experience, but by particular signifying structures in paintings 
151 
which disaggregates meaning. Such signifying processes draw on our 
unconscious drives, our phenomenal experience, our discursive understanding 
and aesthetic competences. Each painting does so in its own particular way as 
an address of each of our capacities, histories and temperaments. The (anti-
structuralist) claim being that the negativity of poetic ambiguity is the property 
of the dialectical and aesthetic relation between the experiences of viewer and 
the structures of the painting. 
Furthermore, the aesthetic negativities of poetic ambiguity encountered in 
Friedrich's painting titled Garden Terrace, are not identical to the feminine 
negativities of Kristeva's semiotic register associated with a pre-oedipal, pre-
discursive maternal realm. This critique of the conflation of the feminine with 
semiotic disruption, is made in advance of a more full scale critique of ecriture 
feminine developed in Chapter Four, which conflates negative aesthetics with a 
politiCS of the feminine. 
If poetic ambiguity in painting invites the practicing of negativity, it does so in a 
particular way. The claim being that it opens the viewer to differences because 
meaning is rendered slippery and ambiguous. The signifying process called 
sublime irresolution, by contrast pits differences irresolvably against one 
another and prevaricates on the disruption or maintenance of distinctions or 
boundaries. These differences mark these processes as two modalities of a 
discourse of aesthetic negativity, whose disruptive effects persist in paintings 
from the 17th century to the present. 
Chapter Two investigated Louis Marin's discussion of Nicholas Poussin's 
painting Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe in his book Sublime Poussin, which 
details something of that signifying process called sublime irresolution. Here 
meaning is disaggregated because the viewer is unable to integrate 
irreconcilable oppositions. This unspeakable, indeed unrepresentable, 
experience invites a sublime practicing of negativity. 
In understanding what such a sublime practicing of negativity entails, Chapter 
Two investigated Kant's two texts The Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement and The 
Analytic of the Sublime. The former informs this study's persistent engagement 
with dialectics and with a discursively situated aesthetic autonomy. For like 
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Kant's Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement, the interpretive method deployed 
throughout this thesis, sustains the irreducible differences between the 
negativities of aesthetic experience and the positivities of understanding. Kant's 
text enables us to understand that there are negative types of 'aesthetic ideas' 
that disable rational understanding. Where Kant's Dialectic of Aesthetic 
Judgement productively engages the autonomy of aesthetic negativity, his 
account of the sublime in The Analytic of the Sublime privileges the positivity of 
reason over the negativities of sublime excess, thereby consolidating a binarist 
relation between these oppositions. 
Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy, engages a version of the sublime at odds with the 
Kantian sublime. For the Nietzschean sublime is a polyvalent, de-subjectifying 
and aesthetic opportunity to encounter that which is repressed by a Kantian 
account of the sublime. Nietzsche's account of the sublime inaugurates an anti-
binarist critique of Kantian metaphysics that was taken up by poststructuralist 
and feminist theory in the late 20th century. This critique informs both Adorno's 
and Derrida's engagement with negative aesthetics. In Adorno's book Aesthetic 
Negativity sublime art (and indeed all art) is the privileged locus of aesthetic 
negativity. In this schema, aesthetic negativity is an effect of a dialectical 
relation between the viewer "and the aesthetic object. Sublime art inaugurates a 
processual relation between oppositions so that, for example, subject/object or 
conceptual/non-conceptual distinctions are disabled. It is this immanent process 
that invites the practicing of negativity as a critique of reason. From this 
perspective, sublime art is a de-subjectifying opportunity to practice negativity. 
Similarly, Lyotard's essay titled The Sublime and the Avante-Garde is a theory 
of the sublime which registers the sublime as an event, via the diagnostic 
question "Is it happening?". This question, like the negativity of Kant's 
'aesthetic ideas', records a moment of indeterminacy as an experience of 
aesthetic negativity that cannot be conceptualised or represented. 
These philosophical theories of the poetic and the sublime variously engage an 
aesthetics of negativity which registers in both philosophy and painting from the 
17th century to the present. The first two chapters of this thesis sketched this 
aesthetics of negativity in philosophy and in painting, in the interests of 
demonstrating that the two signifying processes called poetic ambiguity and 
sublime irresolution invite aesthetic practices of negativity. I have given these 
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signifying processes an identity by drawing on the insights of these philosophers 
of negativity and art historians who identify sublime or poetic effects in 
paintings, and synthesising these insights with an account of sublime or poetic 
experience of paintings. 
With regard to that signifying process called sublime irresolution, Marin's 
account of sublime unrepresentability in painting, Adorno's dialectical account of 
negative aesthetics, and Lyotard's diagnostic of a sublime event, serviced my 
analysis of its de-subjectifying effects in painting. Sublime irresolution from this 
perspective, like poetic ambiguity, registers a processual encounter between the 
painting and the viewer which disaggregates meaning. This failure of meaning 
both invites the practicing of negativity and registers as an aesthetic event, 
available to the diagnostic question 'Is it happening?' The difference however is 
that my engagement with aesthetic negativity, unlike Adorno's and Lyotard's, is 
also oriented toward understanding how paintings deliver such practices of 
negativity. 
In this regard Chapter Two investigated the differing modalities of sublime 
irresolution encountered in Poussin's Landscape with Pyramus and Thisbe, in 
Turner's Seascape with Storm coming on and The Fall of an Avalanche at 
Grisons, and Rothko's Red on Maroon. Each of these paintings delivered 
differing modalities of that signifying process called sublime irresolution. From 
this we might conclude that although sublime irresolution and poetic ambiguity, 
persistently invite the practicing of negativity, these are not immutable or 
universal, instruments of an aesthetics of negativity. Instead we need to see 
them as discursive opportunities, unspeakable in their effects, but in concert 
with other discursive formations also at work in paintings. 
Where the philosophies of Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty, Kant, Nietzsche, Adorno and 
Lyotard variously engage dialectical negativity, Derrida's and Irigaray's are 
informed by deconstruction, a practice at odds with dialectical negative 
aesthetics. The last two chapters register the tensions between these two 
philosophical deconstructive methods and aesthetic practices of negativity. 
Deconstructive negativity, like aesthetic negativity, disrupts meaning. Derrida's 
deconstructive method disrupts boundaries, including the boundary between 
experience and understanding, a boundary which preserves the autonomy of 
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aesthetic negativity. Derrida's deconstructive project thus degrades aesthetic 
autonomy and requires him to construct a boundary in which aesthetic 
negativity is rendered servile to a sovereign and textual and non-aesthetic 
deconstructive practicing of negativity. 
Chapter Three investigated these antagonisms via a reading of Derrida's text 
called Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, where a quasi-poetic style of philosophy is a 
valediction of Nietzsche's style of writing and where Derrida conflates the 
untruth of this style, with a dissimulating and agonistic figure called 'Nietzsche's 
woman'. Here a quasi-poetic and deconstructive style of writing disrupts a 
traditional style of philosophical writing, by infesting it with its negative others: 
the feminine, poetic style, dissimulation and untruth. In this process the reader 
is invited into a textual, non-aesthetic and deconstructive practicing of 
negativity where the boundaries between the feminine and textual disruption 
are collapsed. A quasi-poetic style of doing philosophy, as a compendium of 
these negativities, not only deconstructs a rational and traditional style of 
philosophy, but also disrupts the autonomy of aesthetic experience. 
Likewise, an engagement with Derrida's text The Colossal delivers the reader to 
a deconstructive practicing of negativity through a style of writing that defers 
meaning and disrupts boundaries. In this process a rational style of doing 
philosophy is degraded inasmuch as the binarist assumptions of a Kantian 
sublime are deconstructed. Instead this text figures a deconstructive sublime, 
without boundaries and hierarchies and open to differences 'to come'. Here the 
sublime is a textual practice where understanding is disabled and meaning 
rendered excessive via the figure of the passe-partout. The Colossal is a text in 
which the reader is invited to practice non-aesthetic deconstructive and sublime 
negativity. Derrida's deconstructive sublime thus erodes the boundaries 
between aesthetic experience and understanding and degrades the autonomy of 
sublime aesthetic experience. 
It is against the degradation of the autonomy of aesthetic negativity that this 
study has not only sustained the differences between aesthetic negativity and 
non-aesthetic, or deconstructive negativity, but has insisted that aesthetic 
negativity is the product of a particular kind of experience. From this 
perspective aesthetic experience is the product of a first order encounter 
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between the viewer and the painting where meaning is disaggregated, even if 
as a second order practice we might understand the effects of, and the 
differences between, practices of negativity. The relation between such 
unspeakable aesthetic experience and understanding the implications of that 
experience, is also a dialectical one. The dialectical interpretive method 
employed in this chapter informed my engagement with the painting and visual 
art practices of Glenn Brown and Jeremy Wafer. I argued that the modalities of 
sublime irresolution and poetic ambiguity of these paintings and visual art 
practices register the impact of deconstruction insofar as we can understand 
these practices in terms of deconstructively appropriate supplements. 
In this regard Chapter Three demonstrated how Brown's paintings deconstruct 
modernist assumptions by copying old master paintings, but deliver these 
copies as new postmodern interventions, via a style of painting which not only 
playfully dissembles, but which positions the viewer on a sublime and 
irresolvable threshold between mastery and abjection. This modality of sublime 
irresolution is comparable to Derrida's figure called 'Nietzsche's woman', yet 
Brown's paintings register as aesthetic experience. 
Jeremy Wafer's visual art practice also engages those signifying processes 
called poetic ambiguity and sublime irresolution, via a modality of 
sublime/poetic inbetweeness, that resembles Derrida's master trope called the 
passe-partout. Wafer's syncretic practice blurs the boundaries between 
sculpture, painting and photography, negotiates the differences between African 
and Western aesthetic traditions, invites aesthetic experience and 
deconstructive understanding, even as it delivers a critique of traditional 
sublime and colonial aesthetics. This post colonial 'sublime poetics of the 
inbetween', engages an aesthetics of negativity, but one marked by 
deconstructive assumptions. 
Chapter Four investigated how Irigaray's text Speaking of Immemorial Waters 
mobilizes a poetics of the sublime as the practicing of negativity via an 
amorous, feminine and poetic style of writing that deconstructs the phallocentric 
assumptions of Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The difference between 
this and Derrida's sublime practicing of negativity, is that Irigaray is interested 
in positivising the negativity of the feminine in the interests of a feminist 
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politics, whereas Derrida's 'sublime poetics of the inbetween' (the passe-
partout) engages the textual negativities of deconstructive undecidability. 
It is this conflation of aesthetic negativity with textual and deconstructive 
negativity and a feminist politics of negativity, which characterises that 
discourse called ecriture feminine, that this chapter takes issue with. The claim 
being that the practicing of negativity inaugurated by the operations of poetic 
ambiguity and sublime irresolution are gender neutral. Like deconstructive 
texts, these signifying processes invite the practicing of negativity, but do so by 
sustaining the boundary between aesthetic experience and understanding. 
Deconstructive ecriture feminine refuses such dialectical distinctions and instead 
disrupts the boundaries between experience and understanding, and between 
the feminine and textual deconstruction, in the service of a feminist politics. 
Chapter Four demonstrated how the painting practices of Rosa Lee and Therese 
Oulton register the impact of ecriture feminine, but without losing their 
aesthetic specificity. Lee's paintings register a deconstructive supplement 
insofar as they deconstruct the boundaries between feminine craft and high art. 
Oulton's paintings deconstruct phallocentric assumptions embedded in the 
traditions of western painting. As in Lee's paintings, these deconstructions of 
phallocentric assumptions are fully understood. Furthermore, in both these 
painting practices, the modalities of sublime irresolution deployed in these 
paintings register a feminine sublime. However, this thesis has made the case 
that understanding the feminine, political and deconstructive significance of 
these paintings is not identical to the aesthetic specific practicing of negativity 
that paintings by Lee and Oulton also invite. This insight enables this chapter to 
critique the deconstructive assumptions of ecriture feminine which conflate a 
politics of the feminine with textual and aesthetic practices of negativity. 
This thesis has thus provided a vocabulary for identifying, and to some extent 
understanding, negativity in painting from the perspective of the viewer. Being 
a joint theory/practice research project, I will conclude this conclusion by giving 
an account of how this vocabulary and these insights impact on my painting 
practice. 
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6. 3. Mobilising negativity in painting. 
The following discussion is a) a contextualisation of my current practice, b) an 
account of how my paintings, developed during this research project, engage 
practices of negativity and, c) a brief consideration of their feminist politics. 
a) Where the paintings titled Peaceful, Powerful, African, for Women 1989 
(Figure 28) (70 x 110 cms.) and Another Dance, On the Other Side 1994 
(Figure 29) (135 x195 cms.) position the viewer on the outside, looking into a 
sublime landscape or labyrinthine field! the paintings titled Plunge 1999 (Figure 
30) (120 x 190 cms.) and No Void 1998 (Figure 31) (90 x 170 cms.) are an 
entry into a mobile interior which is recognisable as both a landscape and an 
infinitely proliferating field, or sublime matrix. My engagement with a sublime 
matrix is thus a long standing one, but one foregrounded after my (provisional) 
departure from South Africa and entry into Britain, at the beginning of 1996. 
This departure marked my disengagement with a discourse of post colonialism, 
one pre-occupied with the crisis of the end of apartheid in South Africa, as 
exemplified in the painting titled Progress and Democracy 1993 (Figure 32) (65 
x 85 cms.). Embarking on this doctoral study in 2001, was an attempt to 
understand what the implications of this new type of sublime painting were. 
b) The two paintings titled In and Out 2001 (Figure 33) (135 x 188 cms.) and 
Becoming Excessive 2003 (Figure 34) (130 x 150 cms.) engage two differing 
moments of a sublime matrix/interior landscape. Sublime meaning in In and 
Out is activated between two registers: a purple/maroon open and vertical slit is 
encased by a (vibrating) mound, which in turn is flattened by two mysterious 
horizontal 'veils' at the top and the bottom of the painting. The viewer's gaze 
thus hovers irresolvably between a vertical, embodied and pulsating opening 
and a wider horizontal aperture that encompasses and flattens the first slit. 
Here an embodied perforation becomes a threshold into a more immense, 
mysterious sublime matrix. In the painting titled Becoming Excessive the viewer 
encounters a system of obsessive marks, a register of a hot mobile energy 
which burrows inward into one, and then into two tunnels. Here sublime 
meaning is activated by the viewer's eye shifting from event to event even as it 
struggles to collect this multiplicity into a whole. Such visual mobility and 
irresolution both disables/invites cognition. 
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Figure 28: Lola Frost. Peaceful, Powerful, African, for Women. 1989 
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Figure 29: Lola Frost. Another Dance, On the Other Side. 1994 
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Figure 30: Lola Frost. Plunge. 1999 
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Figure 31: Lola Frost. No Void. 1998 
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Figure 32: Lola Frost. Progress and Democracy_ 1993 
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Figure 33: Lola Frost. In and Out. 2001 
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Figure 34: Lola Frost. Becoming Excessive. 2003 
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On the Edge 2002 (Figure 35) (700 x 200 cms.) is an enormous painting and 
consists of three panels. If Becoming Excessive is marked by vitality, On the 
Edge struggles against entropy. Although this painting is a version of the terrific 
sublime as the representation of imploding forces, an absorbing and galactic 
void, and a double 'electric' crackle, it also struggles with the possibility that the 
infinite totality of marks that constitute these forms, might be consumed into an 
obsessive layering of paint, relentlessly, and all consumingly, coloured magenta 
and purple. Here differences of tone are placed under pressure by the sameness 
of saturated colour, applied through small and layered brush strokes and latex 
resist layers. To paint in this way was to abandon myself to the failure and 
presentation of spatial representation, via chance configurations. It was a battle 
of a painting, yet one which fuelled my desire to place spatial representation (a 
visual code informed by the relationships between colour, tone and size of 
marks) under pressure through a process informed by drives, chance, 
improvisation, play, and more. It is these kinds of processes, I contend, at work 
in all the works discussed above, that involves a practicing of negativity. This is 
a sublime negativity, repetitive, excessive, not available to description or clear 
understanding, but to aesthetic experience and processual enactment. 
The eight small works presented for examination of this doctoral study are the 
best articulations of this system of working to date. The size of these paintings 
enabled me to bring.a clarity and a richness to the mark making that I had 
struggled with in the bigger works. Each painting begins with a photograph, or 
collaged photograph, of trees or bushes in particular conditions of light, which 
determines the format, composition and spatial relationships of the painting. 
These fixtures exist as a set of restraints, from within, and against which, each 
painting is performed. Each painting is a collection of small painterly 'events', 
whose totality registers as the representation of a credible, and alternative, 
space, even as this space is infused with mobile energy and excess. 
For example Inbetween 2004 (Figure 36) (25 x 78 cms.) was generated by the 
interplay between the negative imprint left when chance marks of latex resists, 
were overpainted with transparent colour, so that an image of something like a 
landscape emerged. This space consists of two zones: a sparkling and 
expansive one on the right and a tender and immersive one on the left. These 
zones are two moments in a delicate, ever mutating yellowish/orange field, 
166 
Figure 35: Lola Frost. On the Edge. 2002 
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Figure 36: Lola Frost. Inbetween. 2004 
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which pulses with a mobile energy. The viewer's eye shifts from event to event, 
from whole to part, immersed in sublime excess. Like Rosa Lee's paintings this 
sublimity is less of the 'awesome cut', but rather of the 'too much'. 
Comprehension fails because meaning flutters, breaks up, and expands. 
Similarly the paintings titled Shift 2007 (Figure 37) (26 x 41 cms.), Twist 2004 
(Figure 38) (31 x 66cms.), and Spasm 2007 (Figure 39) (31 x 36 cms.) are 
fragments of a mobile matrix, even as each of these paintings gather together 
energies that shift, twist or convulse. In each of these paintings meaning 
gathers together, insofar as we can identify these active 'fields' as landscapes, 
only to threaten to fall apart into an almost meaningless collection of marks. 
If the four paintings discussed above operate within relatively coherent 
chromatic ranges (yellow, orange, red), Overflows 2007 (Figure 40) (47 x 87 
cms.), Intersections 2007 (Figure 41) (35 x 65 cms.) and Condensations 2007 
(Figure 42) (47 x 60 cms.) are an effect of multiple colours working in and 
against one another. In Overflows the 'fabric' of this field, organised as an 
encircling container, consists of flickering planes of yellows, pinks, mauves and 
reds, punctuated, indeed perforated, by flashes of phthalo turquoise. These 
differences of colour destabilise the predictable representation space, so that it 
becomes a space that shimmers and moves. Likewise in Intersections, 
differences in colour become a register of an energy that disperses and morphs 
itself throughout the painting. Here the muscular and darker green/mauves 
contain the energetic explosions of warm light at the centre. Condensations by 
contrast is a journey into the minuscule, where fractals of light and colour 
explode a space, which seen from a distance seems solid and unified. 
Borderline 2007 (Figure 43) ( 35 x 72 cms.), like all the paintings referred to 
above, consists of a mobile, tonally and chromatically saturated field which 
adjoins another void, figured as light beyond this infinitely proliferating matrix. 
This painting thus registers two tropes of the sublime: a sublime matrix figured 
throughout my current practice, and a more traditional sublime void as glowing 
light, found for example in sublime paintings by C.O. Friedrich. To approach this 
painting from this interpretive perspective allows us to understand, and 
differentiate between, two typologies of the sublime. This concluding discussion 
has however been an attempt to demonstrate how my painting practice is 
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Figure 37: Lola Frost. Shift. 2007 
170 
Figure 38: Lola Frost. Twist. 2007 
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Figure 39: Lola Frost. Spasm. 2007 
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Figure 40: Lola Frost. Overflows. 2007 
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Figure 41: Lola Frost. Intersections. 2007 
-------
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Figure 42: Lola Frost. Condensations. 2007 
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Figure 43: Lola Frost. Borderline. 2007 
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informed by aesthetic predicaments and practices of negativity, not approached 
through categories or types, but as an effect of the failure of meaning. 
I will conclude this section with an imprecise resume of what this process 
entails. My current painting practice may be characterised as the articulation of 
a sublime matrix, or an 'otherworldly' space, where repetitive and excessive 
marks register a pervasive, drive-driven energy. It is also practice which 
mobilises the differences between oppositions, for example where meaning 
coheres and simultaneously threatens to fail, or where space is both static and 
mobile, or where the clash of colours threatens the coherence of tonal 
perspective. It is oppositions like these, which seem to activate the peculiarities 
of aesthetic negativities, whose desubjectifying effects are perhaps best 
identified through the question 'Is it happening?'. Each painting mobilises this 
possibility in its own way, and undoubtedly, each viewer experiences these 
predicaments from the perspective of his or her aesthetic competences, 
prejudices and discursive understanding. My point being however, that the 
aesthetic negativity of these paintings registers as a particular kind event that 
does not secure resolvable, unambiguous or categorical understanding. 
c) We are however, able to bring categories of understanding to aesthetic 
experience, via the dialectical manoeuvre defended through out this study. Like 
Lee's and Oulton's paintings discussed above, my paintings are also an 
engagement with what is called the feminine sublime. The aesthetic effects of 
these paintings which erode/sustain meaning, can be understood as a register 
of a particular modality of sublime experience, where differences are linked up 
as infinite variations of the same. The infinitely proliferating sublime matrix, that 
is the foundational trope of this practice, thus sets the scene for an infinitely 
mobile and immersive set of relations, without borders. Like Irigaray's 
Immemorial Waters, such an immersive and relational 1 practice could also be 
understood as the articulation of a feminine imaginary, where the landscape as 
sublime matrix, becomes a metaphor for vibrating and enfleshed body parts, 
and where small quivering, repetitive brushmarks are registers of obsessive 
feminine desire. 
IBoth Christine Battersby in her book The Phenomenal Woman, and Andrea Duncan in her chapter titled This 
phenomenal ecriture in the book The Feminine Case, associate the feminine with phenomenal relationality, 
informed by an enfleshed metaphysics and the embodied link between mothers and daughters. 
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My paintings are thus also political. They refigure sublime experience from a 
particular discursive perspective, one which for example, challenges the sublime 
effects of C.D. Friedrich's void, where the viewer, via the Ruckenfigur, remains 
at a safe distance from threatening nothingness. The (feminine) immersiveness 
of my paintings is different to Rothko's immersive sublime fields for my practice 
is not marked by stasis. Instead, the infinitely proliferating and mobile matrix 
that my paintings mobilise, like Turner's sublime paintings, suggests an infinity 
that is always becoming and always excessive. 
This is a significant politics, but from my perspective as a painter, it is only the 
beginning of painting. The valuable, difficult and interesting feature of painting 
is that it offers a process through which I am able to practice negativity. This 
research project has been an attempt to articulate that insight, both in my 
painting practice and in the written thesis. The latter has provided a vocabulary 
and a context for understanding what practices of negativity entail, whilst my 
painting is the delivery of aesthetic practices of negativity. This research has 
thus revealed a practice embedded in a politics of the feminine, but one which 
also exceeds such a politics, insofar as it registers an aesthetics of negativity 
not predicated on resolvable or unambiguous understanding. Like 
deconstruction, this is a practice that exceeds: it make demands on the viewer 
that relate to, but which are not contained by, the feminist or deconstructive 
understandings we bring to it. 
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